The full text of the report as submitted to the Arab League secretary general Nabil Al-Arabi on January 22, 2012
League of Arab States Observer
Mission to Syria
Report of the Head of the League of
Arab States Observer Mission to Syria for the period from 24 December 2011 to
18 January 2012
In the name of God, the Merciful,
the Compassionate
“We offered the trust to the
heavens and the earth and the mountains, but they refused to carry it, and were
afraid of it; and man carried it. Surely he is sinful, very foolish” [Qur’an 33:72]
I . Legal bases
1. By resolution 7436 of 2 November
2011, the Council of the League of Arab States adopted the Arab plan of action
annexed thereto, welcomed the Syrian Government’s agreement to the plan, and
emphasized the need for the Syrian Government to commit to the full and
immediate implementation of its provisions.
2. On 16 November 2011, the Council
of the League of Arab States adopted resolution 7439 approving the draft
protocol of the Legal Centre and the mandate of the League of Arab States
Observer Mission to Syria, namely to verify implementation of the provisions of
the Arab plan of action to resolve the Syrian crisis and protect Syrian
civilians. The resolution requested the Secretary-General of the League of Arab
States to take such steps as he deemed appropriate to appoint the Head of the
League of Arab States Observer Mission and to make contact with the Syrian
Government with a view to signing the protocol.
3. By resolution 7441 of 24
November 2011, the Council of the League of Arab States requested the
Secretary-General of the League to deploy the Observer Mission to the Syrian
Arab Republic in order to fulfil its mandate under the protocol immediately on
its signature.
4. The Syrian Arab Republic and the
General Secretariat of the League of Arab States signed the protocol on 19
December 2011. The protocol provided for the establishment and deployment to
the Syrian Arab Republic of a Mission comprising civilian and military experts
from Arab countries and Arab non-governmental human rights organizations.
Paragraph 5 stated that the Mission should transmit regular reports on the
results of its work to the Secretary-General of the League of Arab State and
the Syrian Government for submission — via the Arab Ministerial Committee on
the Situation in Syria — to the Council of the League at the ministerial level
for its consideration and appropriate action.
5. On 20 December 2011, the Council
of the League approved the appointment of General Muhammad Ahmad Mustafa
Al-Dabi from the Republic of the Sudan as Head of the Observer Mission.
II. Formation of the Mission
6. The General Secretariat
requested Member States and relevant Arab organizations to transmit the names
of its candidates for the Mission. On that basis, 166 monitors from 13 Arab
countries and six relevant Arab organizations have thus far been appointed.
III. Visit of the advance
delegation of the General Secretariat to Syria
7. In preparation for the Mission,
an advance delegation of the General Secretariat visited the Syrian Arab
Republic on 22 December 2011 to discuss the logistical preparations for the Mission.
8. In accordance with the protocol,
the Syrian Government confirmed its readiness to facilitate the Mission in
every way by allowing the free and safe movement of all of the observers
throughout Syria, and by refraining from hindering the work of the Mission on
security or administrative grounds. The Syrian Government side also affirmed
its commitment to ensuring that the Mission could freely conduct the necessary
meetings; to provide full protection for the observers, taking into
consideration the responsibility of the Mission if it were to insist on
visiting areas despite the warning of the security services; and to allow the
entry to Syria of journalists and Arab and international media in accordance
with the rules and regulations in force in the country.
IV. Arrival and preliminary visits
of the Head of Mission
9. The Head of the Mission, General
Muhammad Ahmad Mustafa Al-Dabi, arrived in the Syrian Arab Republic on the
evening of Saturday 24 December 2011. He held a series of meetings with the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Walid Al-Moualem, and with Syrian Government
officials, who stated that they stood prepared to cooperate fully with the
Mission and to endeavour to ensure its success, overcoming any obstacles that
may arise. The necessary logistical and
security arrangements were agreed.
10. The Syrian side stated that
there were certain areas that the security protection detail would not be able
to enter with the observers for fear of the citizens’ reaction. The Head of the
Mission replied that that situation would enable the Mission to engage with
citizens and opposition parties without government monitoring, thereby removing
the citizens’ fear of repercussions as a result of communicating with the
Mission.
