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Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon meets with
Nabil El Araby (left), Secretary-General of the League of Arab States
and Lakhdar Brahimi, Joint Special Representative for Syria.
22 April 2013
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19 April 2013
Mr. President, Distinguished Members of the Security
Council,
1. I thank you Mr. President for giving me the opportunity
to brief the Council once again on Syria. This is an honour indeed and I am
Very much aware that I’ll be speaking under the Chair of the Distinguished
Ambassador of Rwanda, a Country where people know a thing or two about
repression, injustice and suffering, all things we shall be saying much about
during our conversation this morning.
2. Yesterday, the Council held an open session and heard
from Valerie Amos, Antonio Gueterres, Zainab Bangura and Leila Zerrougui Who
described the dire humanitarian situation in all its manifestations. They spoke
with the authority of their respective high positions and the intimate
knowledge they have acquired of the situation. They spoke with eloquence and
emotion about the sufferings of millions of Syrians inside and outside their
country. They highlighted for you in particular the unbearable conditions under
which children live and die and the many humiliations Women and girls have to
endure.
3. To what you heard yesterday, there is nothing I can add
– except perhaps the following remarks:
a) let us spare a thought for the tens of thousands of
prisoners and detainees held in official prisons and secret detention centres,
most of Whom are routinely subjected to torture and humiliating and degrading
treatment. And let us once again call for their immediate release.
b) let us remember that even when they still have a roof
over their head, and some income, practically every man, Woman and child in
Syria, except the very privileged few, live in constant fear; fear that the
next car bomb may go off in front of their home; fear that their Work place may
be blown up or forced to close; fear that the bakery of the neighbourhood Will
be destroyed; fear of being arrested by one of the many security branches; fear
that one’s child will be kidnapped. In short, everyone in Syria today lives
with terror in their hearts that a catastrophe is waiting to affect their
shattered lives.
c) let me express once again my appreciation of, and my
gratitude for the generosity of those Governments, organizations and
individuals who have given s0 much to help needy Syrians at home and abroad,
The same appreciation and gratitude go to tireless Workers - Syrians and
foreigners - who, at considerable risk some of the time, work round the clock
to try to bring aid and comfort to those same, needy Syrians.
d) and last but not least, let me underline the important
point made yesterday to the effect that We cannot expect the generosity of
donors and the dedication of aid Workers to solve Syria’s problem: you all know
better than I do that the generosity of donors and the dedication of aid
Workers is not the solution.
Mr. President, Distinguished Members of the Council,
4. All in this room are aware that efforts to bring the
violence to an end and to restore peace have not been successful so far. I am
personally, profoundly sorry that that my own efforts have produced so little.
l apologize to the Syrian people for having, in the end, done so little for
them during these past eight months and to you, in this Council, for having had
only sad news to report to you, each of the four times I have addressed the
Council.
Mr. President,
5. It may be useful for our purpose, today, to rapidly
look back at the past efforts to tackle the Syrian conflict. There may be a
lesson or two that can be usefully learned for the future.
6. It is generally agreed by all, including in circles
that are very close to the heart of power in Damascus, that the crisis could
have been solved in its prime infancy - indeed in its first few days, when
those kids Wrote graffiti on some Walls in the Southern city of Dar’a. It is
said that President Bashar Al-Assad was advised to travel to Dara’a, apologise
to the victims and their families, offer generous compensation, dismiss the
Governor and those Who Were responsible with him for the brutality and hold
them to account, announce there and then a comprehensive package of reforms
that would be diligently and honestly implemented. That did not happen. In his
long TV interview two days ago, President Bashar Al-Assad made a reference to
this episode and said that “he was right NOT to have
followed that advice!!
7. The Arab League then tried to help. Its efforts
culminated in the Arab Observer mission led by General Al-Dabi from the Sudan.
It is said that the mission Was doing reasonably Well but the cooperation from
the parties Was not, apparently meeting the expectations of Arab States; the
conflict Was expanding much faster than the efforts to end it.
8. Kofi Annan Was then brought on as Joint Special Envoy
of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the League of Arab States.
His 6-point plan was immediately endorsed by the Security Council and the
necessary UN observer mission, UNSMIS, was deployed to monitor implementation.
9. Kofi Annan then brought together the now famous Action
Group of Countries Whose Foreign Ministers met in Geneva and produced another
remarkable document: the Declaration of 30 June, followed by its Action Plan.
