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Sigrid Kaag, Special Coordinator of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission
to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons programme,
speaks to the press following her briefing to the Security Council
in closed-door consultations. 05 November 2013
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THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL
27
November 2013
Dear
Mr. President,
I
have the honour to transmit the second monthly report of the
Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) pursuant to paragraph 2 (f) of OPCW Executive Council
decision EC-M-3 3/DEC.1 and paragraph 12 of Security Council
resolution 2118 (2013) (see annex). The present letter also provides
the information requested in that resolution on the activities of the
United Nations that took place from 23
October to 26 November 2013 related to the implementation of the
resolution.
Introduction
A
number of milestones were reached during the reporting period, which
the Director—General has detailed at length in his report. The
Syrian Arab Republic submitted its initial declaration to OPCW on 23
October 2013, in which it disclosed details about its chemical
weapons pro gramme. Furthermore, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted,
as a part of its declaration, its plan for the programme’s
destruction. In this plan, the Syrian authorities proposed that its
chemical material should be removed from its territory for
destruction.
On
21 November 2013, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted an amendment to
its initial declaration increasing the total amount of declared
munitions to approximately 1,260 items. '
On
31 October 2013, the Joint Mission confirmed that the Government of
the Syrian Arab Republic had completed the functional destruction of
critical equipment for all of its declared chemical weapons
production facilities and mixing/filling plants, rendering them
inoperable. By doing so, Syria met the deadline set by the OPCW
Executive Council to complete destruction as soon as possible, and in
any case not later than 1 November 2013.
On
15 November 2013, the OPCW Executive Council approved the destruction
plan of the Syrian Arab Republic for the elimination of its chemical
weapons programme. In its decision (EC-M-34/DEC.l), the Executive
Council set out detailed requirements and a clear set of timelines
for the removal and destruction of primary chemical material outside
the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as the destruction of other
chemical material, unfilled chemical munitions and chemical weapons
production facilities inside the Syrian Arab Republic.
During
this reporting period, the Special Coordinator visited Moscow,
Washington D.C., The Hague, London and Ankara. She also participated
in planning discussions at OPCW headquarters and addressed the
Executive Council in The Hague, briefed the United Nations Security
Council in
New
York and addressed the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels. In each
location, she held bilateral meetings with Member State counterparts
to brief on the progress of the Joint Mission and to coordinate and
seek support for its future activities. In addition, in all her
meetings she solicited financial and in-kind voluntary contributions
to two trust funds setup by OPCW and the United Nations to ensure
that the Joint Mission operations are sufficiently funded and
equipped for the significant tasks ahead.
The
Special Coordinator also met with representatives of the United
Nations in Geneva, including those of the Joint Special
Representative for Syria, to coordinate relevant activities of the
Joint Mission. She met with officials of the World Health
Organization and is in contact with the United Nations Environment
Programme to seek specialized assistance and advice in the domains of
public health and environmental protection.
The
Special Coordinator also met with counterparts in the Syrian Arab
Republic in Damascus to coordinate Joint Mission activities and to
seek the Government’s continuing commitment to its obligations
under Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) and OPCW Executive
Council decisions. The discussions reiterated the critical need to
ensure the security of Joint Mission personnel and premises. She also
met with representatives of the National Coalition for Syrian
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces in Istanbul to explain the Joint
Mission’s mandated tasks and activities ahead of the Syrian Arab
Republic commencing the transportation of chemical material inside
the country and to discuss the need for the safety of the convoys.
In
conducting these activities, the Special Coordinator has remained in
constant contact With the Director-General of OPCW and myself to
ensure that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
headquarters in The Hague and the United Nations Secretariat are
fully and expeditiously informed of progress made and challenges
faced in implementing mandated tasks.
