Sixteenth Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the
Security Council on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559
(2004)
I.
Background
1.
The current report is my sixteenth semi-annual report on the
implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). It reviews
and assesses the process of the implementation of the resolution
since my last report issued on 20 April 2012 (S/2012/244). It notes
the absence of further tangible progress on key provisions of the
resolution, and highlights concerns that continue to threaten
Lebanon’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence, despite President Michel Sleiman’s and Prime Minister
Najib Mikati’s careful policy of disassociating Lebanon from the
Syrian crisis, and the resumption of the National Dialogue.
2.
Over the last six months, the ongoing turmoil in the Syrian Arab
Republic has further affected Lebanon, increasing political
polarization and concern that the unrest in Syria could have negative
consequences for Lebanon’s stability. Incidents of cross-border
fire, incursions, abductions and arms trafficking across the
Lebanese-Syrian border have increased significantly. Syrian army
violations of Lebanon’s sovereignty have intensified, including
intermittent shelling from Syria. These incidents have caused death,
injury and damage to property in Lebanon.
3.
The crisis in Syria has posed new challenges to the security and
authority of the Lebanese state. In particular, domestic tensions
have significantly increased across Lebanon between groups with
diverging positions vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis, leading to armed
clashes that resulted in death and injury in the north of the
country. In addition, Lebanon has continued to host a large number of
Syrian nationals fleeing the violence in their country, as well as
Palestinian refugees who were based in Syria.
4.
On 5 July, an opposition Member of Parliament, Boutros Harb, was
targeted in an assassination attempt in the building housing his
office in Beirut. This was the second incident of this type this year
after the assassination attempt on Lebanese Forces leader Samir
Geagea near his residence in March.
5.
On 9 August, Lebanese authorities arrested former Minister and Member
of Parliament Michel Samaha for involvement in smuggling explosives
from Syria, allegedly as part of a plot against targets in Lebanon,
with the aim of provoking confessional strife. Syrian General Ali
Mamlouk and Colonel Ali Adnan have also been identified as suspects
in the same case with plotting to assassinate political and religious
figures in the country and planning terrorist attacks by a Lebanese
military court. More recently, the Military Court has been examining
evidence that the Adviser to the Syrian President, Buthaina Shaaban,
was also allegedly involved in the case. Samaha’s public alignment
with positions of the Syrian Government has deepened concerns about
attempts to draw Lebanon into regional events.
6.
On 16 September, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Ali
Jafari, stated publicly that members of the elite Quds Force were
present in Lebanon as advisers. The President and the Government of
Lebanon have requested immediate clarifications from the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Shortly thereafter, the Foreign
Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran denied the statement
attributed to the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
7.
On 11 October, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah confirmed publicly
that his party had launched an Iranian-built drone, assembled in
Lebanon, to Israel for a reconnaissance mission. The Israeli Air
Force shot it down on 6 October over southern Israel.
II.
Implementation of Resolution 1559 (2004)
8.
Since the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1559 on 2 September
2004, several of its provisions have been implemented as highlighted
in my previous reports. Presidential and parliamentary elections took
place in a free and fair manner. Syria withdrew its troops and
military assets from Lebanon in April 2005. Lebanon and Syria
established full diplomatic relations in 2009.
9.
President Sleiman and Prime Minister Mikati have continued to affirm
during the reporting period Lebanon’s respect for all United
Nations resolutions. However, the escalating crisis in Syria has
further stalled processes that are fundamental for the implementation
of this and other Security Council resolutions pertaining to Lebanon.
In addition it has increased political tensions in the country.
10.
The delineation of the Syrian-Lebanese border, which was strongly
encouraged by the Security Council in its resolution 1680 (2006), has
not yet taken place. Moreover, the existence and activities of
Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias continue to pose a threat to the
stability of the country and the region, and highlight the need for
the Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces to increase
their efforts to reach a full monopoly on the possession of weapons
and the use of force throughout Lebanon.
11.
My representatives and I have remained in regular contact with all
parties in Lebanon over the reporting period, as well as with
relevant regional and international leaders. I met Prime Minister
Mikati in New York on 27 September. On this occasion, I reiterated
the United Nations’ unwavering commitment to Lebanon’s stability
and security in these difficult times for the country, as well as the
need for Lebanon to continue its efforts to meet all of its
international obligations, in particular those under relevant
Security Council resolutions.
A.
Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, Unity, and Political Independence
of Lebanon
12.
Resolution 1559 (2004) aims at strengthening the sovereignty,
territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon
under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon
throughout the country, in line with the Taif Agreement of 1989 to
which all the political parties in Lebanon have committed themselves.