11. The Head of the Mission
completed the technical field preparations and secured the necessary
transportation and communication devices in order to start work. He met with
the observers who arrived successively in Syria and briefed them on their
duties and the bases of their work under the protocol. The observers took a
special oath for the Mission which had been drafted by the Head.
12. On 27 December 2011, the Head
of the Mission and ten observers conducted a preliminary visit to the city of
Homs, one of the epicentres of tension,
which has seen acts of violence and armed confrontation between the Army and
the Syrian opposition. Some security barriers separating districts remain in
place.
13. Immediately on arriving in
Homs, the Head of the Mission met with the Governor of the city, who explained
that there had been an escalation in violence perpetrated by armed groups in
the city. There had been instances of kidnapping and sabotage of Government and
civilian facilities. Food was in short supply owing to the blockade imposed by
armed groups, which were believed to include some 3000 individuals. The
Governor further stated that all attempts by religious figures and city
notables to calm the situation had failed. He made enquiries regarding the
possibility of addressing the issue of soldiers and vehicles blocked inside
Baba Amr.
14. The Mission visited the
residential districts of Baba Amr, Karam Al-Zaytun, Al-Khalidiyya and Al-Ghuta
without guards. It met with a number of opposition citizens who described the
state of fear, blockade and acts of violence to which they had been subjected
by Government forces. At a time of intense exchanges of gunfire among the
sides, the Mission witnessed the effects of the destruction wrought on outlying
districts. The Mission witnessed an intense
exchange of gunfire between the Army and opposition in Baba Amr. It saw four
military vehicles in surrounding areas, and therefore had to return to the
Governorate headquarters. It was agreed with the Governor that five members of
the Mission would remain in Homs until the following day to conduct field work
and meet with the greatest possible number of citizens.
15. Immediately on returning from
Homs, the Head of the Mission met with the Government and insisted that it
withdraw military vehicles from the city, put an end to acts of violence,
protect civilians, lift the blockade and provide food. He further called for
the two sides to exchange the bodies of those killed.
16. At that meeting, the Syrian
side agreed to withdraw all military presence from the city and residential
areas except for three army vehicles that were not working and had been
surrounded, and one that had been taken from the Army by armed groups. The
Syrian side requested the Mission’s assistance to recover and remove those
vehicles in exchange for the release of four individuals, the exchange of five
bodies from each side, the entry of basic foods for families in the city, and
the entry of sanitation vehicles to remove garbage. It was agreed at the end of
the meeting that the Mission would conduct another visit to Homs on the
following day in the company of General Hassan Sharif, the security coordinator
for the Government side.
17. During that visit, the Mission
was introduced to one of the leading figures in the opposition, who acted as
media representative of the National Council. An extensive discussion took
place regarding the offer of the Syrian Government and the best way to
implement the agreement. As a result, the military vehicles were returned and
removed; the bodies of those killed were exchanged; trucks entered the city
with food; and three detainees and two women were released and returned to
their families in the presence of the Mission, thereby calming the situation
inside the city.
18. Five days after the monitors were
deployed to five zones, the Ministerial Committee requested that the Head of
the Mission report on the Mission’s work. He travelled to Cairo and gave an
oral presentation to the members of the Committee at their meeting of 8 January
2012. It was decided that the work of the Mission should continue and that the
Head of the Mission should submit a report at the end of the period determined
in the protocol, on 19 January 2012. After the Head's return to Damascus to
resume his duties, the Mission faced difficulties from Government loyalists and
opposition alike, particularly as a result of statements and media coverage in
the wake of the Committee meeting. That did not, however, affect the work of
the Mission or its full and smooth deployment across the country.
19. Following its arrival, and to
this date, the Mission has received numerous letters from the Syrian committee
responsible for coordination with the Mission. The letters refer to the
material and human losses sustained by Government institutions and offices as a
result of what is described as sabotage. They assert that all of the States’
vital services have been affected.
V. Deployment of the Observer
Mission to Syria
20. The observers were divided into
15 zones covering 20 cities and districts
across Syria according to the time frame set out below. The variation in dates
was a result of shortcomings in administrative and technical preparations, such
as the arrival of cars and personnel. Care was taken to ensure even
distribution of observers. Each unit comprised some ten observers of different
Arab nationalities.
