The
Security Council,
Recalling
its resolutions 2319 (2016), 2314 (2016), 2253 (2015), 2235 (2015),
2209 (2015), 2178 (2014), 2118 (2013), 1989 (2011), 1540 (2004) and
1267(1999),
Condemning
in the strongest terms any use of chemical weapons and toxic
chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and expressing
grave concern that civilians continue to be killed and injured by
chemical weapons and toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab
Republic,
Reaffirming
that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of
international law and reiterating
that those individuals, entities, groups or governments responsible
for any use of chemical weapons must be held accountable,
Recalling
the decision of the OPCW Executive Council EC-86/DEC.9 dated
13 October 2017, which encouraged States Parties to share,
according to their national laws and as appropriate, information
related to cases of developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling,
retaining, transferring, or using chemical weapons by non-state
actors, as well as domestic investigations conducted with regard to
chemical weapons, including information on any subsequent criminal or
other legal proceedings undertaken,
Welcoming
full and profound cooperation extended by the government of the
Syrian Arab Republic to the FFM and JIM in establishing facts related
to the incidents with chemical weapons in Um-Housh and Khan Shaykhun,
Noting
that the government of the Syrian Arab Republic called upon the FFM
and JIM to conduct the investigation at the scene in Khan Shaykhun
and granted access to its Shayrat airbase, thus enabling the JIM and
OPCW experts to verify its premises by taking environmental samples
for the presence of traces of sarin as it was allegedly delivered
from there and used in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017, interviewing in
this regard the airbase staff, examining logbooks and aircraft
stationed there,
Expressing
its regret that the FFM and JIM failed to visit Khan Shaykhun and to
collect environmental samples at Shayrat airbase although the
necessary security and technical conditions, as the Council learnt,
were in place,
Expressing
also its regret that the samples the FFM relied on in the course of
investigation lacked full chain of custody envisaged in the working
instruction of the OPCW Technical Secretariat "Chain of Custody
and Documentation for OPCW Samples On-site",
Recalling
that resolution 2319 encouraged the JIM to consult appropriate United
Nations counter-terrorism and non-proliferation bodies, in particular
the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 and
1267/1989/2253
ISIL
(Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, in order to exchange
information on non-state actors' perpetration, organization,
sponsorship, or other involvement in the use of chemicals as weapons
in the Syrian Arab Republic,
Recalling
that resolution 2319 reaffirmed the JIM's ability to examine
additional information and evidence that was not obtained or prepared
by the FFM but was related to the mandate of the JIM,
Recalling
further
that the United Nations Secretary-General in his letter to the
President of the Security Council on 27 August 2015 committed to
undertake the recruitment of impartial and experienced staff of the
JIM to provide the relevant requisite skill sets on the basis of
professional expertise and experience, with due regard to the
importance of recruiting staff on as wide geographical basis as
possible, which fully applies to the FFM, as provided in its terms of
reference and the CWC,
Noting
that the FFM continues to examine other allegations of chemical
weapons use in Syria, unfortunately once again in a remote mode,
which does not allow to ensure the necessary quality of the
investigation,
Expressing
further alarm that chemical weapons have been used in Syria by
non-state actors and that the so-called Islamic State (also known as
ISIL or Da'esh), the Al Nusrah Front and other non-state actors used
or have shown obvious intent to develop, acquire, manufacture,
possess, transport, transfer, or use chemical weapons,
Reaffirming
that no party in the Syrian Arab Republic should use, develop,
produce, acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons,
Having
considered
the seventh and the previous reports of the JIM,
Proceeding
from the understanding that in view of the experience gained, there
is the need for further improvements and update of the JIM's mandate
as it was envisaged in paragraph 1 of resolution 2319,
1. Decides
to renew the mandate of the JIM, as set out in resolution 2319 and in
this resolution, until 16 May 2018 with a possibility of further
extension and update by the Security Council if it deems necessary;
2. Reaffirms
paragraphs 1-4, 6-9, and 12 of resolution 2235 as amended, where
appropriate, by this resolution;
3. Requests
the JIM to dispatch as soon as possible an investigative team to the
site of the incident in Khan Shaykhun to conduct full-scale
investigation using the whole spectrum of relevant methods;
4. Urges
all parties in Syria and Member States with relevant capabilities to
facilitate without any further delay free and safe access for JIM's
experts to the site of the incident in Khan Shaykhun and adjacent
areas;
5. Requests
the JIM to dispatch immediately another investigative team to Shayrat
airbase in the Syrian Arab Republic to collect environmental samples
in order to verify the allegations that sarin used in Khan Shaykhun
had been stored at the airbase;
6. Requests
the JIM in the light of paragraph 8 of its seventh report to
reevaluate its earlier assessments and conclusions, paying special