This objective has remained the highest priority of my efforts to
facilitate the implementation of all resolutions pertaining to
Lebanon.
13.
In its resolution 1680 (2006), the Security Council strongly
encourages the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to respond
positively to the request by the Government of Lebanon to delineate
their common border. I have continued to call upon Syria and Lebanon
to achieve the full delineation of their common border. However,
given the unrest in neighbouring Syria, no tangible steps have been
taken by either side during the period under review towards the
delineation and demarcation of the border between Lebanon and Syria.
14.
I recall that the delineation and demarcation of Lebanon’s
boundaries remain an essential element to guarantee the country’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is also a critical step to
allow for proper border control. The complex security situation along
the Syria-Lebanese border in the current circumstances further
underlines the importance of demarcating the border. As Syrian
officials now complain of arms smuggling from Lebanon to Syrian
opposition forces, it adds to the urgency of border demarcation.While
acknowledging the bilateral nature of border delineation, progress on
this matter remains an obligation of the two countries under Security
Council resolution 1680 (2006), derived from 1559 (2004).
15.
During the reporting period, there has been a significant increase of
shelling incidents and incursions by the Syrian government forces,
some of which targeted Lebanese villages along the border. From 1
January until 30 June 2012, 7 shelling incidents were reported in
northern Lebanon, against 31 incidents for the month of July only.
These incidents have led to Lebanese casualties and prompted the
Government of Lebanon to increase the deployment of the Lebanese
Armed Forces along the northern border in a cabinet decision on 9
July 2012. On 17 September, for the first time, missiles fired by
Syrian warplanes hit a remote area on the edge of the Lebanese town
of Arsal. On 21 September, the Lebanese Armed Forces reported that
there had been incidents in the Eastern Bekaa involving its personnel
and armed elements of the Syrian opposition. No casualties were
reported. The Lebanese Armed Forces stated that it would not allow
any party to use Lebanese territory in order to drag Lebanon towards
the developments of neighboring countries and renewed its
determination to defend Lebanese territory and confront any violation
regardless of the responsible party behind it.
16.
Until mid July, Lebanon complained about these Syrian violations and
incidents discreetly through military channels only. On 23 July, at
the request of President Sleiman, Lebanon protested these violations
at the political level for the first time through diplomatic
channels. On 4 September, Prime Minister Mikati instructed Lebanon’s
ambassador to Damascus to protest the Syrian army shelling along and
across the border. The Prime Minister of Lebanon expressed to me his
determination to protect Lebanon from these violations of Lebanese
sovereignty and territorial integrity. In recent public comments,
President Sleiman urged both the Syrian Authorities and the
opposition to avoid crossing into Lebanese territory and shelling
border areas. I strongly deplored these gross violations of Lebanon’s
territorial integrity and the loss of life. I called on the Syrian
Government to respect Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity in accordance with Security Council resolutions. The
Security Council also expressed grave concern over those repeated
incidents in a press statement on 18 July. The situation on Lebanon’s
northern border remains tense, underscoring the need for continued
vigilance internationally against the risk of a further spillover of
the crisis in Syria
17.
The continued occupation by the Israel Defense Forces of the northern
part of the village of Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue
Line stands in violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty, and resolutions
1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006). My representatives and I have continued
to engage closely with both parties with the view to facilitating the
withdrawal of Israeli forces from the area in implementation of
resolution 1701 (2006).
18.
There has been no progress either in relation to the issue of the
Shab’a Farm area. Neither the Syrian Arab Republic nor Israel have
reacted to the provisional definition of the area contained in my
report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), issued on 30
October 2007 (S/2007/641).
19.
The Israel Defense Forces continued to make almost daily intrusions
into Lebanese airspace, mainly by unmanned aerial vehicles, but also
fighter jets. These overflights are violations of Lebanese
sovereignty and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006). The
Government of Lebanon has repeatedly protested these violations. I
have deplored them and demanded that they cease immediately. Israeli
authorities claim in turn that these overflights are carried out for
security reasons.
B.
Extension of Lebanese Government Control over All Lebanese Territory
20.
The Government of Lebanon has reiterated to the United Nations its
intention to extend the State’s authority over all Lebanese
territory as called for by the 1989 Taif Agreement and resolution
1559 (2004) and. The Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security
Forces have played a crucial role in implementing this commitment, in
difficult security circumstances. However, the ability of the
Lebanese State to fully exercise its authority over all of its
territory remains curtailed and challenged, underlining the need for
continued international support to the Government and the Lebanese
Armed Forces.
