SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR
SYRIA
BRIEFING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
17
October 2018
Señor Presidente,
Embajador Lorenti, [Sacha Lorenti, Bolivia],
Dear
Friends, Members of the Council:
1. When
I briefed you last month, I said that we were approaching a moment of
truth in the effort to convene a UN-facilitated, Syrian-led,
Syrian-owned constitutional committee. The constitutional committee
is the main item which is at the moment operationally left about how
to implement [resolution] 2254. Everything else is still there on the
table but that one [element] is the most important one at the moment.
A credible and balanced committee could be the cornerstone of an
inclusive political process for Syrians towards implementing Security
Council resolution 2254 – the only one we have.
2. Yesterday,
I consulted the Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, and received his
very clear instructions regarding our accelerated efforts to convene
a credible and balanced constitutional committee – the only kind
that the UN Secretariat would be willing to convene and the only one
it would be willing to be associated with. I will come to those
instructions later.
3. First,
let’s be a little bit precise about where we are.
4. As
I told you last month, some things are quite clear. The Government
list and the Opposition list of 50 names each for a constitutional
committee are not in question.
5. But
questions continue to be raised, mainly by the Syrian Government,
over the composition of the Middle Third list of 50 names. So, let me
recall how we did arrive at the Middle Third list that is now on the
table, and indeed has already been further revised, more than once,
and updated in a new list.
6. The
Sochi Final Statement spoke of the need to include, I quote: “Syrian
experts, civil society, independents, tribal leaders and women”
(unquote), with (quote) “adequate representation of Syria’s
ethnic and religious components” (unquote). The Sochi final
statement made clear that it was via the Geneva process, and the
facilitation of the Special Envoy, that the final selection would be
made.
7. Actually,
in truth, it went even further than that. The Secretary-General has
asked me to remind the Council that, in addition to the terms of the
Sochi Final statement itself, an explicit UN-Russian understanding
was made during the Vienna consultations, which took place just
before the UN attended Sochi – namely that I as Special Envoy would
be free to draw not only on names emanating from Sochi but also on
other names, including of Syrians who did not attend Sochi, if
necessary to form a balanced and credible list.
8. And
let me recall also that Security Council resolution 2254 anyway
mandates the United Nations to convene parties in the political
process, and tasks the Geneva talks to set a schedule and process for
drafting a new constitution.
9. The
Middle Third list was developed very carefully, believe me, by the
United Nations. We received inputs, listened to many – including
the guarantors of course, and also others. Above all, we also did our
own careful homework.
10. We
sought out credible and neutral Syrian experts – including people
who have played a role in previous constitution-making process –
who could bridge build between the sides, and whom the two sides
could constructively work with. We looked for respected civil society
representatives, independents and other Syrians of standing –
individuals who could somehow represent the many Syrians who are not
political affiliates but still deserve a stake in their future – as
in any other constitutional process.
11. Of
course, we do know that all Syrians, like all of us, have some
political opinions or leanings – that is natural. But we sought a
fair balance between those leanings, so that no political side could
dominate the committee – this is a key part of what we
consider the “credibility and legitimacy” of the list.
12. We
ensured adequate representation of different ethnic, religious and
regional backgrounds – as well as a balance between those living
inside Syria and the millions of Syrians for the moment living
outside their country due to the conflict.
13. And
finally, with the full support of the Secretary-General and as part
of our commitment to give effect to Security Council resolutions on
women, peace and security, we insisted that a minimum of 30% of the
constitutional committee should be women, and this meant bringing
many qualified and expert women, of all backgrounds, into the Middle
Third. Indeed, the proposed Middle Third is almost half women.
14. That
is what has guided the UN effort to facilitate the Middle Third, and
to revise it into a new list, as it has already done.
15. I
have also carefully facilitated the development, as 2254 and Sochi
both say that I should, on a logical basis, of some basic aspects of
process and rules of procedure that could enable the constitutional
committee to work.
