De-Mistura's Proposal for Syria: Syrian Working Groups

 Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria. UN Photo - May 2015

STAFFAN DE MISTURA - SPECIAL ENVOY FOR SYRIA

BRIEFING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE SITUATION IN SYRIA

29 July 2015

Thank you Mr Secretary-General for your strong and supportive introduction to this debate,

Your Excellency Foreign Minister McCully, Mr. President, Members of the Security Council,

1.  It is precisely the immensity of the human suffering as just described by the Secretary-General and yesterday by our colleague USG O'Brien that commands us to seek out even the remotest possibility for a political solution, even if, and we heard it, sadly the logic of assuming a military victory by anyone, which is impossible, continues. And barrel bombs and other indiscriminate weapons continue to kill Syrian civilians.  

2.  On 5 May, based on instructions from the Secretary-General, we unrolled the Geneva Consultations.  It’s a new form of avoiding getting cornered in a conference which then gets us straight-jacketed, it is a set of structured separate discussions with Syrian and non-Syrian players aimed at "stress testing" any willingness, if there is any, of narrowing the gaps in interpretation of the principles contained in the Geneva Communiqué, which is still, let’s be frank, the internationally only recognized framework for a settlement, even if still ambiguous in some parts.   To-date Consultations with over 200 different individuals, actually 216, -Syrians and non-Syrians- in Geneva and in capitals, reveal a generally shared sense of urgency given especially the recent gains by Daesh and al-Nusra Front, the talk of some de facto fragmentation, radicalization and sectarianism. There is thus growing reference to the need for a managed, phased, gradual controlled transition, to avoid a repeat of what no one in this Council would like to se, the problems we have had in Libya and in Iraq. 

3. Consultations too have reaffirmed that most Syrians and international actors agree on what Syria should look like, and the relevance of the principles and content of the Geneva Communique.  It was three years ago, and it is still valid.  Syrians overall emphasize their own vision for a united, sovereign, independent -they’re very proud people-, non-sectarian, multi-confessional, all-inclusive state with territorial integrity, preserved but reformed state institutions, such as the Ministries -as we have seen in Iraq that was the biggest problem we faced when suddenly many institutions disappeared in one moment of the change-, including the political, security and judiciary sectors led by those who can inspire public confidence and trust. 

4. Yet, there is disagreement -Mr Secretary-General said it very clearly- on how to get there much based on the different narratives, one as to the root causes of the conflict and emerging priorities. The fear of black flags over Damascus is driving many to consider reassessing their own earlier positions. Yet, many continue to consider also that the conflict continues to be about the Arab Spring calls for a change.  There is a firm recognition that counter-terrorism is now definitely a priority. However, many are also wondering -both Syrians and member states- that n order to assert that type of counter-terrorism, there is a need for a credible new government with whom they can partner in that effort. 

Mr. President, 

5. While common ground exists, the question over the devolution of executive authority to a transitional body -let’s be honest with ourselves- remains the most polarizing element of the Communique. For some, this means that the TGB -transitional governing body- is an instrument to hand over power. Some political and armed opposition groups generally reject any notion of power-sharing with the current government in Damascus. The Syrian government has accepted in theory to discuss the TGB at the Geneva II Conference but continues to reject the concept as unconstitutional.

6. It is still broadly understood that, whatever the solution, it should ensure the "meaningfulness and irreversibility of the transition" and a widely acceptable process, without causing an abrupt jolt, shock, trauma, catastrophe, in the system in Syria - we cannot afford that. And that should also include assurances for Syrian communities -and there are many minorities who have been under threat- and regional stakeholders and guarantees that the Syrian people are part of the decision-making - including, let me stress it, especially women.  We met remarkable Syrian women in our Geneva Consultations who haver been giving us often the most powerful concept and analysis we have heard.  

Mr. President, 

7. Sadly there is still no consensus on the way forward on the Communique or yet a formalized even negotiation - we would not be discussing it here otherwise, we would be working on the negotiation. At the same time, given the deepening tragedy- the UN is obliged -and all of us are- to keep the issue alive, to not leave any stone unturned, also attuned to ongoing serious conversations and discussions which are taking place, and we are hearing them, around the region and elsewhere, which may require perhaps more time, and may be linked with developments that the Secretary-General just referred to.  

