"Strictly Confidential" Amos's letter to Security Council on Syria: Exert pressure on parties

Bashar Ja’afari (back, in grey suit), Ambassador of Syria to the UN,

listens as Valerie Amos, USG for Humanitarian Affairs, speaks to

journalists on the humanitarian situation in his country.

 25 October 2013

In this "Strictly Confidential" letter, Valerie Amos, the head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), called on the Security Council to take action on priority areas "where sustained attention from Council Members could help us to make an immediate difference on the ground in Syria."

This document was obtained by UN REPORT. Click here to read the original copy.

"STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

 Note to Security Council Members

    Following my recent briefing to the Security Council on Syria, I thought it would be helpful to set out the points I highlighted when summing up the discussions. One of the key messages is the need to learn the lessons from the Security Council’s handling of the chemical weapons issue and the success of that and understanding how these positive lessons could be applied to make progress on humanitarian issues. Effective operationalisation of the Security Council Presidential Statement requires sustained political support from Security Council members.

     Please see below priority areas where sustained attention from Council Members could help us to make an immediate difference on the ground in Syria:

SAFE AND UNHINDERED DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

* Use leverage with parties to the conflict to allow the evacuation of civilians from areas besieged by either the Government or opposition forces. The recent case of Moadamiyeh is an example of what is possible.

* Use leverage with parties to the conflict to facilitate humanitarian access to hard to reach areas under their control. Attached please find a map of the hard to reach areas where 2.5 million people are trapped and a list of the areas which are besieged.

* Exert pressure on the parties to the conflict to implement a weekly humanitarian pause or area specific pauses to access those in need, especially in hard to reach and besieged areas.

EXPANSION OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS

* Use contacts with the Government of Syria to enable the expansion of humanitarian relief  operations and lift bureaucratic impediments, especially:

a. Facilitation of visas for humanitarian workers, including for UN DSS staff;

b. Facilitation of customs clearance procedures for humanitarian supplies and equipment;

c. Facilitation missions;

d. Agreement on additional humanitarian hubs in Dara’a, Aleppo and Qamishly;

* Use contacts with the Government of Syria to facilitate agreement that humanitarian assistance can go directly to affected communities through the most direct route when supplies are imported from neighbouring countries, for example from Lebanon, Jordan or Iraq, rather than supplies first having to go through Damascus to then be redistributed throughout Syria;

PROTECTION

* Exert pressure on the parties to the conflict to publicly declare that it is unacceptable to target medical facilities, staff and ambulances, and to occupy such facilities, and ask them to immediately demilitarize and evacuate such premises;

SAFE PASSAGE OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES

* Use leverage with all parties to the conflict to allow medical equipment, including surgical equipment, in all conflict areas;

FUNDING

* Engage with countries ahead of the pledging Conference in Kuwait in January 2014 to ensure adequate level of funding to meet increasing needs for 2014.

* Fund the winterization plan. The immediacy of the situation makes it a priority.

      

We are monitoring the progress being made in implementing the recommendations in the Presidential Statement. I will present to the Council a paper which will help Council members to monitor the timely operationalisation of the PRST. 

Valerie Amos, 1 November 2013"

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UNGA (Saudi) Draft Resolution on Human Rights in Syria

DRAFT Resolution to be submitted to the UNGA Third Committee

Sixty-eighth session

Agenda item 69 (c)

Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic

The General Assembly,

PP1 Guided by the Charter of the United Nations, [A/RES/67/183 PP1]

PP2 Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights[1] and relevant international human rights treaties, including the International Covenants on Human Rights,[2] [A/RES/67/183 PP2]

PP3 Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic and to the principles of the Charter, [A/RES/67/183 PP7]