16. From
the three lists – government, opposition, and middle third – it
would be possible to identify a smaller group – 15 from each – to
form a drafting body of the constitutional committee.
17. The
constitutional committee could be mandated to draft
for popular approval a constitutional reform, as a contribution to
the political settlement in Syria leading
to a new political structure, giving
effect to the Sochi Final Statement of 30 January 2018, within the
context of the Geneva process to implement Security
Council resolution 2254. Such a constitutional reform could aim to
embody in
the constitution and constitutional practices of Syria the letter and
spirit of the 12 Principles developed in Geneva, with a lot of hard
work, and endorsed in Sochi, which offer the people of Syria a vision
of a future that can be shared by all.
18. The
constitutional committee could work in Geneva with impartial Syrian
chairmanship acceptable to all components and supported by UN
facilitation, and with appropriate decision-making arrangements.
19. These
arrangements should all take place consistent with respect for the
sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Syria,
and with UN facilitation to enable the Syrians themselves to engage
each other and to independently and democratically determine their
own future with dignity.
20. Clearly,
the key parties are the Syrian parties, and equally, the prospect of
a constitutional committee being effective does rest also on strong
support from key countries. These will be further engaged by us in
the coming few weeks.
21. So,
let me start with the Government of Syria. Deputy Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister Moualem met the Secretary-General during the General
Assembly – I also attended the meeting.
22. The
Foreign Minister on that occasion did strongly cast doubt on the
Sochi statement and its outcome, indicating that the Government had
very different understandings about those matters. He called for a
fundamental reassessment of the work that has been done to date on
the Middle Third list and rules of procedure, and on the UN
facilitation role.
23. For
his part, the Secretary-General reiterated the Sochi statement and
outcome and the mandate of the Security Council, and offered to have
me explain the work that has been done on that basis in much more
detail. He appealed to the Foreign Minister for the Government to
work in partnership with the UN.
24. For
their part, two of the Astana guarantors – Russia and Iran – have
also called the Middle Third list into significant question –
indicating that it does not meet the requirements of the Government,
notwithstanding the extensive consultations and the Sochi
understandings. They have at the same time indicated that they
continue to engage the Government of Syria on the matters. Senior
Russian officials will indeed be in Damascus in the coming days.
25. Turkey,
which had initially felt that our list could benefit from revision,
has indicated lately its full understanding of the logic and
composition of the list now on the table.
26. For
its part, the Syrian Negotiations Committee – “the opposition”
– confirmed to the Secretary-General during the General Assembly
their readiness to move ahead on the basis of the broad package on
the table. The opposition met at the beginning of this week in
Riyadh, and most of their nominees for the constitutional committee
are at present, while we are talking, sitting together in internal
consultations to prepare for their work.
27. The
Small Group of countries – Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, the United Kingdom and the United States – have all urged
that the United Nations convene the constitutional committee without
delay. Similar messages came during the last few days from a large
number of European and Arab Foreign Ministers with whom I met during
the General Assembly.
Querido
Señor Presidente,
28. I
wish to inform the Security Council that the Government of Syria has
invited me to Damascus next week. This is a follow-up to the meeting
with the Secretary-General during the General Assembly. I plan to
engage them on the work that has been done on the Constitutional
Committee. I will of course be ready, if the Council so wishes, to
report back to it after my visit on whether these direct
consultations have produced, as we hope, the approval and agreement
on a credible and inclusive third list.
29. I
also intend before the end of the month to invite the Astana
guarantors for consultations with me in Geneva, and also to engage
the Small Group. That would, in my view, be the last opportunity for
putting finishing touches on the preparations for convening a
constitutional committee.
30. I
would hope then to be in a position to issue invitations to convene
the constitutional committee hopefully during November. I offer no
prediction whether this is possible be possible. What I do know
is that after nine months of preparations, it is important to launch
a credible constitutional committee and that whatever transpires, I
would like to come back and brief you in November on where we
stand.