The groups were deployed to Syrian
governorates and towns as follows:
• On 29 December 2011, six groups travelled to
Damascus, Homs, Rif Homs, Idlib, Deraa and Hama.
• On 4 January 2012, a group travelled to
Aleppo.
• On 9 January 2012, two groups went to Deir
Al-Zor and Latakia.
However, both returned to Damascus
on 10 January 2012 owing to attacks that led to the injury of two of the
monitors in Latakia and material damage to the cars.
• On 10 January 2012, a group travelled to
Qamishli and Hasaka.
• On 12 January 2012, a group travelled to
Outer Damascus.
• On 13 January 2012, four groups travelled to
Suwaida, Bu Kamal, Deir Al-Zor, Palmyra (Tadmur), Sukhna, Banyas and
Tartous.
• On 15 January 2012, two groups travelled to
Latakia, Raqqa and Madinat Al-Thawra.
Annex 1. List of observers, their
nationalities and their distribution.
21. The observers were provided
with the following:
• A map of the region;
• A code of conduct for observers;
• The duties of the group leaders;
• The duties of the observers;
• Necessary equipment such as computers,
cameras and communication devices.
22. An operations room was
established at the offices of the League of Arab States in Damascus. The office
is open 24 hours a day and is directly linked to the League of Arab States
operations room in Cairo and to the groups deployed across Syria. The room
receives daily reports from the field teams and conveys special instructions
for monitoring. Owing to the volume of work, an additional operations room was
opened at the Mission headquarters in Damascus with the task of allocating
individuals and assigning committees on follow-up, detainees, the media and
financial affairs. It coordinates with the main operations room at the offices
of the League of Arab States.
23. In Latakia and Deir Al-Zor, the
Mission faced difficulties from Government loyalists. In Latakia, thousands
surrounded the Mission’s cars, chanting slogans in favour of the President and
against the Mission. The situation became out of control and monitors were
attacked. Two sustained light injuries and an armoured car was completely
crushed. In order to address the matter, the Head of Mission contacted the
Syrian committee responsible for coordination with the Mission. Nevertheless,
the Head of the Mission ordered the immediate return of the two groups to Damascus.
He met the Minister for Foreign Affairs and made a strongly-worded formal
protest. The Syrian side strongly condemned the incident and extended a formal
apology, explaining that the events were not in any sense deliberate. In order to
emphasize the point, the Syrian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs met with
the members of the Latakia team and stated that the Syrian Government would
address the shortcoming immediately and guarantee the safety and security of
observers everywhere. He apologized to them for the unfortunate and
unintentional incidents. The members were then assigned to new zones after four
days’ rest.
VI. Implementation of the Mission’s
mandate under the protocol
24. The Head of the Mission
stresses that this assessment in terms of the provisions of the protocol
summarizes the findings of the groups as relayed by group leaders at their
meeting with the Head of the Mission on 17 January 2012.
A. Monitoring and observation of
the cessation of all violence by all sides in cities and residential areas
25. On being assigned to their
zones and starting work, the observers witnessed acts of violence perpetrated
by Government forces and an exchange of gunfire with armed elements in Homs and
Hama. As a result of the Mission’s insistence on a complete end to violence and
the withdrawal of Army vehicles and equipment, this problem has receded. The
most recent reports of the Mission point to a considerable calming of the
situation and restraint on the part of those forces.
26. In Homs and Dera‘a, the Mission
observed armed groups committing acts of violence against Government forces,
resulting in death and injury among their ranks. In certain situations,
Government forces responded to attacks against their personnel with force. The
observers noted that some of the armed groups were using flares and armour-piercing
projectiles.
27. In Homs, Idlib and Hama, the
Observer Mission witnessed acts of violence being committed against Government
forces and civilians that resulted in several deaths and injuries. Examples of
those acts include the bombing of a civilian bus, killing eight persons and
injuring others, including women and children, and the bombing of a train
carrying diesel oil. In another incident in Homs, a police bus was blown up,
killing two police officers. A fuel pipeline and some small bridges were also
bombed.
28. The Mission noted that many
parties falsely reported that explosions or violence had occurred in several
locations. When the observers went to those locations, they found that those
reports were unfounded.
29. The Mission also noted that,
according to its teams in the field, the media exaggerated the nature of the
incidents and the number of persons killed in incidents and protests in certain
towns.