8.        We have thus strived to develop recommendations, guided by the views and analysis shared with us during the Consultations.  This is the first time by the way that the Syrian people have been given a chance, they told us, to be deeply and intensely consulted - after all we always say this is a Syrian-led , Syrian-involved process, well this was the opportunity.  Our recommendations are predicated on the need for a regional and international consensus - and sustained engagement- on a way forward. 

Mr. President 

9. In responding to the Secretary-General's instruction therefore that we should try to "operationalise the Geneva Communique", together with my team we have consulted widely inside and around; and verified if there was critical mass for common action, and ultimately tried to visualize, from a technical point of view, the implementation of the Geneva Communique, in all its aspects, including the TGB. And we have come up with a detailed formula for the phased implementation of the Geneva Communique, so there is no alibi in case there was -and there will be- a political consensus, including on the TGB, which could assume the functions of a government, a definition of mutual consent, which was in the Geneva Communiqué, the functioning of a military council and Syrian National Congress for national dialogue and constitutional reform, combined with confidence-building measures. 

10. Ours is a straightforward interpretation formula for the implementation of the Communique. Regretfully, the Consultations also confirmed that achieving an agreement on this is difficult in the current Syrian context. In fact, many urged us not convene a Geneva III conference yet, because we are not yet there.  

11.  But, we cannot let the situation in Syria continue to drift. And that’s why based on the appeal and the urge of the Secretary-General, we need to move in a direction where Syrians come together to stop the violence and set out an irreversible path towards a genuine political transition. Which leads us to our main Recommendation. 

12. The Geneva Consultations got Syrians to again start talking to each other, sometimes indirectly through us, but they did. What I am today proposing is actually a deepening, getting much deeper, of those issues in the Geneva Communiqué which are not so controversial, and analyzing those that can be controversial. I now intend to invite therefore Syrians to parallel, simultaneous, thematic discussions through intra-Syrian working groups addressing the key aspects of the Geneva Communique, as identified by them in the first phase of the Consultations:

• Safety and Protection for All: which means including ending sieges, how to do so, ensuring medical access and releasing detainees;
• Political and Constitutional Issues: including the essential principles, transitional governing body and elections;  
• Military and Security Issues: including combatting terrorism in an effective inclusive way, cease-fires, and integration;
• Public Institutions, Reconstruction and Development: which means we should to try to avoid as we said what happened in Iraq and elsewhere where suddenly institutions disappeared and the country got into a major difficulty.  Those institutions should continue to deliver public services under a top leadership acceptable to all, and acting in accordance with principles of good government and human rights.

13. These working groups will start generating movement, we believe, towards a Syrian-owned Framework Document on the implementation of the Geneva Communique. These efforts can build on the very useful meetings that took place in Moscow, in Cairo, in Paris, and even in Astana recently and many track II initiatives. This effort should be led by a Steering committee and the Framework Document will also provide for a transitional governing body, procedures for a national dialogue, and so on. Such an international initiative will require the support of a Contact Group, and we will get there at the right time.

14. In all of the above I seek this Council's support, as the Secretary-General has said, and stand ready to regularly report to you and to the Secretary-General, on progress or challenges, which we will definitively have.

Mr Secretary-General, Mr. President, Members of the Security Council,

15. The Consultations have gone some way towards identifying existing common ground. They also still hold the promise that a set of formal negotiations could convene after preparing the ground, if there is a political will.  The Geneva Consultations have been loud and clear on the profound risks of failing to act now, including the increasing risk of a multi-generational conflict that, with each passing month, reduces the prospects of ever restoring Syria as a unified state, let alone making it even harder to establish a political process.   

16. In closing Mr. President, let me thank the Secretary-General again for being with us today, showing his strong commitment about the issue that is in front of us, and the Secretariat, and the members of the Security Council for their continuous  support for our difficult, uphill, difficult, but needed mission.  I am obviously ready to go into details more in a separate meeting later on.  