PP4 Recalling its resolutions 66/176 of 19 December 2011, 66/253 A of 16 February 2012 and 66/253 B of 3 August 2012, 67/183 of 20 December 2012 and 67/262 of 15 May 2013, Human Rights Council resolutions S 16/1 of 29 April 2011,[3] S 17/1 of 23 August 2011, S 18/1 of 2 December 2011,[4] 19/1 of 1 March 2012,[5] 19/22 of 23 March 2012, S 19/1 of 1 June 2012,[6] 20/22 of 6 July 2012[7], 21/26 of 28 September 2012[8], 22/24 of 22 March 2013, 23/XX of 14 May 2013 and 24/XX of 27 September 2013, and Security Council resolutions 2042 (2012) of 14 April 2012, 2043 (2012) of 21 April 2012, and 2118 (2013) of 27 September 2013, and presidential statement 2013/15 of 2 October 2013 [A/RES/67/183 PP3 as updated]

PP5 Expressing outrage at the continuing escalation of violence in the Syrian Arab Republic, which has caused over 100,000 casualties, mostly by conventional weapons; and in particular at the continued widespread and systematic gross violations, as well as abuses, of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, including those involving the continued use of heavy weapons and aerial bombardments, such as the indiscriminate use of ballistic missiles and cluster munitions, by the Syrian authorities against the Syrian population,

PP6 Alarmed at the failure of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to protect its population [based on A/RES/67/262 PP5] and to implement the relevant resolutions and decisions by United Nations bodies,

PP7 Strongly condemning any human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by armed extremists; [based on A/HRC/RES/24/XX OP3]

PP8 Also strongly condemning the large scale use of chemical weapons on 21 August 2013 in Al-Ghouta, as concluded in the report of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, condemning the killing of civilians that resulted from it, affirming that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law, and stressing that those responsible for any use of chemical weapons must be held accountable, [based on S/RES/2118 PP8]

PP9 Recalling that the League of Arab States, in its resolution 7667 adopted by the 140th ordinary session of the Ministerial Council on 1 September 2013, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, in the Final Communiqué of its Annual Coordination Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 27 September 2013, have held the Syrian government fully responsible for the chemical attacks against the Syrian people, which took place in Al-Ghouta,

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OPCW First Monthly Report on Syria

The UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon transmitted this report to the Security Council today, October 28th 2013. 
It enclosed the first report of the Director - General of the OPCW on the 'Progress in the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Program'. 

Click here to get a copy of the report. 

Sigrid Kaag, Special Coordinator of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission

 to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons programme, 

speaks to journalists in Damascus. 22 October 2013

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

28 October 2013

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to transmit the first monthly report of the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) pursuant to paragraph 2 (f) of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-3 3fDEC.1 and paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). This letter also provides the information requested in that resolution on the activities of the United Nations related to the implementation of the resolution from 27 September to 22 October 2013.

Introduction

At the outset, I would like to congratulate the OPCW for being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. I pay tribute to the leadership of the Director—General, to the professionalism and dedication of OPCW staff, and to their Work, which has earned them this year’s Nobel Peace Prize.

I Wish to recall your letter of 11 October 2013 (3/2013/603) conveying the Security Council’s decision to authorize the establishment of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission as proposed in my letter of 7 October 2013 (8/2013/591). I am pleased to confirm that, on 16 October 2013, the Director-General of OPCW and I established the Joint Mission and concluded a Supplementary Arrangement concerning cooperation . between the United Nations and the OPCW for the implementation of Executive Council decision EC-M-3 3/DEC. 1 and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) relating to the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Also on 16 October 2013, in close consultation with the Director-General, I appointed Ms. Sigrid Kaag as Special Coordinator to head the Joint Mission. I have every confidence that the strong cooperation that has already defined the work of the OPCW and the United Nations will bolster the role of the Special Coordinator and guide the efforts of our two organizations, Within our respective roles and responsibilities, to fully implement the Executive Council decision and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013).

His Excellency

Mr. Agshin Mehdiyev

President of the Security Council

New York

       Upon appointment, the Special Coordinator immediately assumed her responsibilities and continued the effective and efficient functioning of the Joint Mission to date. After a series of meetings at United Nations Headquarters she travelled to the OPCW Headquarters in The Hague for consultations on 19 and 20 October with the Director-General and his staff, along with other stakeholders.