attention to the incident with chemical weapons in the town of Sarmin
since the JIM itself described as "improbable" the
eventuality in which a chlorine-filled barrel bomb, dropped from a
helicopter, could have impacted through the ventilation shaft with a
matching dimension;
7. Decides
that the JIM in conducting its investigations must be guided by high
standards established by the CWC and, accordingly, use the whole
spectrum of relevant methods envisaged in the above-mentioned
Convention and in particular Part XI of its Annex on implementation
and verification, which includes investigation, sampling,
interviewing witnesses and collection of evidence and information on
the site of an incident;
8. Requests
the JIM in addition to provisions of paragraph 7 above to make use of
the recommendations contained in its fourth and fifth reports
(paragraph 49 and paragraph 11 respectively) in order to ensure full
scale, professional and high quality investigations;
9. Directs
the JIM in the course of its investigations to make full use of
evidence collected by the FFM in accordance with the CWC high
standards, as referred to in paragraph 7 above;
10. Requests
the JIM to retain its findings and the findings of the FFM, not based
on the results of on-site investigation, as well as remotely
collected evidence and information until such time, when full-scale
and high quality investigation on the site of an incident becomes
possible;
11. Decides
that any JIM's investigation shall indispensably involve collection
and analysis of additional information and evidence that was not
obtained or prepared by the FFM but was related to the mandate of the
JIM, including all information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic
as well as others pertaining to activities of non-state actors with
regard to using, developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling,
retaining or transferring chemical weapons;
12. Calls
on
the JIM and FFM to engage into the closest cooperation on all the
identified cases of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab
Republic in order for the investigation to be as full and
comprehensive as possible, with the involvement of all the necessary
procedures and methods;
13. Reiterates
its support expressed in paragraph 5 of resolution 2209 for the OPCW
Executive Council decision of 4 February 2015 to entrust the OPCW FFM
with the task "to study all available information relating to
allegations of use of chemical weapons in Syria" and underlines
that paragraph 5 or other provisions of its resolution 2235 do not
affect this tasking and do not limit it to determination that a
specific incident in Syria involved or likely involved the use of
chemical weapons only;
14. Urges
the FFM to timely inform the JIM through the Director General of the
OPCW Technical Secretariat, in accordance with the JIM's mandate as
the OPCW-UN joint instrument, on the inability to organize an on-site
inspection within the process of investigating a chemical incident in
order to make the UN Security Council be aware of the problem;
15. Requests
the Director General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat to urgently
provide the JIM, in the case of a necessity, with technical experts
possessing protective gear and special equipment, who would be able
to work on the site of an incident as a part of the JIM's team, to
collect samples as well as process them in accordance with the
standard OPCW procedures of collecting and analyzing authentic
samples including, where applicable, their express analysis;
16. Encourages
the JIM to consult and cooperate with appropriate United Nations
counterterrorism and non-proliferation bodies, in particular the
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 and 1267/1989/2253
ISIL
(Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, in order to exchange
information on non-state actors' perpetration, organization,
sponsorship, or other involvement in the use of chemicals as weapons
in the Syrian Arab Republic;
17. Invites
the UN Secretary-General to ensure recruiting personnel for the JIM
in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 2235 on as wide
geographical basis as possible and recommends the Director General of
the OPCW Technical Secretariat to review the composition of the FFM
in the light of paragraph 8 of its terms of reference;
18. Calls
on
all other states to cooperate fully with the JIM and in particular to
provide it and the FFM with any relevant information they may possess
pertaining to individuals, entities, groups, or governments who were
perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in use of
chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic;
19. Requests
the UN Secretary-General, in coordination with the Director General
of the OPCW Technical Secretariat, to submit to the Security Council,
for its authorization, within 20 days of the adoption of this
resolution, recommendations on possible additional measures, if
necessary, on strengthening the JIM in the light of this resolution,
and expresses
its intent to respond to the recommendations within five days of
their receipt;
20. Requests
the JIM to submit to the Council and the OPCW Executive Council by 1
February 2018 and 1 May 2018 the reports on the results of its
investigations conducted in full accordance with paragraphs 7 and 8
above;
21. Requests
the JIM to collect and analyze information on trends in the
activities of non-state actors involving preparations for use and
actual use of chemical weapons and submit to the Council relevant
analytical reports in the middle and at the end of its new term;
22. Decides
to remain seized of the matter.
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