Thank you. ​

Follow me on Twitter @NabilAbiSaab

Security Council resolution 2231 on Iran nuclear deal - Ending sanctions

نص القرار باللغة العربية - ترجمة رسمية، أنقر هنا. 

Click here to read the draft resolution and the Annexes. 

UN Security Council resolution (July 14)

The Security Council,

1- Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, and its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010),

2- Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with their obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

3- Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and noting that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation,

4- Welcoming diplomatic efforts by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Iran to reach a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, culminating in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concluded on 14 July 2015, (S/2015/XXX, as attached as Annex A to this resolution) and the establishment of the Joint Commission,

5- Welcoming Iran's reaffirmation in the JCPOA that it will under no circumstances ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons,

6- Noting the statement of 14 July 2015, from China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union aimed at promoting transparency and creating an atmosphere conducive to the full implementation of the JCPOA (S/2015/XXX, as attached as Annex B to this resolution),

7- Affirming that conclusion of the JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this issue, and expressing its desire to build a new relationship with Iran strengthened by the implementation of the JCPOA and to bring to a satisfactory conclusion its consideration of this matter,

8- Affirming that full implementation of the JCPOA will contribute to building confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program,

9- Strongly supporting the essential and independent role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements, including the non-diversion of declared nuclear material to undeclared purposes and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and undeclared nuclear activities, and, in this context, in ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, including through the implementation of the "Framework for Cooperation” agreed between Iran and the IAEA on 11 November 2013 and the "Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues," and recognizing the IAEA's important role in supporting full implementation of the JCPOA,

10- Affirming that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental component of nuclear non-proliferation, promote greater confidence among States, inter alia, by providing assurance that States are complying with their obligations under relevant safeguards agreements, contribute to strengthening their collective security and help to create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation, and further recognizing that effective and efficient safeguards implementation requires a cooperative effort between the IAEA and States, that the IAEA Secretariat will continue to engage in open dialogue on safeguards matters with States to increase transparency and build confidence and to interact with them on the implementation of safeguards, and in this case, avoid hampering the economic and technological development of Iran or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities; respect health, safety, physical protection and other security provisions in force and the rights of individuals; and take every precaution to protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge,

11- Encouraging Member States to cooperate, including through IAEA involvement, with Iran in the framework of the JCPOA in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects, in accordance with Annex III of the JCPOA,

12- Noting the termination of provisions of previous resolutions and other measures foreseen in this resolution, and inviting Member States to give due regard to these changes,

13- Emphasizing that the JCPOA is conducive to promoting and facilitating the development of normal economic and trade contacts and cooperation with Iran, and having regard to States’ rights and obligations relating to international trade,

14- Underscoring that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council's decisions,

Operative Paragraphs

1- Endorses the JCPOA, and urges its full implementation on the timetable established in the JCPOA;

2- Calls upon all Members States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by taking actions commensurate with the implementation plan set out in the JCPOA and this resolution and by refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the JCPOA;

3- Requests the Director General of the IAEA to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA, and reaffirms that Iran shall cooperate fully as the IAEA requests to be able to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports;

4- Requests the Director General of the IAEA to provide regular updates to the IAEA Board of Governors and, as appropriate, in parallel to the Security Council on Iran’s implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA and also to report to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council at any time if the Director General has reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue of concern directly affecting fulfillment of JCPOA commitments;

Terminations

5- Requests that, as soon as the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken the actions specified in paragraph 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA, the Director General of the IAEA submit a report confirming this fact to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council;

6- Requests further that, as soon as the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, the Director General of the IAEA submit a report confirming this conclusion to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council;

7- Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, upon receipt by the Security Council of the report from the IAEA described in paragraph 5:

a) The provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) shall be terminated;

b) All States shall comply with paragraphs 1, 2, 4, and 5 and the provisions in subparagraphs (a)-(f) of paragraph 6 of Annex B for the duration specified in each paragraph or subparagraph, and are called upon to comply with paragraphs 3 and 7 of Annex B;