On 21 October 2013 the Special Coordinator travelled to the Syrian Arab Republic to begin her work from the Joint Mission operations base in Damascus. She met with Foreign Minister Waiid Al-Moualem, the Deputy Foreign Minister and Head of the National Committee for the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Faisal Mekdad, and other Syrian counterparts to identify ways to finalize phase II—related activities and discuss arrangements for phase Hi destruction, as described in my letter of '7 October 2013. During those discussions the Government reiterated its support to the Joint Mission, its commitment to fully implement the requirements of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) and the decisions of the Executive Council

of the OPCW. While in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Special Coordinator Visited a chemical weapons production facility on 22 October 2013 and observed the early results of destruction activities.

The Special Coordinator travelled to Cyprus on 23 October 2013 to develop the Joint Mission Staging Area and Support Base and convened a. planning conference attended by OPCW and United Nations officials. The planning conference focused on phase III activities, and made important progress on key operational matters. The participants finalized a mission concept, a planning framewoik, a draft operational plan, and a range of supporting documentation.

Thus far the Joint Mission, in particular the OPCW, with the support of the United Nations, has focused on clarifying elements contained Within the Government disclosure submitted to the OPCW on 21 September 2013, ahead of an initial declaration to be submitted by 27 October 2013. The Joint Mission has conducted verification activities at 37 out of 41 disclosed facilities. As the Director-General of the OPCW indicates in his attached report, Joint Mission personnel have not been able to visit a few locations due to highly insecure conditions at the respective locations. The security situation at each of the locations is under constant review by the Joint Mission, in close consultation with the Syrian authorities, with the intention or" visiting them as soon as conditions permit. The Joint Mission has confirmed the functional destruction of the production and mixing and filling capabilities at all the sites it has inspected. In all of these activities the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has extended consistent, constructive cooperation.

United Nations activities

Since the adoption of resolution 2118 (2013), the United Nations has worked first to deploy and support the OPCW-United Nations advance team, and subsequently to launch the Joint Mission. To this end, and guided by the principles of the Organization’s global field support strategy, the United Nations has rapidly deployed a range of personnel, assets and capabilities to the Syrian Arab Republic and Cyprus.

        To accomplish this, the United Nations has drawn frOm other missions in the region and from Headquarters with the flexible allocation of personnel, assets and capabilities. As 1 indicated in my letter of '7 October 2013, I intend to make full use of the authorities provided to me to ensure the timely achievement of the mandate of the Mission in a safe manner. The costs of these United Nations activities and deployments will he met by the Joint Mission budget, and will not come at the expense of other missions’ financial resources.

Currently, there are 26 OPCW experts and 50 United Nations personnel working in the Joint Mission, including national staff. These numbers fluctuate constantly, depending on operational requirements. In addition, some of the United Nations support responsibilities are being met through temporary surge deployments of UN personnel who provide short-term capabilities critical for the start-up of the Joint Mission, but whose services are required only for a short time and who are temporarily Joint Mission staff.

During this reporting period, the United Nations has worked to develop the Joint Mission’s operational capability across a range of areas. The United Nations has established office and personnel accommodation for the Mission, deployed 22 armoured vehicles with the support of donors, a diesel fuel tanker, and an armoured ambulance. The United Nations is also providing logistic, administrative and public information support as well as medical assistance, including a United Nations doctor and nurse who work in concert with OP CW paramedics. The United Nations has

also provided emergency trauma bags for office premises and vehicles, together with scheduled related training, and a range of chemical protection equipment. The Mission has established a strategic communications network by linking through other United Nations missions in the region, establishing a VHF base station, and providing computers and satellite and mobile telephones. The United Nations has provided for the Geographic Information System requirements of the Joint Mission, including affiliated equipment. Finally, the United Nations has been central to the outreach effort to Syrian, international and local partners.

