Sources said that the Joint Special Representative for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi proposed "elements (paragraph 44) which could inform an initiative of the Security Council which in turn, would offer a base for negotiations" between the government and the opposition in Syria. He submitted this report in the Security Council's closed meeting on
29 January 2013, diplomats said.
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Brahimi briefs correspondents following
Security Council Consultations on Syria. 29 January 2013
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BRIEFING
TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Joint
Special Representative for Syria
Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi
Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi
New
York, 29 January 2013
Thank
you very much indeed, Mr. President,
Mr.
President,
Distinguished
Members of the Council,
1.
It is an honor to come to this Informal Consultations of the Council
to discuss the Syrian situation, and it gives me particular pleasure
to do so under your Chair, Mr. President. I believe it is not too
late to express to you and to your Colleagues and Staff a happy 2013.
I guess that the best wish one could express to the Security Council
as a whole is that you have no work at all. Indeed no work at all for
you would be what the people of the world would appreciate most.
2.
In my opening remarks, I’ll address the disastrous consequences of
the crisis on the people of Syria. I will speak after that about the
political and military situation and how in my view, the conflict
needs to be addressed. I hope to show that intervention of the
Council is now necessary. Without your action, Mr. President, Syria
runs the risk of sliding fast into Somalianisation.
3.
Things in Syria are not any better today than they were when I last
briefed the Council, on 29 November 2012: as we, and most observers
keep repeating, things continue to get worse by the day. You were
briefed ten days ago by High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi
Pillay and by the Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos. Since
then more Syrians have lost their lives, more Syrians have lost their
limbs; and more Syrians have lost hope.
4.
I thought that the sickening attack at the University of Aleppo
earlier this month was the most revolting illustration of the immense
suffering this conflict is inflicting on the people of Syria: the
mass murder of nearly one hundred students and displaced persons
living on the Campus, and the wounding of scores of others had no
military value. It was killing for the purpose of terrorizing and
inflicting harm on the civilian population and little else.
5.
But then came those unbearable images brought back by Lyse Doucet of
the BBC from the rural settlement of Haswaeyeh near the city of Homs;
there, we saw that it was still possible to reach even worse levels
of horror. In this rural, and until then rather peaceful part of
Syria, God knows how many peaceful, helpless civilian men, women and
children were literally slaughtered and burned by cruel, evil men.
6.
But the tragedy simply does not have an end. Just before coming down,
we read of yet another horror, in a suburb of Aleppo this time;
sixty-five bodies discovered with their hands tied and shot in the
head.
7.
Or look also at the nearly 30 bakeries targeted in the course of
2012, often when long queues of people were waiting to buy a loaf of
bread. After each of these and similar crimes, both sides were quick
to claim innocence and accuse the other party of the crime. Due to a
track record and, at times, circumstantial evidence, strong suspicion
if not actual evidence often points the finger at Government Forces
or their shadowy militia, the Shabiha as the perpetrator. It is
however an established fact, that armed opposition groups have also
been known to commit equally outrageous crimes against civilians.
8.
These amount surely to crimes of war and crimes against humanity and
it may be useful to initiate specific inquiries into crimes such as
those committed earlier this month in Aleppo University, the village
of Haswayeh or the Bakery attacks. It is of course difficult to
undertake such tasks from a distance but I feel certain that, in many
instances, it will be possible to establish responsibility. And that
is worth doing; as it would be a useful complement to the serious
work being done by the International Commission of Inquiry led by
Professor Paulo Sergio Pinheiro.
9.
Valerie Amos told you, Mr. Chairman, everything there is to say about
the dire humanitarian situation. To further underline the magnitude
of the problem, please listen to the following sentence I have taken
one out of the large number of reports and articles we all see every
day. I quote: “The U.N.
refugee agency in Jordan says there has been a spike in the number of
Syrians fleeing the civil war at home and crossing into Jordan.
UNHCR's representative Andrew Harper says about 3,000 Syrians have
entered Jordan every night for the past 5 days. Harper said Tuesday
that the spike is due to intensified shelling, fighting and the
"desperate situation" in Syria's southern villages. He says
Jordan's Zaatari refugee camp is filling up quickly and UNHCR is
running out of money to expand and set up other camps”. End
of quote.
10.