B. Verifying that Syrian security
services and so-called shabiha gangs do not obstruct peaceful
demonstrations
30. According to their latest
reports and their briefings to the Head of the Mission on 17 January 2012 in
preparation for this report, group team leaders witnessed peaceful
demonstrations by both Government supporters and the opposition in several
places. None of those demonstrations were disrupted, except for some minor clashes
with the Mission and between loyalists and opposition. These have not resulted
in fatalities since the last presentation before the Arab Ministerial Committee
on the Situation in Syria at its meeting of 8 January 2012.
31. The reports and briefings of
groups leaders state that citizens belonging to the opposition surround the
Mission on its arrival and use the gathering as a barrier from the security
services. However, such incidents have gradually decreased.
32. The Mission has received
requests from opposition supporters in Homs and Deraa that it should stay
on-site and not leave, something that may be attributable to fear of attack
after the Mission’s departure.
C. Verifying the release of those detained in
the current incidents
33. The Mission received reports
from parties outside Syria indicating that the number of detainees was 16,237.
It also received information from the opposition inside the country that the number
of detainees was 12,005. In validating those figures, the teams in the field
discovered that there were discrepancies between the lists, that information
was missing and inaccurate, and that names were repeated. The Mission is
communicating with the concerned Government agencies to confirm those numbers.
34. The Mission has delivered to
the Syrian Government all of the lists received from the Syrian opposition
inside and outside Syria. In accordance with the protocol, it has demanded the
release of the detainees. 35. On 15 January 2012, President Bashar Al-Assad
issued a legislative decree
granting a general amnesty for
crimes perpetrated in the context of the events from 15 March 2011 through to
the issuance of the decree. In implementation of the amnesty, the relevant
Government authorities have been periodically releasing detainees in the
various regions so long as they are not wanted in connection with other crimes.
The Mission has been supervising the releases and is monitoring the process
with the Government’s full and active coordination.
36. On 19 January 2012, the Syrian
government stated that 3569 detainees had been released from military and civil
prosecution services. The Mission verified that 1669 of those detained had thus
far been released. It continues to follow up the issue with the Government and
the opposition, emphasizing to the Government side that the detainees should be
released in the presence of observers so that the event can be documented.
37. The Mission has validated the
following figures for the total number of detainees that the Syrian government
thus far claims to have released:
• Before the amnesty: 4,035
• After the amnesty: 3,569.
The Government has therefore claimed that a total of 7,604 detainees have been
released.
38. The Mission has verified the
correct number of detainees released and arrived at the following figures:
• Before the amnesty: 3,483
• After the amnesty: 1,669.
The total number of confirmed releases is
therefore 5152. The Mission is continuing to monitor the process and
communicate with the Syrian Government for the release of the remaining
detainees.
D. Confirming the withdrawal of the military
presence from residential neighbourhoods in which demonstrations and protests
occurred or are occurring
39. Based on the reports of the
field-team leaders and the meeting held on 17 January 2012 with all team
leaders, the Mission confirmed that all military vehicles, tanks and heavy
weapons had been withdrawn from cities and residential neighbourhoods. Although
there are still some security measures in place in the form of earthen berms
and barriers in front of important buildings and in squares, they do not affect
citizens. It should be noted that the Syrian Minister of Defence, in a meeting
with the Head of the Mission that took place on 5 January 2012, affirmed his
readiness to accompany the Head of the Mission to all sites and cities
designated by the latter and from which the Mission suspects that the military
presence had not yet been withdrawn, with a view to issuing field orders and
rectifying any violation immediately.
40. Armoured vehicles (personnel
carriers) are present at some barriers. One of those barriers is located in
Homs and some others in Madaya, Zabadani and Rif Damascus. The presence of
those vehicles was reported and they were subsequently withdrawn from Homs. It
has been confirmed that the residents of Zabadani and Madaya reached a
bilateral agreement with the Government that led to the removal of those
barriers and vehicles.
E. Confirming the accreditation by the Syrian
Government of Arab and international media organizations and that those organizations
are allowed to move freely in all parts of Syria
41. Speaking on behalf of his
Government, the Syrian Minister of Information confirmed that, from the
beginning of December 2011 to 15 January 2012, the Government had accredited
147 Arab and foreign media organizations. Some 112 of those organizations
entered Syrian territory, joining the 90 other accredited organizations
operating in Syria through their full-time correspondents.