21.
Over the last six months, Lebanon has continued to face significant
challenges to its security and stability domestically, linked
directly or indirectly to the crisis in Syria. A series of security
incidents have highlighted once again the threats to the security of
Lebanon posed by armed groups outside of the control of the state and
by the proliferation of weapons.
22.
Since May this year, there has been intermittent heavy fighting in
Tripoli between the predominantly Sunni and Alawi neighbourhoods of
Bab al-Tabbaneh and Jebel Mohsen, which continued on each occasion
for several days. They involved the use of heavy weapons and led to a
large number of deaths and injuries. The deployment of the Lebanese
Army and Internal Security Forces in the area has contained the
fighting but the situation still remains fragile. The Lebanese Armed
Forces also confiscated guns, ammunition and heavy weapons in the
area.
23.
On 15 August, dozens of Syrian nationals and a Turkish national were
abducted by a Shia clan in Beirut in retaliation for the abduction
earlier in that week of one of their family members in Syria. The
Government of Lebanon condemned those developments, called for
restraint on all sides and established a security committee to follow
up on these events. I strongly condemned kidnappings and retaliatory
hostage-taking in Syria and Lebanon and called for the immediate
release of all those detained without due process and in violation of
their human rights. On 11 September, the Lebanese Armed Forces freed
the last hostage kidnapped on 15 August, while four Syrians and a
Turkish national had been freed in an operation in south Beirut on 8
September in which government forces made several arrests in
connection with the kidnapping. Following the release on 25 September
of one of the Lebanese pilgrims kidnapped in Syria in May, nine still
remain in captivity.
24.
Lebanese public opinion is deeply divided as to events in Syria.
There have been security incidents, demonstrations and protests in
Beirut, Sidon and in the region of Akkar in particular – some
violent, others peaceful – which have reflected confessional
tensions or challenged the authority of the state, for instance
through the blocking of major highways, burning tires, shooting in
the air.
25.
Taken together the incidents listed above are indicative of the
ongoing security threats in the country and the proliferation of
weapons held by non-state actors. They are also a reminder that the
Lebanese authorities should do more to impose law and order
throughout the country. On 20 September, the Cabinet approved a
broad, medium-term plan budgeted at USD 1.6 billion to increase the
capacity and capability of the Lebanese Armed Forces, including for
border security management. The Lebanese Authorities have indicated
that they will be looking for assistance from the United Nations and
donor support for this plan as part of the implementation of
resolution 1701 (2006). I welcomed the Government’s decision.
26.
Over the reporting period, the situation in the UNIFIL area of
operation has remained cautiously calm and stable. As the Lebanese
Armed Forces deployed some troops out of South of the Litani Sector
to reinforce its efforts along the north-eastern border, UNIFIL
increased operational activities in its area. The Lebanese Armed
Forces assured the United Nations that this was a temporary measure
and that the troops would be sent back to the South as soon as the
situation allowed. In the meantime, on some occasions, UNIFIL faced
some restrictions to its freedom of movement in its area of
operations, which in some instances endangered the safety and
security of the United Nations peacekeepers. The freedom of movement
of UNIFIL and the security and safety of its personnel are integral
to the effective execution of the Force’s mandate. I condemned such
restrictions on the freedom of movement of United Nations
peacekeepers. The primary responsibility for ensuring the security
and the freedom of movement of UNIFIL in its area of operations lies
with the Government of Lebanon. I will report to the Security Council
in more detail on these issues in my upcoming report on the
implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).
27.
There are continuing reports of shootings and explosions in and
around para-military infrastructures in the Eastern Beka’a Valley
belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine –
General Command and Fatah al-Intifadah headquartered in Damascus,
confirming that para-military training occur in these facilities. The
permanent presence of such bases along the Syrian-Lebanese border
adds to the general porosity of parts of the land border and poses a
challenge for the control of the border by the Lebanese security
forces. It also makes the delineation of the border more difficult.
28.
With regard to Lebanon’s border with the Syrian Arab Republic,
there continue to be reports of arms trafficking taking place in both
directions. Several Member States have expressed deep concern over
the illegal transfer of weapons across the land borders. The Lebanese
Armed Forces has had successes in recent months in interdicting arms
consignments apparently bound for Syria. At the same time, President
Sleiman and the Lebanese Armed Forces have been very clear in
rejecting suggestions of widespread and substantial arms trafficking
towards Syria. Yet, Lebanese authorities have indicated that the land
border between Lebanon and Syria remains difficult to control, but
that the Lebanese Armed Forces are deployed and have sought to
tighten control along the border to the best of its ability by
increasing the number of patrols and observation mission. I view
these reports with the utmost seriousness but the United Nations does
not have the means to verify them independently. I have repeatedly
expressed my concerns about two-way arms smuggling across the
Syrian-Lebanese border, which poses risks to both countries, to the
leadership of both countries.