31. Let
me remind all of us: without steps on a safe, calm and neutral
environment, the work of a constitutional committee will not end up
being very meaningful. We all know that. But first thing first: the
constitutional committee. On this front, despite our best efforts
regarding steps on safe, calm and neutral environment, we have seen
very few concrete outcomes during 2018. I hope we will see more in
the coming months. For instance, the Working Group on the release of
detainees and abductees, the handover of bodies and the
identification of missing people met again last week in Tehran -- but
we keep urging for the first tangible results. Many, many people in
Syria are waiting for that.
32. Let’s
look now at the big picture for a moment and then we go back to the
constitutional committee. A catastrophe has so far been averted in
Idlib, and the Russian-Turkish memorandum of understanding appears to
be being implemented. Major strides have been taken in defeating
terrorism and this should continue to be a priority. ISIL’s
territorial base has largely been erased – though it does remain
dangerous. The de facto map of Syria is for the moment relatively
stable, but it must not become a de facto soft partition, nor a
theatre for new international confrontations. There must therefore be
a political path forward. President Putin and President Erdogan said
that the Idlib deal offered a window for the constitutional committee
to be established and the political process to go ahead. The European
Union will host for instance a third Brussels Conference in March
2019 – we know that its decisions will depend on a credible
political process.
33. The
United Nations has done all that it can, and frankly more, to find a
way to convene a credible and balanced constitutional committee. We
are ready to do more and in an accelerated way during the forthcoming
month, taking advantage of the Idlib window of opportunity, but we
are not ready to convene a committee that is not credible and
balanced.
34. In
that regard, having consulted the Secretary-General, let me also give
you some heads up - if I may: I will myself be moving on as of the
last week of November. I have had the honor to serve for four years
and four months as Special Envoy. I have for some time been
discussing with the Secretary-General my desire for purely personal
reasons to move on. I have deeply appreciated his constant support
and wise counsel on this matter.
35. But
I will definitely not say goodbyes or engage in reflections today. A
month can be a century in politics. We still have a very intense and
hopefully fruitful month ahead. I am not laying down the charge until
the last hour of the last day of my mandate. In fact, the
Secretary-General has instructed me that my last month of service
should be used to actively verify whether the UN is in a position or
not to convene a credible and balanced constitutional committee and
report to the Security Council accordingly. I plan to do so with
clarity and frankness, and count on the support of the Security
Council and all Syrian counterparts to do so.
36. So,
let me summarise some bottom lines of my message, which has been
long:
1)
The Idlib MOU provides a unique window of opportunity for launching a
credible and inclusive constitutional committee. We must take
advantage of it. This is and remains our aim. And our assessment is
that, if there is a political will, there is no reason for the
constitutional committee not to convene in November, 10 months after
the Sochi declaration;
2)
The main reason so far for the delay in convening in Geneva the first
session of a credible and inclusive constitutional committee, is the
difficulties that the Government finds to accept the current Third
list of participants prepared by the UN, as per the Sochi declaration
and resolution 2254;
3)
I plan to discuss this pending issue during my forthcoming mission to
Damascus, and report back to the Secretary-General and the Security
Council thereafter on the outcome;
4)
Since my personal plan – purely personal, believe me – in
consultation with the Secretary-General, has always been to end my
mission for purely personal reasons in the last week of November
2018, which means 4 years and 4 months after the beginning of this
mission, my intention, and as per the Secretary-General’s
instructions, is to dedicate this crucial last month to actively
verify once for all the feasibility of the implementation of a
credible and inclusive constitutional committee, and hence also the
implementation of the Sochi declaration.
5)
I will therefore report in November to the Secretary-General and the
Security Council on the status of the implementation of the
constitutional committee in order to allow the Secretary-General and
the Security Council to draw their own conclusions so that my own
successor will be able to start from a clean ground his or her
mission.
Thank
you.
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