42. The Mission followed up on this
issue. It identified 36 Arab and foreign media organizations and several
journalists located in a number of
Syrian cities. It also received complaints that the Syrian Government had
granted some media organizations authorization to operate for four days only,
which was insufficient time, according to those organizations. In addition to
preventing them from entering the country until they had specified their
destinations, journalists were required obtain further authorization once they
had entered the country and were prevented from going to certain areas. The
Syrian Government confirmed that it grants media organizations operating
permits that are valid for 10 days, with the possibility of renewal.
43. Reports and information from
some sectors [teams] indicate that the Government places restrictions on the
movement of media organizations in opposition areas. In many cases, those
restrictions caused journalists to trail the Mission in order to do their work.
44. In Homs, a French journalist
who worked for the France 2 channel was killed and a Belgian journalist was
injured. The Government and opposition accused each other of being responsible
for the incident, and both sides issued statements of condemnation. The
Government formed an investigative committee in order to determine the cause of
the incident. It should be noted that Mission reports from Homs indicate that
the French journalist was killed by opposition mortar shells.
Annex 2. A list of media
organizations identified and a list of media organizations that entered Syria,
according to the official information.
VII. Obstacles encountered by the
Mission
A. Monitors
45. Some of the experts nominated
were not capable of taking on such a responsibility and did not have prior
experience in this field.
46. Some of the observers did not
grasp the amount of responsibility that was being placed on them and the
importance of giving priority to Arab interests over personal interests.
47. In the course of field work,
some observers were unable to deal with difficult circumstances, which are at
the core of their duties. Monitors must have certain traits and the
specializations required for such work.
48. A number of the observers are
elderly, and some of them suffer from health conditions that prevent them from
performing their duties.
49. Twenty-two observers declined
to complete the mission for personal reasons. Some observers offered unfounded
reasons, which were not accepted by the Head of the Mission, while others had a
personal agenda.
Annex 3. List of the names of
observers who declined to complete the Mission.
50. Some observers reneged on their
duties and broke the oath they had taken. They made contact with officials from
their countries and gave them exaggerated accounts of events. Those officials
consequently developed a bleak and unfounded picture of the situation.
51. Some of the observers in the
various zones are demanding housing similar to their counterparts in Damascus
or financial reimbursement equivalent to the difference in accommodation rates
resulting from the difference in hotel standards or accommodation in Damascus.
These issues do not warrant comment.
52. Some observers are afraid to
perform their duties owing to the violent incidents that have occurred in
certain locations. The unavailability of armoured cars at all the sites and the
lack of bulletproof vests have negatively affected some observers’ ability to
carry out their duties.
Comments of the Head of the Mission
concerning the observers
53. Some of the observers,
unfortunately, believed that their journey to Syria was for amusement, and were
therefore surprised by the reality of the situation. They did not expect to be
assigned to teams or to have to remain at stations outside the capital or to
face the difficulties that they encountered.
54. Some of the observers were not
familiar with the region and its geography. The unavailability of armoured
vehicles and protective vests had a negative effect on the spirits of some
observers.
55. Some of the observers
experienced hostility both from the Syrian opposition and loyalists. This
hostility also had a negative effect on their spirits.
56. Despite the foregoing comments,
the performance of many of the observers was outstanding and praiseworthy.
Those who underperformed will improve with experience and guidance.
B. Security restrictions
57. Although it welcomed the
Mission and its Head and repeatedly
emphasized that it would not impose any security restrictions that could
obstruct the movement of the Mission, the Government deliberately attempted to
limit the observers’ ability to travel extensively in various regions. The
Government also attempted to focus the attention of the Mission on issues in
which it is interested. The Mission resisted those attempts and responded to
them in a manner that allowed it to fulfil its mandate and overcome the
obstacles that stood in the way of its work.
C. Communication equipment
58. The Mission communicates with
the various groups by mobile phones and facsimile machines connected to the
local Syrian telephone network. Occasional cuts in service prevent the Mission
from communicating with the groups.