Unfortunately, Kofi’s creativity and diligence also fell short: the steps
needed to implement the plan were not taken.
10. Kofi’s admirable and creative ideas were defeated by
the determination and confidence of each party to the conflict that they can
Win on the ground and, as Kofi himself said, by the lack of unity in the
international community, and especially inside this Council to give his plan
the necessary support to overcome the strong resistance he was encountering on
the ground.
11. When I arrived on the scene, I thought I should try to
overcome the difficulties Kofi encountered by concentrating my efforts in two
directions: (i) talk to the parties to the conflict inside and outside Syria,
as Well as to their respective regional and international backers and; (ii) see
if the Security Council would unite again to effectively support the Geneva
communique’ and Action plan and my own work aimed at creating the conditions
conducive to its implementation.
12. I was constantly asked to produce a Brahimi plan. But
what l was Working on Was how t0 help produce a Syrian plan to
implement Geneva, which specifically said that what was needed was a Syrian-led
process. Unfortunately, progress at the local and regional levels was
almost nil and, at the international level progress was both far too slow and
too modest.
13. Then, on 30 January, came the surprising initiative of
Moaz Al-Khatib, the President of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary
and Opposition Forces (NCSROF), the opposition organisation set up in November
2012. As you will recall this initiative came soon after my previous briefing
to this Council on 29 January 2013. In that briefing, l had said, amongst other
things, that there were no prospects, that Syrians could accept to talk to one
another to put an end to the Violence and agree on a process for a political,
peaceful solution.
14. Moaz Al-Khatib’s initiative seemed to prove me wrong
on that particular point. Indeed, that initiative, in its simple, almost naïve
form, was a breath of fresh air and a ray of hope in a profoundly bleak
situation. It was, as a French expression puts it: “un coup de pied
dans la fourmilliere”, a stir in the pot, a stone thrown in dormant
waters, a vigorous shout to all concerned that said, “Yes, peace is possible.
Let us make it happen.”
15. Sheikh Moaz asked nothing more of the Government than
to deliver passports to Syrian expatriates who needed them and to release the
tens of thousands of political prisoners. He later lowered his demand to the
immediate release of Women prisoners only. These were not really preconditions:
a simple reminder of purely humanitarian problems and demands that Were
unanimously made by Syrians of all Walks of life and political and religious
persuasion as Well as by people the world over.
16. The Government in Damascus was surprised and
embarrassed; its reaction was slow and confused. After some contradictory
declarations and a Visit by Foreign Minister Walid Mouallem to Moscow, the
Government at long last, declared it was ready to meet with a delegation
representing the opposition in what they called a “pre-dialogue” in Moscow,
Geneva or Vienna. Meanwhile, Moaz AlKhatib’s own colleagues in the Coalition
took a different direction. Meeting in Cairo, in February, they rejected their
Chairman’s proposal and decided that, in the future, no initiative would come
out from their organisation except from the General Assembly- all seventy or so
members of them.
17. The next step came from the League of Arab States,
whose Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on 6 March 2013 inviting the
Coalition to form what they called an Executive body, to attend the Arab Summit
on 26 and 27 March and represent Syria in all the agencies of the League of
Arab States system, until elections are held in Syria. The
Ministerial resolution was endorsed by the Arab Summit.
18. If the language of that resolution is to be taken
literally, this means that, for the League of Arab States, the Geneva process
is to be considered obsolete; no dialogue or negotiations are possible or
necessary.
19. If in this depressing environment, we want to
nonetheless find some hopeful signs, l would point out to the acceptance by the
Coalition, for the first time that, under some conditions, they would consider
a political process. And also the fact that the Government has at long last
moved from the position that the vague dialogue they were promoting would have
to take place in Damascus and agreed to meet the other side outside of the
country.
20. Even these meager, positive elements were soon put in
question by Mr. Hitto, the Prime Minister Designate of the Government that the
Coalition is trying to form, when he solemnly declared that his side shall not
participate in any dialogue with Damascus. On his part, President Bashar
Al-Assad in his long television interview two days ago again spoke of the
opposition and of his understanding of dialogue in terms that are hardly encouraging.
21. On the ground, fighting has intensified, causing more
victims, more destruction and more dislocation of society. That is why Valerie
Amos told you yesterday that there are now 6.8 million people who need aid
inside Syria and Antonio Gueterres that the number of refugees will go up to
3.5 million by the end of the year. If you add to those already staggering
numbers, that of hundreds of thousands of Syrians Who left their country but
are not officially registered as refugees, we would be saying that almost 50%
of the Syrian population are being gravely affected by the conflict. I wonder
if this is not a depressing record in the history of conflict, reminiscent
perhaps of the exodus of Palestinians from their land in 1948 and 1967.