29.
The allegations of arms trafficking across the Syrian-Lebanese border
and the repeated incidents along the border that caused death and
injury to civilians emphasize the urgent need to improve the
management and control of Lebanon’s land borders. This is also a
necessity in order to avoid armed groups and militias in Lebanon from
expanding their weapons arsenal, which constitutes a threat to
domestic and regional peace. Despite the commitment expressed by the
Lebanese Government to adopt a comprehensive national strategy for
border management, little concrete progress has been accomplished on
the matter at this stage. In the meantime, it remains an obligation
under Security Council resolutions that all states take the necessary
measures in order to prevent the transfer of arms to groups outside
the control of the Government of Lebanon.
C.
Disbanding and Disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese Militias
30.
In its resolution 1559 (2004), the Security Council calls for the
disarming and disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.
This key remaining provision of the resolution is yet to be
implemented. It merely reflects and re-affirms a decision that all
Lebanese committed themselves to in the Taif Accord in 1989, in the
aftermath of the civil war. This agreement led at the time to
Lebanese militias - with the exception of Hizbullah - giving up their
weapons. This agreement must be preserved and implemented by all in
order to avoid the spectre of a renewed confrontation amongst the
Lebanese.
31.
Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias continue to operate in the country
outside of the Government’s control in serious violation of
resolution 1559 (2004). While several groups across the political
spectrum in Lebanon possess weapons outside Government control, the
armed component of Hizbullah is the most significant and most heavily
armed Lebanese militia in the country, reaching almost the capacities
of a regular army. The maintenance of arms by Hizbullah and other
groups poses a serious challenge to the State’s ability to exercise
full sovereignty and authority over its territory. In addition, there
are a series of Palestinian armed groups operating in the country
inside and outside the refugee camps.
32.
I have repeatedly expressed my deep concern to Lebanese leaders about
the serious risks that the continued existence of these militias
poses to the stability of the country and the region. I urged them to
address this matter without further delay, as it is their obligation
under Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). Nonetheless, the
leadership of Hizbullah acknowledges that it maintains a substantial
military arsenal separate from that of the State, claiming it serves
defensive purposes against Israel. In public pronouncements, the
leadership of Hizbullah stated that it has upgraded the strength of
its military capabilities and will seek to continue to do so. This is
in blatant defiance of resolution 1559 (2004). The Secretary-General
of Hizbullah also acknowledged on 11 October that his militia had
launched a drone towards Israel that was intercepted by the Israeli
Air Force on 6 October. Hizbullah is also a Lebanese political party.
Israeli officials have argued that, given the participation of
Hizbullah in the Lebanese government, Israel would consider reacting
to any Hizbullah attack on Israel with retaliation on the Lebanese
state.
33.
On 3 October at least three Hizbullah militants were killed and
several other people wounded as a result of explosions at an
ammunition depot in the Bekaa town of Nabi Sheet. Immediately after
the explosion, Hizbullah militants cordoned off the area. That
incident was a stark reminder of the risk posed by the presence of
ammunition held by non-State actors, particularly in densely
populated area. Following this incident, members of the Lebanese
opposition reiterated their call for the urgent need to resolve the
issue of Hizbullah’s weapons.
34.
In recent months, there have been credible reports suggesting
involvement by Hizbullah and other Lebanese political forces in
support of the parties in the conflict in Syria. Member States have
raised the matter with me with concern, particularly in the wake of
recent reports on the killing of Hizbullah militants involved in the
fighting against armed elements of the Syrian opposition. Such
militant activities by Hizbullah in Syria contradict and undermine
the dissociation policy of the Government of Lebanon, of which
Hizbullah is a coalition member.
35.
Over the reporting period, there has been yet again no tangible
progress towards the disbanding and disarming of Lebanese and
non-Lebanese militias as called for in the Taif Accord and resolution
1559 (2004). I recall that since the adoption of the resolution in
2004, with the exception of the National Dialogue of 2006 that took
some preliminary decisions on this matter that were never
implemented, no concrete steps have been taken to address this
crucial issue which stands at the heart of the sovereignty and the
political independence of Lebanon. Nonetheless, several Lebanese
groups and individuals have been speaking up against Hizbullah’s
maintenance of a military arsenal which they consider is a
destabilizing factor in the country and contradictory to democracy,
as many Lebanese see the continued existence of such arms as an
implicit threat for use within Lebanon for political reasons, bearing
in mind in particular the violent events of May 2008.