8 - Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that on the date ten years after the JCPOA Adoption Day, as defined in the JCPOA, all the provisions of this resolution shall be terminated, and none of the previous resolutions described in paragraph 7(a) shall be applied, the Security Council will have concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue, and the item "Non-proliferation" will be removed from the list of matters of which the Council is seized;

9- Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that the terminations described in Annex B and paragraph 8 of this resolution shall not occur if the provisions of previous resolutions have been applied pursuant to paragraph 12;

Application of Provisions of Previous Resolutions

10- Encourages China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the EU, and Iran (the “JCPOA participants”) to resolve any issues arising with respect to implementation of JCPOA commitments through the procedures specified in the JCPOA, and expresses its intention to address possible complaints by JCPOA participants about significant non-performance by another JCPOA participant;

11- Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, within 30 days of receiving a notification by a JCPOA participant State of an issue that the JCPOA participant State believes constitutes significant non-performance of commitments under the JCPOA, it shall vote on a draft resolution to continue in effect the terminations in paragraph 7(a) of this resolution, decides further that if, within 10 days of the notification referred to above, no Member of the Security Council has submitted such a draft resolution for a vote, then the President of the Security Council shall submit such a draft resolution and put it to a vote within 30 days of the notification referred to above, and expresses its intention to take into account the views of the States involved in the issue and any opinion on the issue by the Advisory Board established in the JCPOA;

12- Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that, if the Security Council does not adopt a resolution under paragraph 11 to continue in effect the terminations in paragraph 7(a), then effective midnight Greenwich Mean Time after the thirtieth day after the notification to the Security Council described in paragraph 11, all of the provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) that have been terminated pursuant to paragraph 7(a) shall apply in the same manner as they applied before the adoption of this resolution, and the measures contained in paragraphs 7, 8 and 16 to 20 of this resolution shall be terminated, unless the Security Council decides otherwise;

13- Underscores that, in the event of a notification to the Security Council described in paragraph 11, Iran and the other JCPOA participants should strive to resolve the issue giving rise to the notification, expresses its intention to prevent the reapplication of the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notification is resolved, decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that if the notifying JCPOA participant State informs the Security Council that such an issue has been resolved before the end of the 30-day period specified in paragraph 12 above, then the provisions of this resolution, including the terminations in paragraph 7(a), shall remain in effect notwithstanding paragraph 12 above, and notes Iran’s statement that if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12 in whole or in part, Iran will treat this as grounds to cease performing its commitments under the JCPOA;

14- Affirms that the application of the provisions of previous resolutions pursuant to paragraph 12 do not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of application, provided that the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent with the JCPOA, this resolution and the previous resolutions;

15- Affirms that any application of the provisions of previous resolutions pursuant to paragraph 12 is not intended to harm individuals and entities that, prior to that application of those provisions, engaged in business with Iran or Iranian individuals and entities that is consistent with the JCPOA and this resolution, encourages Member States to consult with each other with regard to such harm, and to take action to mitigate such unintended harm for these individuals and entities, and decides if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12 not to impose measures with retroactive effect on individuals and entities for business activities with Iran that were consistent with the JCPOA, this resolution and the previous resolutions prior to the application of these provisions;

JCPOA Implementation

16- Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to review recommendations of the Joint Commission regarding proposals by States to participate in or permit nuclear-related activities set forth in paragraph 2 of Annex B, and that such recommendations shall be deemed to be approved unless the Security Council adopts a resolution to reject a Joint Commission recommendation within five working days of receiving it;

17- Requests Member States seeking to participate in or permit activities set forth in paragraph 2 of Annex B to submit proposals to the Security Council, expresses its intention to share such proposals with the Joint Commission established in the JCPOA for its review, invites any Member of the Security Council to provide relevant information and opinions about these proposals, encourages the Joint Commission to give due consideration to any such information and opinions, and requests the Joint Commission to provide its recommendations on these proposals to the Security Council within twenty working days (or, if extended, within thirty working days);