Another illustration of the
magnitude of the tragedy: talking to a visiting UN delegation a few
days ago, a senior official of the Syrian Government said that the
city of Daraya in the suburbs of Damascus has seen its population
dwindle to seventy thousand – 70,000 – from an original total of
more than 300,000; which means that more than two thirds – 2/3 –
of the inhabitants of that city have left it.
11.
Let us, for a minute or two play a game of guess work: should the
military situation around Damascus take a turn for the worst, we will
of course see a massive exodus of civilians fleeing the capital. Let
us suppose that, not two thirds like Daraya, but one third only of
them leave. You would then be speaking of more than one and a half
million people getting out of Damascus. Let us further suppose that
one third of the people on the move find refuge somewhere else inside
Syria.
12.
Where would the remaining one million people go? Obviously to the
nearest borders, that is the Lebanese and Jordanian borders.
13.
This is of course a worst case scenario; but it would be totally
wrong to assume that this is far fetched or only a very remote
possibility. Someone who knows Syria much better than me speaks of
another scenario far more gloomy and frightening: he sees Damascus
being the theater of a long and bloody confrontation where the
beautiful Old City will be completely destroyed.
14.
But let us stay with our own scenario: I am sure you’ll agree with
me that Lebanon would collapse under the weight of 500,000 additional
people forcing their way into its territory and that Jordan will be
equally critically destabilized by the flow of half a million new
arrivals from Syria.
15.
Do we need to add to this description the familiar figures of 60,000
people at the very least of those killed and probably 5 times maybe
more that number of the wounded during this conflict. And the
refugees already abroad 700,000 of them, predicted to go up to one
million in a few months time. And the internally displaced – more
than 2 million. And those who need help inside the country – 4,
perhaps already close to 5 million.
16.
Let us also remember the detainees: I saw a nominal list of nearly
30,000. Their real number is certainly very very much higher; some
speak of 60,000 others of 100,000. It has been established, as you
all know, that torture is routinely practiced in official and
non-official detention centres. And there are also countless people
who have disappeared and are said to have been detained or killed by
the many security organizations of the State and the much feared,
shadowy Shabbiha.
17.
And do I need to mention again the physical destruction of the
country? Those parts of some cities that look like Berlin in 1945.
The priceless cultural heritage of Syria being destroyed or
plundered. The bandits and traffickers doing what they do best? The
hospitals and other health facilities destroyed completely or closed
or used by security agents to arrest people suspected of being part
of the opposition? Electricity being cut off for long hours every
day? In some place lately there is no electricity at all. Shortages
in almost everything? The galloping unemployment and punishingly high
prices that continue to increase almost by the day: two very quick
examples of how difficult life is for Syrians today: to get some gas
it is necessary to queue with you car for up to 24 hours in front of
a petrol station. And the price of a cooking gas canister has gone up
– listen to this - from 350 to 5000 liras.
18.
Syrians themselves are helping one another to the best of their
ability. For example in the small town of Salmya is home to 100,000
to 120,000 mainly Ismailis. They have received and are supporting
100,000 IDPs, with little help from outside. Some Kurdish villages
have seen their population shoot up from 10,000 to 60,000 people.
19.
Syria’s neighbours deserve everyone’s admiration and profound
gratitude for their inspiring sense of international responsibility,
their fraternal solidarity with their neighbours and their amazingly
generous hospitality extended to those hundreds of thousands of
refugees.
20.
All UN Agencies are mobilized, as you know. Together with others, the
ICRC chief among them, they are doing their best to come to the
rescue of all these people, be they inside or outside Syria, in
Government or opposition controlled territory. Theirs is not an easy
task. They do not always succeed in reaching those who need them the
most; and their work is not without risk for national and
international staff alike. But it is indispensable to do this work
and it is being done as well as conditions permit.
21.
In addition to the physical difficulties faced on the ground,
humanitarian aid is crippled by the lack of funding, so much so that
food rations are now being curtailed. In addition to what Valerie
Amos told you on the subject, let me quote from what the Secretary
General said a few days ago in Davos. I quote: “The
humanitarian community needs $1.5 billion for the next six months --
the largest-ever short-term appeal. However, our appeals to date have
been woefully under-funded. That is why I am convening a pledging
conference in Kuwait on January 30th.
For many years, Syrians have shown great generosity and solidarity in hosting refugees from Palestine, Iraq and Somalia. The international community should come to Syria’s aid in its own time of need.”