36.
I have long supported the National Dialogue, a Lebanese-led political
process, as the best way to address the issue of arms and achieve the
ultimate goal of no weapons or armed forces in Lebanon other than
those of the Lebanese State. This is the process that the Lebanese
leaders committed to in 2008. On 11 June, President Sleiman succeeded
in re-convening the National Dialogue that had not met since November
2010. The session was attended by many of the country’s leaders
from across the political spectrum, representing both the March 8 and
March 14 political movements. The Secretary-General of Hizbullah, one
of the main stakeholders in the matters to discuss, was absent from
the meeting. He had not attended any of the dialogue sessions since
it reconvened in 2008. He was represented by Hizbullah parliamentary
leader Mohamed Raad. Former Prime Minister Saad Hariri was also
absent and represented by former Prime Minister Fuad Siniora, who
also attends the National Dialogue in his own capacity. The leader of
the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea, declined to participate. At the
conclusion of the 11 June session, a declaration was issued recording
the agreement of the participants on 17 points, including commitment
to the promotion of calm on the security, political and media levels;
avoidance of violence and recourse to arms; support for the Lebanese
Armed Forces; making Lebanon neutral with respect to regional and
international conflicts and the avoidance of the negative impact
of regional crises; except in matters where there is an Arab or
international consensus or relating to the Palestinian cause; and
commitment to international resolutions.
37.
Since 11 June, the National Dialogue convened three times on 25 June,
16 August and 20 September. In the 25 June session, it was decided
that President Sleiman should present his vision with regard to a
national defence strategy, including the weapons issue, as a basis
for the discussion. The participants reaffirmed their commitment to
the joint Baabda declaration of 11 June. They also called upon the
Government to put in place mechanisms for implementing earlier
decisions of the National Dialogue with regard to the Palestinians,
including by addressing their social and humanitarian situation and
Palestinian weapons outside the camps. On 16 August, after much
uncertainty about the participation of the opposition that insisted
that the weapons of Hizbullah be discussed, the National Dialogue
resumed talks and agreed to postpone discussions on National Defence
strategy until all members could be present; and to impose, through
all legitimate means, security throughout Lebanon, including the
establishment of a committee made up of members of the Dialogue to
peacefully resolve the issue of kidnappings in the country.
38.
At the last session on 20 September, President Sleiman tabled a short
paper laying out his vision for a comprehensive national defence
strategy. While the participants did not discuss the substance of the
paper, they agreed in a joint statement to consider the President’s
vision as “a starting point for discussion aiming at concurring on
a national defence strategy, addressing the issue of arms” and
further asserted “the necessity to maintain the dynamics of the
dialogue”. The next session is set for November.
39.
The deliberations within the National Dialogue, since it resumed in
June, have displayed yet again highly divergent positions between the
two main camps in particular related to the weapons of Hizbullah. In
the meantime, participants expressed jointly their commitment to
domestic peace and to protect the country from the potential
repercussion of the crisis in Syria.
40.
With regard to the situation of Palestinians in Lebanon, the
leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has
reiterated to me and to the Lebanese authorities its firm position
that all Palestinians in Lebanon must respect the sovereignty and
political independence of Lebanon and adhere to Lebanese law and
security requirements.
41.
During the period under review, a series of incidents in Palestinian
refugee camps have raised concern. On 17 May, the Lebanese Armed
Forces arrested the driver of a vehicle suspected of carrying
weaponry out of the Ain al-Hilweh camp. On 15 June, tensions
increased in the Nahr al-Bared camp after the Lebanese Armed Forces
arrested two young Palestinians. Residents subsequently pelted
soldiers with stones who retaliated with gunfire, killing one
Palestinian. In the ensuing clashes in Nahr al-Bared and Ain
al-Hilweh on 18 June, two people were killed. In addition, a
substantial number of camp residents and Lebanese Armed Forces
personnel were injured. The incidents sparked demonstrations in other
camps in Lebanon. The incidents highlighted the specific need to
address accesses issues there while continuing to respect broader
security concern. In July, steps have been taken to ease access
restrictions which have applied at Nahr al-Bared since the fighting
there in 2007. In addition, the Lebanese Armed Forces resumed their
duties in and around the camp. Prime Minister Mikati met Palestinian
representatives and appointed Khaldoun el-Sharif as the new chairman
of the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee to promote
Lebanese-Palestinian exchanges on the living conditions of refugees.