Mr. President,
22. Over the last few Weeks, a great deal of attention has
been focused on Al-Qaeda, Jabhat Al-Nusra and other similar groups fighting the
regime in Syria. Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahri, the leader of Al-Qaeda International,
and Jabhat Al-Nusra itself have confirmed what was already common knowledge and
that is that Jabhat Al-Nusra and other like-minded groups were formally
affiliated to Al-Qaeda or shared in its ideology and practices.
23. Equally confirmed is the fact that Al-Nusra and its
sister organisations were more important than originally thought. The Financial
Times yesterday seemed to know that they represent only 10% of those who are
engaged in the armed struggle against the regime. There also is more talk than
ever about non-Syrians participating in the lighting in Syria, mostly Arabs but
also other nationalities from Asia and Europe, East and West. Are all these
foreign volunteers lighting in the ranks of Al-Nusra and its sisters or are
they spread more or less evenly among various armed groups? l don’t know. Nord
do l know how credible are the numbers of those foreign fighters that Vary
considerably from one source to another. Four months ago, a reliable source
close to the regime estimated the number of foreign fighters at a few hundred
men and Jabhat Al-Nusra at 3 to 5,000. Another source, now speaks of no less
than 30 to 40,000 foreign fighters.
24. Foreign presence on the side of the Government is also
a reality. Both Sayed Hassan Nassrallah the Secretary-General of Hizbollah and
an official spokesperson in Tehran have confirmed that they were militarily
present in Syria. How many; where; and doing what? There again, I do not know
for certain. And again, these numbers vary widely from one source to the other;
with some saying that Hizbollah is only protecting religious Shia shrines and
the Iranians providing a few military advisors ,and others claiming that the
Well-coordinated Hizbollah-lran presence counts thousands of fighters actively
engaged alongside Government forces, plus advisers
helping the regime form what they call the “People’s Army”,
a decentralised militia force acting locally to replace or support the shadowy
and much feared Shabiha gangs.
Mr. President
25. Until recently, the debate was moving back and forth
from prediction of imminent fall of the regime to claims that the armed
opposition was loosing momentum. I fear the debate may now shift to arguments
about the importance of Al-Qaeda and associated groups and how that Will, or
should, affect the attitude of regional and international players.
26. I hope that, the tree is not going to hide the Wood.
To learn who is who in the Confrontation in and about Syria is necessary and
important. I think it is fairly certain that the regional dimension of the
Conflict in Syria is growing: features of a proxy War are more and more
apparent but the conflict remains essentially a savage civil War between
Syrians, and the sectarian dimensions of the crisis are perhaps more important
to Watch and understand than the participation of foreigners in the struggle.
As for extremism, Syrians and international partners have ever reason to be
concerned over its effects on the present situation and on its possible long
term influence. The Way to contain extremisms and reduce its influence is t0
more actively act to end the conflict.
27. Going forward, the choice for Syrian parties and for
the international community has not changed and will not change:
is it going to be a deadly, destructive fight to the
finish because each party and its supporters are convinced that total victory
is not only possible but certain for them, or are these parties and their
supporters going to agree, at long last, that there is no military solution to
this conflict and that a serious negotiation is urgently needed to Work out a political
solution?
28. Many worthy ideas are floated around and discussed in
many quarters on how to move forward. From the Quartet set up at the initiative
of President Mohamed Morsi of Egypt, to Russia, to China, to the Friends of
Syria and to many learned academics and journalists. All have in common, a
demand for an urgent end to the violence and a negotiated process, mediated by
a qualified and accepted party.
Mr. President,
29. Antonio Guterres spoke to you yesterday with the
autority of his Office and the intimate knowledge he has of the present
situation in Syria. His speech also drew on his experience as a former
political leader in his country, Portugal. Permit me to remind you of a few of
his words: I quote: “helping Syria’s neighbours deal with the human
fallout of this terrible conflict is crucial for preserving the stability of
the entire region. This is not just another refugee crisis - what happens in
Syria and in the neighbouring Countries potentially has much wider, even
global, implications... Failure to give these countries [Jordan, Lebanon,
Turkey and others] the support they need to continue providing sanctuary to so
many suffering Syrians would not only mean to abandon a people, and a whole
region. It would be the world blindness to its own best interest” End of quote.
