JOINT
SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES FOR
SYRIA KOFI
A. ANNAN
Mr. President, Members of the Council,
Mr President,
Mr. President,
Mr. President,
Mr. President,
BRIEFING
TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE SITUATION IN SYRIA
New
York, 11 July 2012
Mr. President, Members of the Council,
1.
Thank you for inviting me to speak to you today. This is an important
moment to take stock of where we are and where we must go. Let me
also join Mr. Ladsous in thanking troop contributors and expressing
my gratitude to the men and women serving under General Mood.
2.
I reported to you a month ago that the six—point plan and Security
Council resolutions 2042 and 2043 were not being implemented — as
they must. I recalled in this context the failure of President Assad
to take the bold steps necessary to implement the six-point plan, and
noted the intensification of violence from both the Government and
the armed opposition. I called for joint and sustained pressure by
the Council on the parties, and consequences for non-compliance. The
Secretary-General’s report before you carries the same message.
3.
Since I last briefed you, the situation has gone from bad to worse.
Mr Ladsous’ briefing today confirms that the violence in Syria
continues to escalate, with intensified government campaigns to root
out opposition strongholds, and civilians being killed and injured in
appalling numbers. Despite repeated promises to comply with its
obligation to cease the use of heavy weapons, the government has
increased its operations With shelling, mechanized infantry and the
use of helicopter gunships, including in population centres.
Opposition elements have
also
intensified their attacks against government forces and
installations. At least
several
hundred thousand people are displaced, and many civilians are trapped
in
combat
zones, not receiving medical care or humanitarian aid. Battles
continue to
rage
through city after city. Whole neighborhoods have been shelled into
ruins.
Entire
families have been massacred. Thousands have been detained or
disappeared
without a trace and reportedly tortured. We have not seen substantial
releases
of detainees. Peaeefid demonstrators are not able to assemble without
fear,
and are reportedly violently repressed when they do gather in
protest.
Journalists
are still unable to access and move around the country without
restriction.
The assaults on human dignity must end, those responsible must be
held
to account, and the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people must
be
addressed.
Mr President,
4.
A group of influential states and organizations, gravely concerned at
the situation,
convened
for the first time under my chairmanship on 30 June in Geneva not as
a
talk shop, but as an Action Group on Syria. I thank those who
participated, and
those
who were not there but who are ready to help. For the first time, the
international
community has not only urged a renewed effort to stop the violence
they
have also laid out a clear path for change in Syria. We must work in
parallel
on efforts to ensure a cessation of violence and human rights abuses
and
comprehensive
six point plan implementation, but also on a path for political
transition
that can take place with the constructive participation of the
relevant
parties,
both in Syria and internationally. The Action Group agreed to work
together
by taking specific, concrete actions to secure a common agenda, and
support
my efforts to facilitate a meaningful political process.
5.
The Action Group identified steps and measures to stop the violence
and secure
comprehensive
implementation of the six point plan. In this regard, members
opposed
further militarization of the conflict and called for comprehensive
implementation of the sixapoint plan and resolutions 2042 and 2043.
They urged
all
parties to re-cornmit to a sustained cessation of armed violence in
all its forms
immediately
and without waiting for the actions of others, and the Government to
implement
its obligations regarding humanitarian assistance, detainees,
journalists,
and peaceful protest.
6.
The Action Group also agreed on “Principles and guidelines for a
Syrian-led
transition”,
so that the Syrians could stop the violence and embrace a clear way
forward
and reach a Syrian solution. A solution must meet the legitimate
aspirations
of the Syrian people, and involve irreversible steps according to a
7.
In particular, the Action Group agreed that any transition should
include a
transitional
governing body which would exercise full executive powers and can
establish
a neutral environment in which the transition can take place. This
body
could
include members of the present government and the opposition and
other
groups,
and should be formed on the basis of mutual consent.
8. The Action Group also stressed that all government institutions must perform according to human rights and professional standards and operate under a top leadership that inspires public confidence. The Action Group agreed that a transition also requires a meaningful national dialogue, a constitutional revision process subject to popular approval and free and fair multiparty elections steps overseen by a transitional governing body.
8. The Action Group also stressed that all government institutions must perform according to human rights and professional standards and operate under a top leadership that inspires public confidence. The Action Group agreed that a transition also requires a meaningful national dialogue, a constitutional revision process subject to popular approval and free and fair multiparty elections steps overseen by a transitional governing body.
9.