The safety and security of all Joint Mission personnel are a central concern for

me and for the Special Coordinator. The security environment in the Syrian Arab Republic remains difficult and unpredictable. The security of OPCW and United Nations personnel remains the ultimate responsibility of the Government of

the Syrian Arab Republic. The Joint Mission has taken a proactive role in assessing the security context, working with the host Government to ensure the necessary security arrangements, and advising on and supporting the conduct of operations.

The United Nations liaises with the Government and local groups related to site access. Opposition groups have a central role in ensuring the safety of the Mission and access to sites where they may exert influence. One of the primary risk mitigation measures employed by the Joint Mission is to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic only staff that need to be in the country to perform their function, and to keep staff in the country only as long as their presence there is operationally required. In this regard, the Joint Mission Staging Area and Support Base in Cyprus will play an increasingly important role as staff are deployed there in support of the Mission, but also as staff move between Damascus and Cyprus. I

In other efforts to establish the Mission, and further to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), in which the Council called on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to conclude modality agreements with the United Nations and OPCW, on 16 October 2013 the United Nations and OPCW jointly proposed a draft tripartite status-of-mission agreement to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic with a view to concluding the agreement by 1 November 2013.

The United Nations and the OPCW have also concluded a tripartite exchange of letters with the Government of Cyprus, for the Joint Mission Staging Area and Support Base. Arrangements have also been put in place in Lebanon to facilitate the transit of Joint Mission personnel and equipment. The United Nations and the OPCW appreciate the support of both Governments.

On the same day that the Joint Mission was officially hunched on 16 October 2013, both the United Nations and the OPCW launched trust funds to support our respective contributions to this mission. There has been donor interest in both funds and discussions are ongoing with a number of countries related to contributions to the United Nations trust fund.

Phase III activities

It is clear that the Joint Mission, and in particular the OPCW, have a. vital role in verifying Syrian activities with respect to the destruction of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Less clear, but vital to the work of the Joint Mission, is the degree to which the Mission will be expected to provide direct support t0 Syrian authorities in their own planning or operations. The role of the Joint Mission, if any, in conducting actual operations, for instance in the packing, safe transport, and possible removal from the Syrian Arab Republic of chemical agents, requires further consultation and review. The Joint Mission is prepared to contribute to the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons programme in the most efficacious manner possible, consistent with the decision of the OPCW Executive Council and resolution of the Security Council. I have asked the Special Coordinator, operating under the guidance of the OPCW Director-General and myself, to rapidly conclude the necessary consultations with the Syrian authorities and relevant stakeholders in order to arrive at a shared understanding of the operational role to be played by the Syrian Arab Republic, by the Joint Mission, and possibly by Member States. This is an urgent task if the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Joint Mission, working together, are to meet the envisaged deadlines.

As part of this effort, the Joint Mission will identify areas where support may. be required from Member States or other organizations. I am grateful for the offers of assistance that have been made thus far to the OPCW and the United Nations for this mission. Already the Joint Mission has received valuable support from Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. This support has included armoured vehicles vital to the operational activities of the Joint Mission, airlift capacity for personnel including the Special Coordinator and for ' material including armoured vehicles and mapping information. In addition, Sweden has agreed to place an aircraft at the disposal of the Joint Mission for an initial period of two months. The aircraft will be based in Cyprus and used primarily to transport personnel between Cyprus and Beirut for onward travel to Damascus.

Related to possible areas of support for the Joint Mission’s work is the support that the Syrian authorities may require or benefit from for the conduct of their activities I related to the destruction of the chemical weapons programme. The Syrian authorities have developed an initial security plan for the transport of materials associated with the chemical weapons programme Within the country. That plan will be further discussed between the Joint Mission and the Government. In addition, the Syrian Arab Republic is obliged to submit its destruction plan to the OPCW by 27 October 2013. The ExecutiVe Council of the OPCW will consider the plan and take a decision by 15 November 2013 outlining the detailed requirements for the complete elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment. The Special Coordinator will work closely with the OPCW headquarters, the Syrian authorities and interested Member States to ensure synchronization of the related planning efforts.