18- Requests the Secretary-General, in order to support JCPOA implementation, to take the necessary administrative measures to facilitate communications with Member States and between the Security Council and the Joint Commission through agreed practical arrangements;

19- Requests the IAEA and the Joint Commission to consult and exchange information, where appropriate, as specified in the JCPOA, and requests further that the exporting states cooperate with the Joint Commission in accordance with Annex IV of the JCPOA;

20- Requests the Joint Commission to review proposals for transfers and activities described in paragraph 2 of Annex B with a view to recommending approval where consistent with this resolution and the provisions and objectives of the JCPOA so as to provide for the transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology required for Iran's nuclear activities under the JCPOA, and encourages the Joint Commission to establish procedures to ensure detailed and thorough review of all such proposals;

Exemptions

21- Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that the measures imposed in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) shall not apply to the supply, sale, or transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, and the provision of any related technical assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, by JCPOA participant States or Member States acting in coordination with them, that is directly related to: a) the modification of two cascades at the Fordow facility for stable isotope production; b) the export of Iran’s enriched uranium in excess of 300 kilograms in return for natural uranium; and c) the modernization of the Arak reactor based on the agreed conceptual design and, subsequently, on the agreed final design of such reactor;

22- Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, that Member States engaging in the activities permitted in paragraph 21 shall ensure that: a) all such activities are undertaken strictly in accordance with the JCPOA; b) they notify the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and, when constituted, the Joint Commission ten days in advance of such activities; c) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in the relevant INFCIRC referenced in resolution 1737 (2006), as updated, have been met; d) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and e) in case of supplied items, materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in the INFCIRCs referenced in resolution 1737 (2006), as updated, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfers;

23- Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, also that the measures imposed in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) shall not apply to the extent necessary to carry out transfers and activities, as approved on a case-by-case basis in advance by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), that are:

a) directly related to implementation of the nuclear-related actions specified in paragraphs 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA;

b) required for preparation for the implementation of the JCPOA; or,

c) determined by the Committee to be consistent with the objectives of this resolution;

24- Notes that the provisions of paragraph 21, 22, 23 and 27 continue in effect if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12;

Other Matters

25- Decides to make the necessary practical arrangements to undertake directly tasks related to the implementation of this resolution, including those tasks specified in Annex B and the release of guidance;

26- Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Security Council in its exercise of the tasks related to this resolution, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures in this resolution;

27- Decides that all provisions contained in the JCPOA are only for the purposes of its implementation between the E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as setting precedents for any other State or for principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognized principles and practices;

28- Recalls that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the conditions specified in paragraph 15 of that resolution are met, and underscores, that if the provisions of previous resolutions are reapplied pursuant to paragraph 12 of this resolution, then this provision will apply;

29- Emphasizes the importance of all States taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iran, or any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the application of the provisions of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1929 (2010) and this resolution;

30- Decides to remain seized of the matter until the termination of the provisions of this resolution in accordance with paragraph 8.   

Follow me on Twitter @NabilAbiSaab

US draft resolution on chemical weapons in Syria: Attribution mechanism, accountability

The Security Council, 

Recalling the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC), and the Council’s resolutions 1540 (2004), 2118 (2013) and 2209 (2015),

Recalling that the Syrian Arab Republic acceded to the CWC, noting that the use of any toxic chemical, such as chlorine, as a chemical weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic is a violation of resolution 2118, and further noting that any such use by the Syrian Arab Republic would constitute a violation of the CWC,

Condemning in the strongest terms any use of any toxic chemical as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic and noting with outrage that civilians continue to be killed by chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic,

Reaffirming that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law, and stressing again that those individuals responsible for any use of chemical weapons must be held accountable,

Recalling its request to the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Secretary-General to report in a coordinated manner on noncompliance with resolution 2118,

Noting the letter of the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council of 25 February 2015 (S/2015/138), transmitting the note of the Director-General of the OPCW, discussing the decision of the OPCW Executive Council of 4 February 2015 that expressed serious concern regarding the findings of the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) made with a high degree of confidence that chlorine has been used repeatedly and systematically as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic,