For many years, Syrians have shown great generosity and solidarity in hosting refugees from Palestine, Iraq and Somalia. The international community should come to Syria’s aid in its own time of need.”
Mr.
President,
22.
Of course humanitarian action is indispensable and urgent. It will
address the needs created in and around Syria by the terrible crisis
which has been affecting the country and its people as well as their
neighhbours for close to two years now.
23.
But humanitarian aid does not address the core of the problem; it
addresses only the consequences. To go to the roots of the problem, a
lasting solution has to be found for the crisis.
24.
Two months ago, when I briefed the Council, many believed that the
Syrian regime was crumbling and President Assad about to fall or flee
the country in a matter of weeks perhaps even days. Today, the mood
has shifted; President Assad is said to be doing well and his regime
still strong. He will be there for the foreseeable future if not
forever, we are told. To drive the point home some journalists in
Damascus and Beirut write very optimistically articles about the
progress being made every day. One went as far as to say total
victory, for the regime of course, is not more than a few weeks away!
25.
We were not convinced by the analysis which prevailed two months ago,
anymore than we are convinced by what is being said today. The truth
is that the regime has been seriously shaken and it has not regained
its balance. It was under stronger pressure two months ago than it is
today, but Kissinger’s formula is as valid today as it was
yesterday: “A conventional army loses if it doesn't win; the
guerilla army wins if it doesn't loose”.
26.
The regime is still strong enough to keep President Assad in power.
But its legitimacy has been severely, probably irreparably damaged
and many are those who have serious doubts that President Assad will
be able to regain that legitimacy anytime soon, if at all. Prime
Minister Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation has come closer to
the truth than most when he said a few days ago in Davos and I quote:
I think that every day, every week,
every month the chances of him (meaning President Assad) surviving
are becoming less and less. And
Prime Minister Medevdev added “but
I repeat, again, this must be decided
by the Syrian people. Not Russia,
not the USA not any other country.”
End of quote.
27.
Much has been said in 2011 about the fact that in the countries of
the so-called Arab spring “the wall of fear has come down.” In
the course of the dramatic developments of these past months in the
region, this may have been forgotten. But that is a fundamental
reality and it is as valid in Syria as it is elsewhere. The regime in
Damascus is still as repressive as it has been, if not more, and is
engaging in a full scale war against entire segments of its
population, but it is nevertheless still true that people are less
afraid to speak out and many have taken arms to challenge the
domination of the regime. Indeed, many, as you know, have deserted
the ranks of the armed forces, the Police, the Government, the Baath
party and the bureaucracy.
28.
In this connection much nonsense has been written or said about what
passed between President Assad and myself when we met on 24 December
2012. Our conversation was in fact perfectly “normal”, exactly
what a conversation between a Head of State and a United Nations
Envoy is and should be. Our exchange was easy, candid and mutually
respectful. I invited the President to tell me how he saw the
situation and what he intended to do, and he did tell me. I then told
him honestly how I saw things and what, in my opinion, the reactions
of Syrians and non-Syrians would be to what he had told me of his
forthcoming initiative. And he listened to me with attention and
patience.
29.
I later spoke publicly about President Assad’s speech of 6 January
2013. I stand by everything I said except for the word “sectarian”
which was not an accurate description of what was in the speech. A
few days later, on 9 January I think, Syrian Minister of Foreign
Affairs Walid Al-Mouallem sent to the Secretary-General a memorandum,
which tried to give an infinitely more positive reading of the speech
than what had been actually said by the President. And yesterday,
Syria’s Permanent Representative sent you another letter to inform
you of how his country’s Government is trying to implement
President Assad’s initiative.
30.
The fact remains, however, Mr. President that the Syrian parties to
the conflict are still very far apart. For President Bashar, the
problem is almost exclusively, an external conspiracy implemented by
terrorist organizations trained, armed and funded by external enemies
of Syria. As for the opponents of the Government, they see a popular
uprising against a repressive regime that has lost its legitimacy. It
is important to note in this connection that this analysis of the
opposition is shared by all of the components of the opposition,
those who are working from abroad and those who are inside the
country; those who have taken up arms and those who still believe in
the possibility of peaceful protest and action.
31.
One change that has taken place, however, deserves attention: the
Government as well as opposition groups now speak timidly of “a
political solution” even if neither appears to be ready to give
up its fundamental preconditions.