The Syrian Arab Republic remains responsible for the destruction of its chemical weapons programme and has delivered a copy of a letter addressed to the OPCW Director—General by the Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister that contained a list of “requirements for the implementation of the security plan”. The extensive list included items related to transportation, material packing and handling, communications, safety and security, power generation, and personnel support.

The Joint Mission is currently analysing the list. The United Nations, possibly using the trust fund that I have established for this operation, will consider meeting certain of the validated support requests either through the direct provision of assistance to the Government, through the conditional loan of material assistance to the Government, or through its own direct operational engagement, acting through the Joint Mission. Some of the support requested by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic could potentially be used for legitimate purposes associated with the destruction of the chemical weapons programme, while at the same time have practical military applications. The United Nations will not pro cure or otherwise provide such dual-use material to the Government. Any assistance provided by the United Nations will be subject to strict conditions in order to ensure that it is used solely for the intended purposes.

The Special Coordinator will consult With the Syrian authorities, and the OPCW and the United Nations Headquarters as appropriate, in order to develop as quickly as possible a list of support requirements for the Syrian Arab Republic and separately for the Joint Mission, which she will share with interested Member States as soon as it is available.

As part of its planning activities, the Joint Mission, with support from the Health and Safety Branch of the OPCW and the United Nations Environment Pro gramme, has developed an initial environmental protection and health and safety analysis. Both parties are prepared to provide additional assistance once more detail regarding the overall operational plan of the Joint Mission is established. The United Nations is

also in contact with the World Health Organization regarding the possible public health implications of activities associated with the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons programme.

Conclusion

The Security Council demonstrated the importance of eliminating the chemical weapons pro gramme of the Syrian Arab Republic when it unanimously adopted resolution 2118 (2013). The Director-General of the OPCW and I, together with our staffs, have acted on this mandate with singular focus to ensure timely progress for the sake of the Syrian people and for the sake of regional and international peace and security. The OPCW and the United Nations have managed Within the brief time of the reporting period to establish a fully functioning Mission capable of confronting the challenging tasks and operating in a dangerous and volatile environment.

The decisions taken by the two Councils rightly accorded operational priority to disabling the capability to produce chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic from their separate component parts. Accordingly, since the initia} deployment of a joint advance team less than one month ago, the OPCW with the support of the United Nations, has verified the destruction of critical equipment in chemical weapons production, mixing and filling facilities. The functional destruction of the declared capacity of the Syrian Arab Republic to produce chemical weapons is expected to be completed as planned by 1 November 2013, a mere 34 days after the adoption of resolution 2118 (2013), with the possible exception of two sites that could not be accessed for security reasons. Efforts _will continue to conduct verification of destruction work at that site.

Let me reiterate that all destruction of chemical Weapons facilities, stocks | and associated materials is the responsibility of the Syrian Government. Neither the OPCW nor the United Nations is mandated to conduct actual destruction activities. First and foremost, success of this Joint Mission will depend on the sustained commitment by the Syrian authorities to fulfil their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the decision of the OPCW Executive Council and the resolution of the Security Council. Without sustained, genuine commitment by the Syrian authorities, the Joint Mission will not its objectives.

I would also like to underscore that the Joint Mission is carrying out its work in an extremely dangerous, volatile, and unpredictable environment. It impacts the ability of the Joint Mission to conduct its highly technical work and we should remain vigilant to do all in our powers to support the men and women of the OPCW and the United Nations who have worked so hard, and so well together to achieve these initial steps. However, the job is far from complete and much' impmtant work remains to be done. The United Nations will continue to act in partnership with the OPCW, and through the Joint Mission, to implement the provisions of resolution 2118 (2013) in their entirety.

I should be grateful if you could bring this letter urgently to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

BAN Ki-moon

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Security Council draft statement on humanitarian situation in Syria

This draft presidential statement was proposed by Australia and Luxembourg. Security Council will discuss it today afternoon (Monday, 30 Sep). 