United
Nations component activities
The
United Nations component of the Joint Mission has augmented its
essential staffing, assets and capabilities required on the ground in
Damascus, has developed the Joint Mission office in Cyprus and has
established a small New York office, While remaining focused on
having only alight footprint in each location. To this end, the Joint
Mission continues to draw on
United
Nations resources in the region as well as OPCW and United Nations
Headquarters. Some of the United Nations support responsibilities
continue to be met through temporary deployments of United Nations
personnel Who provide short-term capabilities that are critical to
the Joint Mission. Currently there are 15 OPCW experts and 48 United
Nations personnel working in the Joint Mission, including national
staff. These numbers for both OPCW experts and United Nations
personnel are tailored to the specific operational requirements of
the Joint Mission.
The
United Nations component in Damascus continued to provide support
through coordination and liaison with the Government of the Syrian
Arab Republic, opposition groups and international stakeholders. It
also provided the Joint Mission with security advice and risk
assessments, information assessments, communications and outreach,
logistical expertise, and logistical and administrative support.
The
United Nations component continuously assesses the security situation
as it affects the operations of the Joint Mission in the Syrian Arab
Republic. It is undertaking measures to install security enhancements
at its current headquarters in Damascus. While some enhancements have
been implemented, others are either being installed or awaiting
importation clearances. All armoured vehicles have been equipped with
communications and tracking systems. Safety and security measures
have been put in place for all personnel and a programme of security
training courses has commenced. Despite these measures, the facility
remains vulnerable to certain risks, and the Joint Mission is
actively exploring viable alternative locations to base its
activities, should the security situation require it.
As
I stated in my last letter to the Security Council (8/2013/629), the
safety and security of all Joint Mission personnel is of central
concern to me, the Director-General of OPCW and the Special
Coordinator. The security environment in the Syrian Arab Republic,
including in Damascus, remains complex, challenging and
unpredictable. The safety and security of Joint Mission personnel
remains the ultimate responsibility of the Government of the Syrian
Arab Republic. In addition, all parties must also ensure the access
and safety of Joint Mission personnel at sites Where they may exert
influence, in order that the Joint Mission may fulfill its mandate.
Key
personnel have now deployed to the Joint Mission office in Cyprus. A
donor coordination/advisory cell has been set up to work closely With
international contributors. A Swedish aircraft and crew have deployed
to Cyprus to carry out cargo and personnel airlift operations for the
Joint Mission. Romanian Close Personal Protection officers, based
partially in Cyprus to provide protection capabilities for the
Special Coordinator in the mission area, have also deployed. It is
envisioned that a Danish Close Protection team will assume this role
from 1 March 2014 until the end of the mandate of the Mission.
A
New York office of the Joint Mission has been established at United
Nations Headquarters in order to communicate and coordinate closely
with Member States and to ensure timely follow-up on behalf of the
Joint Mission. A United Nations Liaison Officer has been continuously
present at OPCW headquarters in The Hague to further ensure close
collaboration and coordination.
The
United Nations and OPCW are still negotiating the tripartite
status-of-mission agreement with the Government of the Syrian Arab
Republic. In addition, the United Nations and OPCW are seeking to
conclude a memorandum of understanding With the Syrian Arab Republic
regarding the provision of medical services to Joint Mission
personnel.
Phase
II activities
The
Joint Mission continues With ongoing phase II inspection and
verification activities. While 3 of the 23 sites declared by the
Government of the Syrian Arab Republic have not received physical
inspections by Joint Mission personnel owing to safety and security
concerns, 2 of these 3 sites have now been verified with the support
of sealed GPS cameras used by Syrian personnel, in accordance with
guidance provided by Joint Mission inspectors. The exact geographical
location and the time the images were captured were then fully
authenticated. One of the two sites declared as abandoned by the
Syrian Arab Republic was verified as such. Only one site remains to
be verified. It has been declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as
inactive. This site Will be verified as soon as conditions permit,
and following a security assessment by Joint Mission personnel.
In
addition, during the reporting period, Joint Mission inspectors also
conducted visits to verify the complete destruction of Category 3
munitions at all relevant sites in the Damascus area, The Joint
Mission has also completed plans for visits to the Horns area to
verify the destruction of Category 3 munitions at the sites there.
The Joint Mission remains poised to conduct visits when the security
situation becomes permissive.