- For the government those preconditions are that the “external conspiracy has to come to an end first; funding and arming of the rebellion must be suspended and “the terrorists” as they call their opponents put down their weapons; and
- For the opposition groups those preconditions are that President Assad abandons power, if not immediately, within a very short period of time.
32.
But this very modest progress in no way means that things have
changed enough for what I call the “inner circle” meaning the
Syrian track to be the place where a peaceful process maybe
initiated. The Syrians alas, are not really ready to talk to one
another even through intermediaries. They need much help to reach
that stage.
33.
And, as I said in my previous briefing, at the regional level, the
picture is not very promising either. It is in fact worrisome. The
challenge of building a regional consensus for a peaceful settlement
in Syria is made difficult by the clear alignment of most regional
parties with one or the other of the parties in Syria.
34.
Grave concern is expressed in many ways among Syria's immediate
neighbors as to the present impact of the Syrian crisis and of its
future implications if the crisis continues spiralling, as well, we
all fear it could. There is, first and foremost, the problem of the
well-being of hundreds of thousands of displaced Syrians rendered
more serious by particularly harsh winter conditions. Public opinion
in each of those countries is already divided on the Syrian issue
with factions having expressed support for the government and others
for the opposition. The flow of Syrian refugees is increasingly
becoming a matter of controversy in those countries with some calling
for an open borders policy to help alleviate the displaced people’s
misery and others insisting on closing the borders before them. There
are also strong indications that Syrian factions are getting material
support from allies in neighbouring countries and that citizens of
those countries are fighting alongside their Syrian allies.
Hence
the two big risks that are of serious concern to the international
community:
35. The first is the transformation of Syria into a playground for competing regional forces, governments and non-state actors alike. This process is largely underway and can become acute in view of the high stakes embedded in the Syrian tragedy. As many have already observed, what we are presently witnessing in Syria is AT THE SAME TIME, and with the same intensity, a struggle INSIDE Syria and a struggle FOR Syria. The combination of these two processes substantially fuels the present conflict and complicates its settlement through diplomatic mediation.
36. The second, and no less serious concern, is the risk of a full-fledged regionalization of the Syrian civil war through the growing osmosis of that war with unresolved domestic issues within its immediate environment. No country, and certainly not Lebanon or Jordan, Iraq or Turkey, not to mention the Palestinians, is immune to the military and political fallout of the Syrian civil war. The Syrian civil war may well end up becoming contagious and affect the whole Levant where similar sectarian makeups and cleavages are to be found not to mention trans-state ideological and partisan movements. In other words, Mr. President, far from being in a position to help Syrians solve their present problem, the region is facing the risk of being itself contaminated by Syria’s difficulties and engulfed in its crisis.
35. The first is the transformation of Syria into a playground for competing regional forces, governments and non-state actors alike. This process is largely underway and can become acute in view of the high stakes embedded in the Syrian tragedy. As many have already observed, what we are presently witnessing in Syria is AT THE SAME TIME, and with the same intensity, a struggle INSIDE Syria and a struggle FOR Syria. The combination of these two processes substantially fuels the present conflict and complicates its settlement through diplomatic mediation.
36. The second, and no less serious concern, is the risk of a full-fledged regionalization of the Syrian civil war through the growing osmosis of that war with unresolved domestic issues within its immediate environment. No country, and certainly not Lebanon or Jordan, Iraq or Turkey, not to mention the Palestinians, is immune to the military and political fallout of the Syrian civil war. The Syrian civil war may well end up becoming contagious and affect the whole Levant where similar sectarian makeups and cleavages are to be found not to mention trans-state ideological and partisan movements. In other words, Mr. President, far from being in a position to help Syrians solve their present problem, the region is facing the risk of being itself contaminated by Syria’s difficulties and engulfed in its crisis.
37.
We are still where we were two months ago: only the Security Council
is in a position to help, if I may so Mr. President, and the time to
act is now.
Mr.
President,
38.
As you and the other distinguished members of the council are aware,
since I last briefed the Council I had three meetings with
representatives of the Russian Federation and the United States. The
first meeting was in Dublin on 6 December and was attended by
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov,
the second and third meetings took place in Geneva on 9 December 2012
and 11 January 2013 respectively, and were attended by the Personal
Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the
Middle East and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and United
States Deputy Secretary of State Mr. William Burns.
39.