42.
Beyond the incidents listed above, occasional security incidents and
inter-factional clashes involving the use of weapons occurred in Ain
al-Hilweh, causing some injuries but no fatalities. While the
Lebanese authorities deem the cooperation with security authorities
in the camp to be satisfactory, the threat of internal violence that
could potentially spill over into surrounding areas still exists in a
number of camps as some of them continue to provide safe haven for
those who seek to escape the authority of the State. With the
exception of the Nahr al- Bared camp, Lebanese authorities do not
maintain a permanent presence inside the camps, despite the fact that
the Cairo agreement of 1969 – which permitted the presence of
Palestinian armed forces in the refugees’ camps - was annulled by
the Lebanese parliament in 1987.
43.
Humanitarian conditions for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have
remained dire and precarious. In this regard, Prime Minister Mikati
pledged to me again his government’s intention to do its best to
improve their living conditions. The United Nations has continued to
urge the Lebanese authorities to improve the conditions in which
Palestinian refugees live in Lebanon, notably by facilitating their
access to the official labour market through the implementation of
outstanding legislation, without prejudice to the eventual resolution
of the Palestinian refugee question in the context of a comprehensive
peace agreement in the region and bearing in mind the detrimental
effects of dismal living conditions on the wider security situation.
For its part, UNRWA is proceeding steadily with work to rebuild the
Nahr al-Bared camp. Reconstruction of about a quarter of the camp has
been finalized and further funding is in place to complete about half
of the overall work. Further progress depends on donor support. In
the meantime, displaced refugees need continuing support notably in
the form of rental subsidies.
44.
The presence of Palestinian armed groups outside the camps continues
to challenge the ability of Lebanon to exercise full sovereignty over
its territory. In spite of the decision taken in 2006 by the National
Dialogue, and confirmed in recent sessions of the National Dialogue,
no progress was made with regard to dismantling the
Damascus-headquartered PFLP-GC and Fatah Al-Intifada military bases
in the country. All but one of these bases are located along the
Syrian- Lebanese border. Their presence continues to undermine
Lebanese sovereignty and governmental authority. It also poses a
challenge to the effective control of the eastern border between
Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. I have called consistently upon
the Lebanese authorities to dismantle these bases, and on the
Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate with these
efforts. During the month of May, the Secretary-General of the
PFLP-GC, Ahmad Jibril, visited Lebanon for the first time since 2006
and met with a number of political leaders, mostly from the March 8
coalition. During the visit, Jibril asserted that his group would not
give up its arms and that the disarmament of Palestinian factions
outside refugee camps in Lebanon would be conceivable only once the
Arab-Israeli conflict were settled and the rights of the Palestinian
people assured.
III.
Observations
45.
During the period under review, there has been no further tangible
progress yet again towards the implementation of the remaining
provisions of resolution 1559 (2004). At the same time, Lebanon’s
stability and sovereignty have been severely challenged. The country
has remained vulnerable to the impact of the Syrian conflict,
polarizing opinions and increasing tension. Largely as a result of
the deteriorating situation in Syria, Lebanon has witnessed
cross-border clashes and shelling', arms smuggling, the influx of
thousands of refugees', deadly Alawi- Sunni clashes', and politically
motivated assassination attempts, which destabilized the country. I
am deeply concerned by the impact ofthe Syrian crisis on Lebanon.
Despite internal and external pressures, President Sleiman and Prime
Minister Mikati have upheld successfully a policy of dissociation
from the Syrian crisis. I congratulate them on their efforts and urge
them to continue
to
pursue this policy. I also commend them for Working with all parties
to preserve Lebanon’s security and stability in difïicult
circumstances. However, I am increasingly concerned that the
increasing number of reports of activities in Syria by Hizbullah, a
member ofthe governing coalition, could jeopardize this policy and
ultimately Lebanon’s stability.
46.
While I am conscious that the remaining provisions ofthe resolution
to be implemented are the most difficult and sensitive, and that the
situation in the region has not been conducive to further progress on
the outstanding provisions of resolution 1559 (2004), I reiterate my
Íirm conviction that it is in the best interest of Lebanon and the
Lebanese to make progress towards the implementation ofthe
resolution for the long-term stability ofthe Country and the region.
Much Work lies ahead for the implementation of resolution 1559
(2004), in particular as regards the question of Weapons outside
government Control.
47.