Also
in this reporting period the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic
began to destroy specialized and standard equipment belonging to
production facilities, in addition to special features of buildings
and standard buildings at the same locations. The Joint Mission will
begin verifying activities at these sites in the coming days.
Phase
III activities
In
preparation for phase III activities, Joint Mission personnel visited
a chemical material storage site near Damascus to determine the
nature and quantity of specialist packaging materials required to
safely transport all declared chemical material storage containers.
The information was provided to an Operational Planning Group meeting
at OPCW headquarters in The Hague, which met from 6 to 9 November
2013. Important pledges of in-kind donations, particularly from the
United States of America, have since been confirmed to ensure safe
and secure packaging, handling and transporting of the chemical
material during phase III.
The
Operational Planning Group meeting also supported the Syrian Arab
Republic in outlining steps the Syrian authorities would be required
to take for the removal of selected chemical material from the
country for destruction outside its territory. The report of the
Group includes timelines and projected logistics and security
requirements considered necessary by the Syrian Arab Republic in this
regard.
Following
a request by the Director—General of OPCW, on 15 November 2013, the
Special Coordinator sent a letter to all Member States attaching the
projected logistics and security requirements identified by the
Syrian Arab Republic as needed to meet the most urgent impending
deadlines set out in the OPCW Executive Council decision of the same
day.
The
Director-General of OPCW made the letter of the Special Coordinator
available to States parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention for
their consideration.
Specialist
packaging materials have begun to arrive in Lebanon, and the Joint
Mission is contracting transport for onward movement to Damascus.
Significant numbers of trucks Will be required to transfer the
packaging materials overland to the Syrian capital. The Syrian
authorities have identified a staging area in Damascus to store the
packaging materials prior to their distribution to the various
declared sites. In this connection, the United Nations and OPCW
maintain that the Syrian Arab Republic, in accordance with its
obligations as a State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, is
responsible for preserving public health and the environment.
In
preparation for the packaging of the chemical agents, the Joint
Mission has organized a packaging and International Maritime
Dangerous Goods course in Beirut to train select Syrian personnel.
Joint
Mission personnel have conducted an assessment mission to the port of
Latakia, the location designated by the Syrian Arab Republic prior to
the transfer of chemical material out of the country. The Joint
Mission determined that the port city had all the necessary
capabilities required to handle the planned loading and shipment of
chemical warfare agents, as well as sufficiently secure facilities
for the deployment of Joint Mission personnel. The Joint Mission is
currently working to establish a temporary forward operating base in
Latakia to support the inspection and verification of chemical
material prior to loading. Chemical material may have to be repacked
for maritime transport to ensure the highest safety standards.
The
Joint Mission is also coordinating the offers of assistance and the
planning With respect to the support of the maritime transfer of
selected chemical material from the Syrian Arab Republic. In this
regard, several Member States have indicated their Willingness to
provide specialized cargo container vessels capable of safely storing
and transporting the material at sea. Member States have also offered
maritime escorts to ensure security of the vessels. The Joint Mission
is in discussions with these Member States to facilitate an agreed
arrangement. A maritime planning group, consisting of interested
Member States, Will meet in Cyprus to take discussions forward.
Details concerning the final destruction plan need to be available as
soon as possible. In this regard, the United Nations and OPCW
maintain that the States undertaking the removal and maritime
transport should seek to agree among themselves on questions of
possession, jurisdiction and control and the related questions of
liability for, and mitigation of, security and other risks, including
in respect of damage to public health and the environment.
In
addition to the two trust funds set up by OPCW and the United Nations
to fund these activities, the Director-General of OPCW was requested
by the Executive Council to set up a third special trust fund to seek
financial contributions for the complete destruction of the binary
chemical components and associated reaction masses of the Syrian Arab
Republic outside the country. On 20 November 2013, OPCW also issued
an “Expression of Interest” seeking to identify commercial
companies interested in participating in a future tender for the
treatment and disposal of hazardous and non-hazardous organic and
non-organic chemicals and related packaging materials. Member States
are encouraged to contribute to all three trust funds set up by OPCW
and the United Nations to ensure successful implementation of the
mandate.