59. The Mission was equipped with
10 Thuraya satellite phones. Such devices are hard to use inside buildings
owing of the difficulty in obtain a satellite signal. As a result, ordinary
phones and fax machines, which are not considered secure communications
equipment, were used to send daily reports, instead.
60. The communication equipment the
Qatari observers brought with them was held at the Jordanian border, despite
demands made by the Head of the Mission to the Syrian authorities to permit
entry of that equipment. That notwithstanding, the amount of equipment would
not have been enough to meet the needs of all sites and station.
61. The Mission does not have
portable two-way radios for communication between team members. The Chinese
Embassy provided 10 such radios as a gift to the Mission. They were used in three
sectors only.
62. Internet service is unavailable
in some regions, and in other areas it is intermittent, including in the
capital.
63. There are no cameras attached
to the vehicles used by the Mission, which would facilitate observers’ work in
dangerous areas.
D. Transportation
64. The Mission has 38 cars at its
disposal (23 armoured and 15 non-armoured), including 28 four-wheel drive
vehicles and 10 sedans. It should be noted that the Mission’s mandate requires
the used of armoured four-wheel drive vehicles, given the nature of the
Mission. The number of such vehicles currently available does not satisfy the
needs of the Mission, particularly for transportation into trouble spots.
65. When it was first deployed, the
Mission rented several cars from local sources for use in monitoring
operations. However, owing to some acts of violence directed against the field
teams, the rental companies recalled those vehicles and their drivers out of
fear for their safety.
66. The Mission encountered
difficulties in hiring drivers because the opposition groups refused to allow
local drivers to enter their areas because they believed the drivers were
members of the security services, which forces the observers to drive the vehicles
themselves.
67. Some of the observers demanded
to use vehicles sent by their countries, a demand that was denied by the Head
of the Mission, who allocated the vehicles according to the needs of each zone.
Annex 4. List showing the number,
types and distribution of vehicles and the countries that provided them.
E. The media
68. Since it began its work, the
Mission has been the target of a vicious media campaign. Some media outlets
have published unfounded statements, which they attributed to the Head of the
Mission. They have also grossly exaggerated events, thereby distorting the
truth.
69. Such contrived reports have
helped to increase tensions among the Syrian people and undermined the
observers’ work. Some media organizations were exploited in order to defame the
Mission and its Head and cause the Mission to fail.
VIII. Basic needs of the Mission, should its
mandate be renewed
• 100 additional young observers, preferably
military personnel
• 30 armoured vehicles
• Light protective vests
• Vehicle-mounted photographic equipment
• Modern communications equipment
• Binoculars, ordinary and night-vision
IX. Evaluation:
70. The purpose of the protocol is
to protect Syrian citizens through the commitment of the Syrian Government to
stop acts of violence, release detainees and withdraw all military presence
from cities and residential neighbourhoods. This phase must lead to dialogue
among the Syrian sides and the launching of a parallel political process.
Otherwise, the duration of this Mission will be extended without achieving the
desired results on the ground.
71. The Mission determined that
there is an armed entity that is not mentioned in the protocol. This
development on the ground can undoubtedly be attributed to the excessive use of
force by Syrian Government forces in response to protests that occurred before
the deployment of the Mission demanding the fall of the regime. In some zones,
this armed entity reacted by attacking Syrian security forces and citizens,
causing the Government to respond with further violence. In the end, innocent
citizens pay the price for those actions with life and limb.
72. The Mission noted that the
opposition had welcomed it and its members since their deployment to Syria. The
citizens were reassured by the Mission’s presence and came forward to present
their demands, although the opposition had previously been afraid to do so
publicly owing to their fear of being arrested once again, as they had been prior
to the Mission’s arrival in Syria. However, this was not case in the period
that followed the last Ministerial Committee statement, although the situation
is gradually improving.
73. The Mission noted that the
Government strived to help it succeed in its task and remove any barriers that
might stand in its way. The Government also facilitated meetings with all
parties. No restrictions were placed on the movement of the Mission and its
ability to interview Syrian citizens, both those who opposed the Government and
those loyal to it.