Noting that chlorine has allegedly been used as a chemical weapon subsequent to the adoption on March 6 of Security Council resolution 2209 (2015),

Recognizing that the OPCW FFM is not mandated to reach conclusions about attributing responsibility for chemical weapons use,

Recalling that, in its resolution 2118, it decided that the Syrian Arab Republic and all parties in Syria shall cooperate fully with the OPCW and the United Nations,  

1. Reiterates its condemnation in the strongest terms of any use of any toxic chemical, such as chlorine, as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic;

2. Recalls its decision that the Syrian Arab Repiiblic shall not use, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or, transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to other States or non-State actors;

3. Reiterates that no party in Syria should use develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain, or transfer chemical weapens;

4. Expresses its determination to identify those responsible for these acts and reiterates that those individuals, entities, groups, orr governments responsible for any use of chemicals as weapons including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, must be held accountable, and calls on all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic to extend their full cooperation in this regard;

5. Requests the UN Secretary General, in coordination with the OPCW Director-General, to submit to the Security Council, for its authorization, within 15 days of the adoption of this resolution, recommendations regarding the establishment of an OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism to identify to the greatest extent feasible individuals, entities, groups, or governments who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic where the OPCW FFM has determined that a specific incident in the Syrian Arab Republic involved or likely involved the use of chemical weapons, and expresses its intent to respond to the proposal within five days of receipt;

6. Recalls that in its resolution 2118 it decided that the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with the OPCW and the United Nations and that all parties shall cooperate fully in this regard and stresses that the Council understands that such obligation includes an obligation to cooperate with the OPCW Director-General and its FFM and the United Nations SecretaryGeneral and the Joint Investigative Mechanism, and that such cooperation also includes access to relevant locations, individuals, and materials in the Syrian Arab Republic, and the ability of the Joint Investigative Mechanism to examine additional information and evidence that was not obtained or prepared by the FFM;

7. Calls on all other States to cooperate fully with the Joint Investigative Mechanism and in particular to provide it and the OPCW FFM with any relevant information they may possess pertaining to chemical weapons attacks in the Syrian Arab Republic;

8. Requests the FFM to collaborate with the Joint Investigative Mechanism from the commencement of the Joint Investigative Mechanism’s work to provide full access to all of the information and evidence obtained or prepared by the FFM including but not limited to, medical records, intervieuu tapes and transcripts, and documentary material, and requests the Joint Investigative Mechanism, with respect to allegations of chemical weapons use that are the subject of investigation by the FFM, to work in coordination with the FFM to fulfill its mandate;

9. Requests the United Nations Secretary-General, in coordination with the OPCW Director General, to present a report to the United Nations Security Council and inform the OPCW Executive Council as of the date the Joint Investigative Mechanism begins its full operations and every 30 days thereafter on the progress made;

10. Requests further the United Nations Secretary-General, in coordination with the OPCW Director General, to undertake without delay the steps measures, and arrangements necessary for tthe speedy establishment and full functioning of the Joint Investigative Mechanism including recruiting impartial and experienced staff with relevant skills and expertise in accordance with Terms of Reference and notes due regard should be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible;

11. Requests the Joint Investigative Mechanism to complete its first report within 90 days of the date on which it commenced its full operations, as notified by the United Nations Secretary - General;

12. Requests the Joint Investigative Mechanism to retain any evidence related to possible uses of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic other than those cases in which the FFM has determined that a specific incident in the Syrian Arab Republic involved or likely involved the use of chemical weapons and to transmit that evidence to the Secretary- General and Director General of the OPCW every six months;

13. Affirms that the establishment of the Joint Investigative Mechanism need not be approved by any body other than the United Nations Security Council;

14. Decides to establish the Joint Investigative Mechanism for a period of one year with a possibitity of future extension by the Security Council, if it deems it necessary;

15. Reaffirms its decision in response to violations of resolution 2118 to impose measures uiider Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;

16. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Follow me on Twitter @NabilAbiSaab