I condernn the increasing number of incidents in which civilians have
been killed, injured or put at risk on the Lebanese side ofthe border
with the Syrian Arab Republic owing to actions ofthe authorities
ofthe Syrian Arab Republic. I am also Worried by sporadic reports of
incidents involving armed elements ofthe Syrian opposition and the
Lebanese Armed Forces in the border areas. I call upon all parties,
in particular the Government of Syria, to cease all such actions, and
to respect Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity in
accordance with Security Council resolution 1559 (2004).
48.
I have repeatedly cautioned that the Widespread proliferation of
Weapons outside the control ofthe State combined with the continued
existence of heavily armed militias are ominous for the security of
Lebanese citizens, as sadly manifested by the serious incident on 3
October. Armed groups defying the control of the State are
incompatible with the objective of strengthening Lebanon’s
sovereignty and political independence, and with the protection of
Lebanon's unique and pluralistic system and the rights of Lebanese
citizens. I condemn the possession and the use of illegal Weapons
Wherever they occur in Lebanon, in particular in populated areas. For
this reason, I appeal once again to all parties and States to
immediately halt all efforts to keep, transfer and acquire Weapons,
and build para-military capacities outside the authority ofthe State.
49.
The maintenance by Hizbullah of sizeable sophisticated military
capabilities outside the control of the Government of Lebanon remains
a matter of grave concern, particularly as it creates an atmosphere
of intimidation in the country and represents a key challenge to the
safety of Lebanese civilians and to the Government’s monopoly on
the legitimate use of force. It also puts Lebanon in violation of its
obligations under resolution 1559 (2004) and constitutes a threat to
regional peace and stability. I urge Hizbullah not to engage in any
militant activity inside or outside of Lebanon. The launch of a drone
by Hizbullah to Israel is a reckless provocation that could lead to a
dangerous escalation threatening Lebanon’s stability. I call yet
again upon the leadership of Hizbullah to disarm and limit its
activities to that of a Lebanese political party, consistent with the
requirements of the Taif Agreement and Security Council resolution
1559 (2004). This requirement has become even more pressing as
Parliamentary elections are due to take place in the spring of 2013.
In a democratic State, it is a fundamental anomaly that a political
party maintains its own militia.
50.
As Lebanon lacks an indigenous arms manufacturing capability, I call
upon the Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed forces to take
all the necessary measures to prohibit Hizbullah from acquiring
weapons and build para-military capacities outside the authority of
the State in violation of resolution 1559 (2004) and in so far as
resolution 1747 (2006) is concerned. As Hizbullah maintains close
ties with a number of regional states, in particular with the Islamic
Republic of Iran, I call upon these States to encourage the
transformation of the armed group into a solely political party and
its disarmament, consistent with the requirements of the Taif
Agreement and resolution 1559 (2004), in the best interest of Lebanon
and regional peace and security.
51.
It is my firm belief that the best way to address the disarmament of
armed groups in Lebanon, particularly Hizbullah, is through a
Lebanese-led cross-party political process, although this process
cannot make enough headway until external actors cease their military
support to Hizbullah, which in turn must be open to discussing in
good faith the issue of its arsenal. In this context, I would like to
congratulate President Sleiman for reconvening the National Dialogue.
I also commend Lebanese leaders from across the spectrum for their
commitment to the Baabda Declaration of 11 June 2012. Given their
divergent views on the Syrian crisis, it is indeed important
that Lebanese leaders have committed not to permit the use of Lebanon
as a buffer zone, base or channel for the passage of arms and armed
personnel to Syria. This is an important achievement that Members of
the Security Council and other Member States should help the
Government of Lebanon to sustain.
52.
At the last session of the National Dialogue on 20 September,
President Sleiman presented his vision of a national defence strategy
for the country. I am glad that Lebanese leaders have now a basis on
which to start serious discussions on a crucial matter for Lebanon’s
stability and domestic peace. It is important for this process to
gain further traction. Tangible steps are needed towards disarming
and disbanding militias. I urge all political leaders to transcend
sectarian and individual interests and genuinely promote the future
and the interests of the State. Irrespective of the particular
composition of the government, the authority of the Lebanese State
can only be consolidated through progress on the issue of arms beyond
its control. The end result of such a process must be that there are
no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no
authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon consistent
with the Taif Agreement and Security Council resolution 1559 (2004).
The disarming and disbanding of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias is
a necessary element to complete the consolidation of Lebanon as a
sovereign and democratic State. I therefore call upon President
Sleiman to ensure that the National Dialogue takes operational
decisions in this regard without delay.
53.