Conclusion
The
Joint Mission has made considerable progress in verifying the
implementation of phase II by the Syrian Arab Republic, in planning
for phase III and in starting initial phase III activities. The OPCW
Executive Council decision of 15 November 2013 set ambitious
timelines. Achieving these timelines Will require an unprecedented
effort and coordination from all stakeholders under extremely
challenging conditions.
Several
Member States have played a critical role assisting in the
implementation of respective OPCW Executive Council decisions and
Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). In particular, I would like
to reiterate my appreciation to the Government of Cyprus for agreeing
to host the Joint Mission office on its territory and for
facilitating the deployment of Joint Mission personnel and assets. I
would like to extend my sincere appreciation to the Government of
Lebanon for facilitating the transit of all Joint Mission personnel
and assets through Beirut’s entry hubs to the Syrian Arab Republic.
In
addition, a number of Member States have provided material funding,
technical expertise and critical assets to the Joint Mission, and
several other Member States are awaiting confirmation of their
offers. The Joint Mission has received valuable additional in-kind
support from Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States and the
European Union. As at 25 November 2013, the OPCW trust fund included
€10.8 million With contributions from Canada, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, the Republic of
Korea, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The
United Nations trust fund currently includes $2 million from the
United States and pledges in the amount of €250,000 from Denmark
and €250,000 from Luxembourg. Without this assistance, the Joint
Mission would not have been able to implement its mandated tasks.
Going
forward, there remain a number of issues and circumstances that could
impact the implementation of mandated tasks in accordance with OPCW
Executive Council decisions and Security Council resolution 2118
(2013).
First,
Member State voluntary in-kind contributions continue to be at the
forefront of requirements. As described above, progress has been made
in procuring and delivering packaging material for phase HI
activities. Member States considering contributions of assets
necessary to ensure security have been asked to engage bilaterally
with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. At the same time,
the Syrian authorities are being encouraged to consider alternative
options to ensure the safety and security of inland transportation
for the chemical material. In addition, it is possible that other
needs may be identified regarding the destruction of chemical
material and reaction mass outside the Syrian Arab Republic, as well
as possible additional equipment needed to complete the destruction
of Syrian chemical weapons, material and production facilities inside
the Syrian Arab Republic.
Second,
full clarity regarding the plan for the removal and destruction of
chemical material outside Syrian territory is critical, including the
location for destruction. In order to move forward, detailed
arrangements need to be put in place, including timelines concerning
the availability of equipment and the docking facilities, and careful
agreement regarding specific roles and functions of the Joint Mission
and concerned Member States.
Third,
the implementation of Joint Mission mandated objectives cannot occur
without conditiOns inside the Syrian Arab Republic that are conducive
to carrying out these tasks. The Syrian authorities have continued
their constructive cooperation with the Joint Mission.
Representatives of the Syrian opposition based in Istanbul have also
indicated their support for the safe transportation of convoys
containing chemical material. The Security Council, in resolution
2118 (2013), emphasized the importance of ensuring the security of
activities undertaken by Joint Mission personnel and allowing them
immediate and unfettered access. Furthermore, the Council, by that
resolution, decided that all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic
shall cooperate fully in this regard. Nevertheless, recent fighting
in the Syrian Arab Republic shows that the security situation is
volatile, unpredictable and highly dangerous.
The
Director-General of OPCW and I remain deeply concerned about the
safety and security of Joint Mission personnel.
Given
the complexity of the mission and the unpredictable operating
environment, many factors remain outside the control of the Joint
Mission. Its personnel are making every effort to ensure that the
necessary arrangements are in place to implement mandated objectives.
The international community should remain unwavering in its support
to the women and men of the Joint Mission. The United Nations will
continue to act in partnership with OPCW, and through the Joint
Mission, to implement the provisions of the decisions of the
Executive Council (EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DECl) and
Security
Council resolution 2118 (2013) in their entirety.
I
should be grateful if you would bring this letter urgently to the
attention of the members of the Security Council.
Please
accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.
BAN
Ki-moon