The UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon submitted this proposal to the Security Council today, 27 August 2015. The Council is expected to endorse it within 5 days. Here's the original copy.
Dear
Madam President,
On
7 August 2015, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution
2235 (2015), condemning any use of toxic chemicals, such as chlorine,
as a chemical weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic and expressing its
determination to identify those responsible for these acts. In this
regard, the Council recalled the Protocol for the Prohibition of the
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons
Convention) and the Council's resolutions 1540 (2004), 2118 (2013)
and 2209 (2015).
To
this end, the Council established, for a period of one year with a
possibility of future extension if it deems necessary, a Joint
Investigative Mechanism (JIM) to identify to the greatest extent
feasible individuals, entities, groups or governments who were
perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use
of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic
chemical, in the Syrian Arab Republic where the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-Finding Mission (FFM)
determines or has determined that a specific incident in the Syrian
Arab Republic involved or likely involved the use of chemicals as
weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical.
I
hereby submit to the Council for its authorization, in accordance
with operative paragraph 5 of resolution 2235 (2015),
recommendations, including elements of Terms of Reference, regarding
the establishment and operation of an OPCW-United Nations Joint
Investigative Mechanism. This submission is made in coordination with
the OPCW Director-General.
Her
Excellency
Mrs.
U. Joy Ogwu
President
of the Security Council
New
York
----------------
In
operative paragraph 6 of resolution 2235 (2015), the Council
requested that, after it has authorized the JIM, I, in coordination
with the OPCW Director-General, undertake without delay the steps,
measures, and arrangements necessary for the speedy establishment and
full functioning of the JIM, including recruiting impartial and
experienced staff with relevant skills and expertise to fully
implement the responsibilities pursuant to resolution 2235 (2015),
with due regard to be given to the importance of recruiting staff on
as wide of a geographical basis as is practicable.
Furthermore,
in operative paragraph 9 of resolution 2235 (2015), the Council
requests the OPCW FFM to collaborate with the JIM from the
commencement of its work to provide full access to all of the
information and evidence obtained or prepared by the FFM, including
but not limited to, medical records, interview tapes and transcripts,
and documentary material. The OPCW FFM would transmit all evidence
and findings to the JIM. Based on the assessment of the JIM of this
information, the JIM may request the OPCW FFM to provide additional
information or may decide that additional investigation(s) are
required.
Since
the adoption of resolution 2235 (2015), I have been in close contact
with OPCW Director-General Ahmet Ozfimcÿi, and staff members of our
organizations have been working closely in order to develop the
requested recommendations and to plan for the implementation of the
resolution. Based on these consultations, and in coordination with
the Director-General of the OPCW, I wish to present my
recommendations, including elements of Terms of Reference, to
implement our respective roles and responsibilities pursuant to
resolution 2235 (2015).
For
the purposes of the JIM, the United Nations and the OPCW shall
operate in the areas of their particular competencies, taking into
account the complementary roles of each organization.
I
and the OPCW Director-General shall agree on a Supplementary
Arrangement pursuant to the Relationship Agreement between the United
Nations and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,
concluded in 2001. Such an Arrangement shall set out the modalities
for cooperation between the United Nations and OPCW in the context of
resolution 2235 (2015).
The
JIM shall demonstrate objectivity, and its composition shall reflect
comprehensive, professional and multidisciplinary expertise to meet
the mandate of the resolution.
In
coordination with the Director-General of the OPCW, and the heads of
other relevant international organizations as appropriate, I shall
undertake the recruitment of impartial and experienced staff to
provide the relevant requisite skill sets. Recruitment shall be based
on professional expertise and experience, with due regard to the
importance of recruiting staff on as wide a geographical basis as
practicable.
I
propose that the JIM be comprised of the leadership of an
independent, three-member panel to be supported by a core staff of
professionals grouped into three components. In this regard, the JIM
shall be headed by an Assistant-Secretary-General with overall
responsibility, and two Deputies at the D-2 level, responsible for
the political and investigation components, respectively.
The
leadership of the JIM shall be supported by three components. A
Political Office, to be based in New York, shall provide political
analysis, legal advice, media relations and administrative support.
An Investigation Office, to be based in The Hague, shall provide
chemical and medical analysis, forensics, military ordnance analysis,
investigation, and information analysis. A Planning and Operations
Support Office, to be based in New York, shall provide support to the
political and investigation components.
Given
the particular nature of the responsibilities and operating
environment of the JIM, I intend to fully use the authority provided
to me, including in the area of human resources, to promote the
timely achievement of the mandate of the JIM, while maximizing the
safety and security of its personnel.
With
regard to its functions, methods of work and scope, the JIM shall
conduct its operations in an independent manner and shall be
responsible for its report(s).
The
JIM, in fulfilling its mandate, shall ensure the integrity and
confidentiality of its work, including the protection of documents
and evidence, as much as possible while meeting its reporting
requirements.
Operative
paragraph 7 of resolution 2235 (2015) recalls that in resolution 2118
(2013), the Security Council had decided that the Syrian Arab
Republic and all parties in Syria shall fully cooperate with the OPCW
and the United Nations and stresses that this includes an obligation
to cooperate with the OPCW Director-General and its FFM and the
Secretary-General and the JIM. This includes full access to all
locations, individuals and materials in the Syrian Arab Republic that
the JIM deems relevant to its investigation and where it determines
there are reasonable grounds to believe access is justified based on
its assessment of the facts and circumstances known to it at the
time, including in areas within Syrian territory but outside the
control of the Government of Syrian Arab Republic, and that such
cooperation also includes the ability of the JIM to examine
additional information and evidence that was not obtained or prepared
by the FFM but that is related to the mandate of the JIM as set forth
in paragraph 5 of resolution 2235 (2015).