I also encourage President Sleiman and the Government of Prime
Minister Mikati to finally implement decisions taken in the past by
the National Dialogue, such as the dismantling of Palestinian
military bases maintained by the PFLP-GC and Fatah al-Intifada
outside the refugee camps. I was heartened by the renewed commitment
expressed during the National Dialogue to implement this decision.
These bases, most of which straddle the border between Lebanon and
Syria, undermine Lebanese sovereignty and challenge the country’s
ability to manage its land borders. Mindful that these two militias
maintain close regional ties, I expect the Government of the
Syrian Arab Republic to act constructively in this process.
54.
I am deeply concerned by the situation of Palestinian refugees in the
camps in Lebanon. I hope that the coming period will see more
substantive Lebanese-Palestinian dialogue and progress in improving
the unremittingly miserable living conditions of the refugees,
including through the implementation of outstanding legislation to
ease their employment. Such progress would not prejudice the eventual
resolution of the Palestinian refugee question in the context of a
comprehensive regional peace agreement. I urge donors to support
UNRWA and its vital work in providing services to Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon.
55.
I regret the absence of any progress on the border delineation and
demarcation with the Syrian Arab Republic. The absence of progress on
this issue has a significant impact on enhancing border control.
Given that Syrian officials complain of arms smuggling from Lebanon
to Syrian opposition forces, I hope that Syrian officials share my
sense of urgency about the necessity of border demarcation.
56.
I stress again the importance of the early adoption of a
comprehensive border management strategy by the Government of
Lebanon. Doing so would enable better control of Lebanon’s
international borders and prevent the illegal transfers of arms in
both directions. This has become even more pressing in the context of
events in the neighbouring Syrian Arab Republic and would help to
stem potential negative repercussions.
57.
I deplore Israel’s continued violations of Lebanon’s sovereignty
and territorial integrity. I call upon Israel to adhere to its
obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions and withdraw
its forces from the northern part of the village of Ghajar and an
adjacent area north of the Blue Line, and cease its overflights of
Lebanese airspace that undermine the credibility of Lebanese security
services, and generate anxiety among the civilian population.
They also greatly increase the risk of unintended consequences in a
region that is already seething with tension.
58.
The recurrence of security incidents throughout Lebanon, some of
which have led to death and injury, remains of serious concern. They
highlight the fragility of the domestic situation and the need for
Lebanese security forces to remain vigilant to prevent the illegal
use of weapons in the country and impose law and order. I
welcome recent statements by President Sleiman deploring the
proliferation of weapons in the country and its domestic use. I also
commend the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces
which have performed robustly in addressing several security
challenges over the reporting period, including the arrest of former
Minister Samaha. In this context, I call upon the Lebanese
authorities to complete the investigation and due process in a fair
and transparent way in order to bring all those implicated in this
case to justice.
59.
I am grateful to those Member States that are helping to equip and
train the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces,
and I urge the international community to continue this
critically required support. This is essential to enable the
Government of Lebanon to assume effectively its responsibilities
under relevant Security Council resolutions. I stand ready to assist,
as appropriate, efforts to move forward the initiative of the
Government of Lebanon to strengthen the capacity of the Lebanese
Armed Forces.
60.
The multiple challenges faced by Lebanon at present, largely as a
result of the Syrian crisis, are real. Given the extraordinary
diversity characterizing Lebanese society, it is necessary that the
spirit of cooperation and respect for the principles of
co-existence and security in Lebanon prevail as must domestic peace
without intimidation by armed groups as set out in the Taif
Agreement. In this context, I am encouraged by the response of
Lebanese leaders across the political spectrum to the message of Pope
Benedict XVI during his visit to Lebanon in September encouraging an
atmosphere of calm and tolerance among all communities.
61.
It is imperative not to let Lebanon be drawn into regional turmoil.
Lebanon must not be used anymore as a battleground for actors seeking
to advance their own interests at the country’s expense or to
destabilize the region. I believe that the country can come through
this critical period safely if its leaders show a measure of unity
and responsibility. This will also require that the international
community give priority to protecting Lebanon from harm at this
difficult time. In addition, this should not detract from the full
implementation of this and all other Security Council resolutions
pertaining to Lebanon, which remain the best way to ensure Lebanon’s
longterm prosperity and stability as a democratic state.
62.
I remain firmly committed to the implementation of resolution 1559
(2004) for the sake of peace and security during a particularly
difficult and challenging time in Lebanon. I, therefore, call on all
parties and actors to fully abide by resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680
(2006) and 1701 (2006). I will continue my efforts towards the full
implementation of these and all other Security Council resolutions
pertaining to Lebanon.