The Group also made clear that there must be a commitment to
accountability and
to
national reconciliation. The Group stressed that it is for the people
of Syria to
come
to a political agreement, but that time is running out and rapid
steps are
needed.
Mr. President,
10.
Neither the Government nor the opposition has fully embraced the
Action Group communique, but its importance is apparent to all. We
must all work together to secure the full commitment of the parties
in word and deed.
11.
I have just returned from the region, where I addressed matters
directly with President Assad. I also consulted the Government of
Iran, which was not present in Geneva, and the Government of Iraq,
which I had not had the opportunity to visit since taking up this
assignment. Turkey, Qatar and Kuwait participated in the Action
Group, together with the League of Arab States Secretary-General, and
I look forward to further regional consultations, including in Saudi
Arabia, as soon as possible. And you may recall that in previous
visits ‘I have been to Qatar, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey.
12.
You Will recall that, on 12 April, a nationwide cessation of armed
violence was declared. The fighting stopped, showing that the parties
are capable of halting theviolence. But this lull did not hold.
13.
In my meeting with President Assad, we spoke candidly about the need
to establish a clear mechanism for the cessation of violence in a
renewed comprehensive effort to implement the six~point plan. We
discussed the idea of stopping military operations and urgently
calming the situation in key parts of the country that are
experiencing significant violence. This could include simultaneous
actions in several locations, where violence has been ongoing and
where civilian needs are particularly urgent.
14.
For this to work, the Government has to be prepared to go further
than before. President Assad indicated that he would be ready to take
the first step to cease violence _in the context of an agreed set of
actions by the parties. This principle should be applied in all
locations as part -of do-escalation efforts.
15.
It is also essential that the Government is ready to be realistic
about the weapons
of
the local armed opposition. Until now, it had insisted that armed
elements must
surrender
their weapons in return for amnesty. This is not acceptable and would
efforts to cease violence. President Assad agreed to consider the
idea that
the
armed opposition would not have to surrender its weapons as an
initial step
towards
political dialogue.
16.
These efforts must be complemented by action in all circumstances to
allow
immediate
and full humanitarian access to all areas affected by the fighting.
They
must
also be matched by a readiness to take specific actions by the
Government to
build
confidence — including most urgently meaningful release of
detainees, and
broader
action on full implemantation of the six-point plan.
17.
I made clear to the President that on the basis of this discussion we
should
urgently
finalize comprehensive implementation arrangements for securing a
cessation
of armed violence in accordance with the six point plan — plans
which
are
only as valuable as the first steps taken to implement them and
positively
impact
people caught in the violence. I wish to stress once again that the
six-point
plan
is a package intended to create a conducive environment for dialogue
and
must
be implemented in full.
18.
In this regard, I specifically stressed with President Assad his
Government’s
unacceptable
use of heavy weapons, and he indicated he would stop. Let me
stress:
the Government should be the first to stop, and should not insist on
the
opposition
handing over its weapons. Nothing is more urgent, given the appalling
scale
of civilian casualties the use of heavy weapons is exacting, in clear
violation
of
the Government’s responsibilities under international law.
19.
President Assad asked that UNSMIS provide support to the initiation
of local
ceasefires
and dialogue. UNSMIS can facilitate dialogue and specific steps to
end
violence
between the Parties, including through outreach with the armed
opposition.
For UNSMIS to play this role, however, all parties must commit to
cooperate
with the Observers, including free and safe access, as the Action
Group
stressed.
And let me be clear: it is the parties which remain responsible
forholding to their commitments.
20.
Local dialogue initiatives and ceasefire arrangements can only work
if they feed
into
and are complemented by, and indeed linked to, broader and credible
nation
wide
political transition process With clear timelines, as envisaged by
the Action
Group.
As the Action Group outlined, disarmament has to be addressed in the
framework
of the political transition process. This is one of the inherent
linkages
between
stopping the violence and moving ahead on the political track.
21.
President Assad and I exchanged views on aspects of how a political
transition
could
be negotiated and unfold — which, I indicated, I believe should be
able to be
completed
within six months to a year. President Assad indicated that this
could
be
possible if conditions were correct. A key issue at this stage is the
appointment
of
an effective empowered interlocutor who is clearly authorized to
negotiate on
the
basis of the six—point plan and the Action Group communique’. It
is essential
that
this person be seen as credible both in terms of his or her access to
the
President,
and in terms of his or her ability to be viewed with confidence by
those
he
or she must engage. President Assad offered me a name. I am looking
further
into
this matter.