I am deeply grateful to Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov
for meeting with me in Dublin and for agreeing to the two other
meetings with their respective deputies. I will not be so
presumptuous as to comment on those meetings in the presence of
Ambassador Susan Rice and Ambassador Vitaly Churkin.
Mr.
President,
40.
I am sorry if I sound like an old, broken record. But I seriously
don’t see where else one should start or end except in saying that,
things are bad and getting worse, the country is breaking up before
everyone’s eyes; there is no military solution to this conflict –
at least not one that will not destroy Syria completely and destroy
also the nation of Syria; Syrians cannot themselves start a
peace process, their neighbours are not able to help them; only the
international community may help and is the international community
is first and foremost the United Nations Security Council. And the
Geneva Communiqué and Action Plan offer good bases to initiate the
necessary action to provide that help.
41.
There evidently is now a better assessment worldwide, of the tragic
dimension of the crisis and its terrible consequences on the Syrian
population and, no less important, of the huge disintegrating impact
it is having on the social fabric of the country, of the rising
influence of extremist groups on both sides and of the growing
violent sectarian alignments.
42.
Compared to the upheavals that have struck some countries in the Arab
world, the Syrian conflict has indisputably proven to be the
deadliest and most intractable, the most threatening for its
neighbours and the most worrisome for the country’s future. Does
international action measure up to this climatic peak in the
so-called “Arab Spring”? Does the diplomatic management measure
up to the dimensions of the tragedy and the stakes at play? Does the
pressure from third parties on the belligerents to accept a
negotiated settlement measure up to the violence and devastation? To
all these questions, I am sure you will agree, distinguished members
of the Council, the answer is, at best, a very polite “not
enough.”
43.
I think that public opinion the world over is now looking up to the
Security Council to take a determined, strong lead.
44.
The principles on which the Council’s actions might be based are
explicitly or implicitly contained in the Geneva Communiqué:
a)
Syria’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity must be
preserved;
b)
There must be clear recognition that the ultimate objective is to
enable the Syrian people to exercise their legitimate rights to
dignity and human rights and to have a full say in the manner in
which they are governed;
c)
An essential element in that process is the formation of a
transitional Government with full executive powers. The meaning of
“full executive powers” has to be clarified before
the Syrian parties come together to discuss the formation of that
transitional government. Leaving that definition, the definition of
full executive powers, to the parties is fairly certain to lead to a
dead end;
In
this connection, the Geneva communiqué was elegant and creative in
that it did not speak of President Bashar Al-Assad and his role in
the transition and beyond. I think, however, it is largely understood
that “governing body with full executive powers” clearly meant
that the President would have no role in the transition;
Now, Mr.
President,
And this is
another point that needs to be taken into consideration,
d) The actual
negotiation should take place between a strong, fully representative
team on behalf of the opposition and a strong civilian- military
delegation representing the Government. Of course both negotiating
teams should be comprised of individuals capable of reaching a
compromise agreement during a reasonable period of time;
e) These
negotiations should start outside of Syria and take place according
to an agreed timetable to enable the process to move – as fast as
possible - towards the democratic process which would include the
election, constitutional reform and referendum. From what I heard in
Damascus and elsewhere, it will not be to difficult to secure
agreement to move the country from the present Presidential system to
a Parliamentary system of Government;
f) It is
important that the Council unequivocally expresses support for the
right of each citizen in Syria to enjoy full equality before the law
irrespective of gender, religion, language or ethnicity.
Mr.
President, Distinguished Members of the Council
45. I have
put down a number of elements, which in my view, could inform an
initiative of the Security Council which in turn, would offer a base
for negotiations between a team representing the opposition and
another one acting on behalf of the Government.
This, of
course, not a draft resolution; I would not be so presumptuous as to
submit such a draft to all the experts around this table.
Mr.
President,
46. I have
been blamed by many because I did not submit my plan
for the resolution of the conflict soon enough.
I accept that
criticism. In my defence, I will only say that I did not consider
that presenting my own personal plan was the main
objective of my mission.
I thought and
still think that the main objective was and still is to ensure that
there is a SYRIAN PLAN, a plan that the Syrians can
accept and implement.
47. I believe
that difficult as it is, reaching that stage is possible. But it is
necessary to obtain, first, a strong, unequivocal support from the
Security Council. And that is what I am asking you Mr. Chairmn and
honourable delegates today.