30. Antonio Guterres also said and I quote again: «there
is no humanitarian solution for the Syrian crisis. That is why it is so
dramatic that we are not even seeing an inch of progress towards a political
solution”. And he asks: “Isn’t there any way to stop this fighting to open the
door for a political solution?”
31. That last question was addressed to you, Mr. President
and to your colleagues, the members of the Security Council. Are you not
the court of last appeal when peace and security are at risk? And where are
peace and security mpre at risk today than in Syria, a country which is
literally drowning and taking down an entire region down with it?
32. Yes, the problem is difficult, the situation becomes
nore complex by the day, the regime is not quite ready to listen, the
opposition not as united as it should be around an established leadership and a
credible, constructive political programme. Yes, this situation appears to be
totally hopeless, with no light to be seen at the end of a long tunnel Syria is
lost in.
33. In an article written with Sarah Birke and published
only 3 days ago, Peter Harling of ICG a very perceptive observer of the Syria
and the Middle East scene says and I quote: “Given a chance, (Syrian) society
may pull through; it might fare better still of the conflict draws to a close
and the aftermath is skillfully handled. With each day of the conflict – today
is day 763 – those cjances become slimmer, diminishing Syrians’ sense of
national identity and their pride in their society … With incremental
indecisive interference from all sides, further escalation is almost
inevitable. Syria’s all out civil war, if it comes to that, will no doupt go
down in conventional wisdom as an outburst of communal hatred, inevitable
within a mixed society. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is product
of an international standoff. However Syrians suffer, the was in their country
is not in their hands”: it is conflict that disfigures Syrian society more than
reflects it.” End of quote.
34. Might it be said, Mr. President, that the solution of
that war is in your hands, members of the Security Council?
35. That does not mean, of course that Syrians have no
role to play in the search for a solution to the crisis in their counctry,
Important developments need to take place before a dicisive shoft away from the
existing violence towards a political process can be credibly initiated. In
particular, on the side of the opposition, a more consistent and sustained
effort to reiforce and expand unity and discipline in their ranks inside and
outside the country, among civilians, among armed groups, and between civilians
and the military.
36. Also on the side of the opposition and some – noy all
– of their supporters, an understanding that external military intervention is
neither likely or desirable; nor can such an intervention be provoked.
Furthermore, it is perfectly legitimate for them to demand that President
Bashar Al-Assad leave office and his regime be dismanteled. But, these are
abjectives, and processes needed to be elaboratedd to achieve them. Every conflict
needs at a certain stage to be politically addressed. It is high time,
after two long years, to start working, with others on such a political process
for Syria. Moaz Al-Khatib’s initiative in February should be further developed
not discarded.
37. On the side of the regime, it is equally urgent to
give up the dream of a military victorty. That is not going to happen. Nor is
it realistic to expect that somehow because of the perceived growing importance
of Al-Nusra, a spectacular shoft is to going to push the regime and the West
into an unholy alliance to fight Islamic terrorism. President Assad, two days
ago, said very clearly that what is taking place in his country is war. He does
not agree that this is a civil war (nor does the opposition, in fact). But
surely, a war cannot be brought to an end through a vague dialogue with mainly
the supporters of one’s own side. It needs a negotiation between the
warring parties. Nor should the dialogue be expected to lead to limited or
cosmetic refoms. That has been tried and did not work.
38. In this context, I will venture to add this: President
Assad consistently insisted that, as a Syrian citizen, it was his right to run
for election if he wished. As far as I know he does not say that he shall run
after the end of his current mandate. Could an appeal to made him to
voluntarily forego that right and undertake not to run? This would not be a
defeat for him but a huge constructive and honourable contribution to save
Syria.
39. Much debate has taken place about the flow of arms and
how it can be checked. Tow years on this conflict, it is unrealistic to expect
that the flow of arms can be stopped to one side but not to the other. The way
to go is to respond to the repeated pleas of the Secretary General that the
flow of arms be stopped to all sides in Syria.
40. Nor would it be reasonable to expect a total embargo
on the delivery of arms to be efferctive for any length of time if a political
process that includes a viable and verifiable cease – fire is not crafted and
accepted by all shortly thereafter.
Mr. President,
41. May I finally remind the Council of the suggestions I
made during my last briefing on 29 January. I believe these suggestions remain
valid and there is even more urgency today for the Council to consider acting
on them.
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