22.
I have publicly described my talks with President Assad as candid and
constructive.
But such talks are only meaningful if they lead to action. The
President
promised action and he must deliver.
23.
During my regional travels, I appreciated the valuable exchanges with
the
Governments
of Iran and Iraq on all issues and the support they offered for the
international
effort to end the violence and secure full implementation of the six
point
plan. Both Governments were also very clear on the importance of a
political transition — one that is Syrian-led and Syrian-owned, and
ensures that the
legitimate
and democratic aspirations of the Syrian people are fully met.
Mr. President,
24.
The opposition, including those elements with arms, must be ready to
respond
urgently
and constructively to initiatives to end the violence and move a
transition
process
forward. We are seeking to engage them on de-escalating the violence
to
ensure
a mutually acceptable practical way of doing so, in full accordance
with
the
six-point plan and the Action Group communique.
25.
When the Action Group met in Geneva, its members urged the opposition
to
increase
cohesion and be in a position to ensure effective representative
interlocutors
to work on the basis of the six point plan and the communique. In
the
immediate aftermath of the meeting, Deputy Joint Special Envoy Nasser
Al
Kidwa
attended a meeting of the opposition in Cairo - the largest such
gathering
since
the conflict began. There were 210 participants, representing various
opposition
groups, civil society and independent figures from within Syria and
abroad.
26.
On 3 July, the participants of the Conference -- with the exception
of one group,
which
had walked out before the closing session -- adopted two documents: a
Common
Political Vision for the Transition in Syria, a consensus document
delineating
a common position on political transition; and a National Pact
establishing
“constitutional foundations of a future Syria”. The adoption of
these
documents
represents a positive step in which a wide range of opposition came
together to describe how they see the way forward. There is valuable
common
ground
between the opposition documents and the Geneva communique, but also
areas
where more work needs to be done.
27.
Regrettably, the conference failed to deliver progress on important
organizational
issues,
and it was a missed opportunity for the opposition to forge greater
unity at
a
crucial moment. However, this will not deter us from continuing to
work for
greater
opposition cohesion and seeking effective representative
interlocutors,
inside
and outside Syria, with whom to partner. This is urgent if we are to
move
the
political transition forward.
28.
Following the Geneva and Cairo meetings, my Office has been actively
working
to
engage with the opposition, both in writing and in face-to-face
meetings. Both
of
my deputies attended the Friends of Syria meeting hosted by the
French
government
in Paris last Friday, 6 July, which was also attended by senior
officials
from over 100 states, and among other things supported the Action
Group
communique. Syrian opposition representatives have also held meetings
with
the Russian government in Moscow during the past week.
Mr. President,
29.
We now have a clear, internationally-agreed path for a transition to
a state that is genuinely pluralistic and democratic, supported by a
wide-cross section of the
international
community. I believe this path offers a process With which all can
seriously
engage. It is on this basis that we have urged the Government, as
well as
all
elements of the opposition, to implement the six point plan and to
work on the
basis
the Action Group communique’. I hope the Security Council will give
its full
backing
and endorsement to what the Action Group agreed.
30.
It is a common pledge of all Action Group participants to apply joint
and
sustained
pressure on the parties. I will be keen to hear soon from all Action
Group
members about their efforts in this regard, and Will be following up
with
Action
Group members in the near future on our next steps. I Will myself
visit
Moscow
next week.
31.
Action Group members opposed further militarization of the conflict.
I am sure
we
all agree that no one should be sending weapons to Syria.
32.
The Permanent Five Members of the Security Council present in Geneva
clearly
pledged
to support the effort. In this regard, I count on members of this
Council to
speak
with one voice to ensure that UNSMIS is supported in a manner
suitable to
the
new phase in which we have entered.
33.
But let me be clear. The conflict has raged with growing intensity
for sixteen
months.
Thousands have been killed. Several hundred thousand are displaced.
These
numbers are growing daily. The Syrian people are living a nightmare.
The
Security
Council has been seized of this matter for some time, and has adopted
two
resolutions, 2042 and 2043. You should insist on implementation of
your
decisions,
and send a message to all that there will be consequences for non
compliance.
34.
Now, more than ever, the international community must put aside
narrow national
approaches
and work intensively together according to a common agenda to bring
about
an end to the violence and get the Syrian-led and Syrian-owned
political
transition
off the ground. If we do not do this now, it may soon be too late.
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