The
FFM shall continue to operate under the authority of the OPCW
Director-General.
The
JIM shall undertake activities to identify to the greatest extent
feasible individuals, entities, groups, or governments who were
perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use
of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic
chemical, in the Syrian Arab Republic where the OPCW FFM determines
or has determined that a specific incident in the SAR involved or
likely involved the use of chemical weapons, including chlorine or
any other toxic chemical. In implementing its mandate, the JIM shall
undertake its work in an impartial manner.
For
this purpose, the JIM may undertake activities at the location(s)
where the use of toxic chemicals as a weapon is alleged to have
occurred, including locations directly relevant to the JIM, such as
hospital(s), and emergency response stations; any other location(s)
within the Syrian Arab Republic, including in territories not under
its control, and in neighbouring and other relevant States, as it may
consider necessary or appropriate.
The
JIM shall liaise and coordinate with the Government of the Syrian
Arab Republic, opposition groups and the international community, as
it deems necessary.
Operative
paragraph 11 of resolution 2235 (2015) requests the JIM to complete
its first report within 90 days of the date on which it commences its
full operation, and complete subsequent reports as appropriate
thereafter. The JIM is also requested to present its report(s) to the
Security Council and inform the OPCW Executive Council. These reports
shall be transmitted under cover by the Secretary-General to the
Security Council.
It
should be noted that, the JIM shall operate separately from
humanitarian work, which provides indispensable life-saving support
to innocent people suffering from the conflict, as well as the
political process, which is seeking to bring about a diplomatic
solution to the conflict.
The
JIM may have a "light footprint" in the Syrian Arab
Republic, deploying only those personnel whose presence is necessary
to perform their functions. The United Nations shall support JIM and
FFM deployments primarily in the area of logistics, security and
liaison, with support for communications, administration and possibly
other areas, as may be required.
With
respect to cooperation with all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic
and Member States, I note that the extremely challenging mandate and
dangerous situation inside the Syrian Arab Republic will impact the
activities of the JIM. Success will therefore depend on the full
cooperation from all parties, including the Government of the Syrian
Arab Republic and other parties in Syria.
The
JIM may establish contact with and receive information from any
parties in the Syrian Arab Republic.
The
United Nations shall engage, in its areas of responsibilities, with
international and regional actors, as well as the Security Council
and other stakeholders, in furtherance of the implementation of
resolution 2235 (2015) and related resolutions of the Security
Council. The strong support of the Security Council and key
stakeholders will be essential to the success of the The Syrian Arab
Republic and all parties in Syria shall cooperate fully with the JIM
and shall provide full access to all locations, individuals and
materials in the Syrian Arab Republic that the JIM deems relevant to
its investigation and where it determines there are reasonable
grounds to believe access is justified based on its assessment of the
facts and circumstances known to it at the time, including in areas
within the Syrian territory but outside the control of the Syrian
Arab Republic.
With
regard to the cooperation with the Syrian Arab Republic and all
parties in Syria, for territory both under and outside the control of
the Syrian Arab Republic, full access shall be granted to the JIM and
the OPCW FFM, as necessary. In order for the JIM to accomplish its
mandate, it would be necessary for all parties to pause hostilities
in the areas in which the JIM requires access for the period of its
presence in these areas. This shall apply to the OPCW FFM as
appropriate.
The
United Nations shall do its utmost and use all means available to it
to work with all parties to comply with these requirements, including
through the good offices of the Special Envoy of the
Secretary-General for Syria.
In
light of the exceedingly complex security challenges which may limit
the means at the disposal of the JIM, the support of the Security
Council, Member States and other stakeholders with influence over
parties in the Syrian Arab Republic is essential in facilitating the
full compliance of all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic with their
requirements.
With
regard to cooperation with neighbouring States, at the request of the
JIM, neighbouring States may provide support and assistance in
facilitating its activities by providing, inter alia, information,
security and protection for the JIM and its personnel, equipment and
documents, access to victims or witnesses taking refuge on their
territories, and transportation and logistical support to the
activities of the JIM within their territories.
The
role of other Member States will also be critical. All other Member
States are called upon to offer their full support to the work of the
JIM. Paragraph 8 of resolution 2235 (2015) calls on all other States
to cooperate fully with the JIM and in particular to provide it and
the OPCW FFM with any relevant information they may possess
pertaining to individuals, entities, groups, or governments who were
perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use
of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic
chemical in the Syrian Arab Republic.
The
core staff of the JIM shall be funded from the regular budget.
Additional expertise and activities shall be funded by voluntary
contributions as requirements continue to emerge. For that purpose,
the Secretary-General intends to establish a trust fund. The JIM
shall make reports to donors on the status of the Trust Fund.
In
accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 2235 (2015), the
Secretary-General is requested, in coordination with the OPCW
Director-General, to report to the Security Council and inform the
OPCW Executive Council as of the date the JIM begins its full
operations and every 30 days thereafter on the progress made.
It
is envisaged that the monthly progress reports shall be in respect of
both Security Council resolutions 2235 (2015) and 2118 (2013).
The
JIM shall complete its first report within 90 days of its
commencement of full operations and complete subsequent reports as
appropriate thereafter. The JIM shall transmit the report or
report(s) to the Security Council under my cover letter and inform
the OPCW Executive Council.
I
would like to close by reiterating that the work of the JIM will be a
challenging undertaking, and will require continued close cooperation
between the OPCW and the United Nations, as well as the support of
the Security Council, Member States and key stakeholders.
I
should be grateful if you would bring the present letter urgently to
the attention of the Security Council.
Please
accept, Madam President, the assurances of my highest consideration.
BAN
Ki-moon
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