74. In some cities, the Mission
sensed the extreme tension, oppression and injustice from which the Syrian
people are suffering. However, the citizens believe the crisis should be
resolved peacefully through Arab mediation alone, without international
intervention. Doing so would allow them to live in peace and complete the
reform process and bring about the change they desire. The Mission was informed
by the opposition, particularly in Dar‘a, Homs, Hama and Idlib, that some of
its members had taken up arms in response to the suffering of the Syrian people
as a result of the regime’s oppression and tyranny; corruption, which affects
all sectors of society; the use of torture by the security agencies; and human
rights violations.
75. Recently, there have been
incidents that could widen the gap and increase bitterness between the parties.
These incidents can have grave consequences and lead to the loss of life and
property. Such incidents include the bombing of buildings, trains carrying
fuel, vehicles carrying diesel oil and explosions targeting the police, members
of the media and fuel pipelines. Some of those attacks have been carried out by
the Free Syrian Army and some by other armed opposition groups.
76. The Mission has adhered
scrupulously to its mandate, as set out in the protocol. It has observed daily
realities on the ground with complete neutrality and independence, thereby
ensuring transparency and integrity in its monitoring of the situation, despite
the difficulties the Mission encountered
and the inappropriate actions of some individuals.
77. Under the protocol, the
Mission’s mandate is one month. This does not allow adequate time for
administrative preparations, let alone for the Mission to carry out its task.
To date, the Mission has actually operated for 23 days. This amount of time is
definitely not sufficient, particularly in view of the number of items the
Mission must investigate. The Mission needs to remain on the ground for a longer
period of time, which would allow it to experience citizens’ daily living
conditions and monitor all events. It should be noted that similar previous
operations lasted for
several months or, in some cases,
several years.
78. Arab and foreign audiences of
certain media organizations have questioned the Mission’s credibility because
those organizations use the media to distort the facts. It will be difficult to
overcome this problem unless there is political and media support for the
Mission and its mandate. It is only natural that some negative incidents should
occur as it conducts its activities because such incidents occur as a matter of
course in similar missions.
79. The Mission arrived in Syria
after the imposition of sanctions aimed at compelling to implement what was
agreed to in the protocol. Despite that, the Mission was welcomed by the
opposition, loyalists and the Government. Nonetheless, questions remains as to
how the Mission should fulfil its mandate. It should be noted that the mandate
established for the Mission in the protocol was changed in response to
developments on the ground and the reactions thereto. Some of those were
violent reactions by entities that were not mentioned in the protocol. All of
these developments necessitated an expansion of and a change in the Mission’s
mandate. The most important point in this regard is the commitment of all sides
to cease all acts of violence, thereby allowing the Mission to complete its
tasks and, ultimately, lay the groundwork for the political process.
80. Should there be agreement to
extend its mandate, then the Mission must be provided with communications
equipment, means of transportation and all the equipment it requires to carry
out its mandate on the ground.
81. On the other hand, ending the
Mission’s work after such a short period will reverse any progress, even if
partial, that has thus far been made. This could perhaps lead to chaos on the
ground because all the parties involved in the crisis thus remain unprepared
for the political process required to resolve the Syrian crisis.
82. Since its establishment,
attitudes towards the Mission have been characterized by insincerity or, more
broadly speaking, a lack of seriousness. Before it began carrying out its
mandate and even before its members had arrived, the Mission was the target of
a vicious campaign directed against the League of Arab States and the Head of
the Mission, a campaign that increased in intensity after the observers’ deployment.
The Mission still lack the political and media support it needs in order to
fulfil its mandate. Should its mandate
be extended, the goals set out in the protocol will not be achieved
unless such support is provided and the Mission receives the backing it needs
to ensure the success of the Arab solution.
X. Recommendations:
83. In view of the above and of the
success achieved in executing the provision of the protocol, which the Syrian
Government pledged to implement, I recommend the following:
• The Mission must be provided with
administrative and logistic support in order allow it to carry out its tasks.
The Mission must also be give the media and political support required to
create an appropriate environment that will enable it to fulfil its mandate in
the required manner.
• The political process must be accelerated
and a national dialogue must be launched. That dialogue should run in parallel
with the Mission’s work in order to create an environment of confidence that
would contributes to the Mission’s success and prevent a needless extension of
its presence in Syria.
(Signed) Muhammad Ahmad Mustafa Al-Dabi
Head of the Mission
Follow me on Twitter @NabilAbiSaab
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