28 September 2013

Statement by the President of the Security Council

1.     The Security Council recalls its Resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012) and 2118 (2013), and its Presidential Statements of 3 August 2011, 21 March 2012 and 5 April 2012.

2.     The Security Council reaffirms its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

3.     The Security Council calls on all parties to respect the UN guiding principles of humanitarian emergency assistance while stressing the importance of such assistance being delivered on the basis of need, devoid of any political prejudices and aims.

4.     The Security Council is appalled at the unacceptable and escalating level of violence and the death of more than 100,000 people in Syria as reported by the UN Secretary-General and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. It is gravely alarmed by the significant and rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Syria. It notes with grave concern that several million Syrians are in need of immediate humanitarian assistance and that without urgent increased humanitarian action, their lives will be at risk.

5.     The Security Council condemns the widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Syrian authorities, as well as any human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by armed groups.

6.     The Security Council also condemns all violence committed in Syria, irrespective of where it comes from, including all acts of sexual and gender-based violence and abuse, and recalls that international humanitarian law prohibits rape and other forms of sexual violence.

7.     The Security Council further condemns all grave violations and abuses committed against children in contravention of applicable international law, such as recruitment and use, killing and maiming, rape and all other forms of sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals as well as arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, ill treatment and use as human shields.

8.     The Security Council moreover condemns increased terrorist attacks resulting in numerous casualties and destruction carried out by organisations and individuals associated with Al-Qaeda, and calls on all parties to commit to putting an end to terrorist acts perpetrated by such organisations and individuals. The Council reaffirms, in this regard, that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, wherever, whenever and by whomsoever committed.

9.     The Security Council recalls the obligations under international humanitarian law to distinguish between civilian populations and combatants, and the prohibition against indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks against civilians and civilian objects, as well as the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons and the employment of weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. The Council urges all parties to immediately cease and desist from all violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights, and calls on all parties to reaffirm their obligations under international humanitarian law and to take all appropriate steps to protect civilians, including by desisting from attacks directed against civilian objects, such as medical centres, schools and water stations, and also calls on all parties to avoid establishing military positions in populated areas. The Council recalls in this regard that the Syrian authorities bear the primary responsibility to protect their populations.

10.  The Security Council also recalls that under international humanitarian law, the wounded and sick must receive, to the fullest extent practicable, and with the least possible delay, medical care and attention required by their condition and that medical and humanitarian personnel, facilities and transport must be respected and protected. To this end, the Council urges free passage to all areas for medical personnel and supplies, including surgical items and medicine.

11.  The Security Council stresses that the magnitude of the humanitarian tragedy caused by the conflict in Syria requires immediate action to facilitate safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance in the whole country. It condemns all cases of denial of humanitarian access, and recalls that arbitrarily depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supply and access, can constitute a serious violation of international law.

12.  The Security Council urges all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, to take all appropriate steps to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and all humanitarian actors engaged in humanitarian relief activities, to provide immediate humanitarian assistance to the affected people in Syria, including by promptly facilitating safe and unhindered humanitarian access to civilians in need of assistance in all areas under their control and across conflict lines. It also encourages further cooperation between the United Nations, its specialized agencies and all parties concerned, including Syrian civil society organisations, to facilitate access and the delivery of assistance in the entirety of the Syrian territory.

13.  The Security Council further urges the Syrian authorities to take immediate steps to facilitate the expansion of humanitarian relief operations, and lift bureaucratic impediments and other obstacles, including through:

(a)   expediting the approval of further domestic and international Non-Governmental Organizations to engage in humanitarian relief activities;

(b)   easing and expediting the procedures for the operationalization of further humanitarian hubs, the entry and movement of humanitarian personnel and convoys by granting the necessary visas and permits in a predictable manner, the importation of goods and equipment, such as communication tools, protective armoured vehicles and medical and surgical equipment, needed for humanitarian operations;

(c)   promptly facilitating safe and unhindered humanitarian access to people in need through the most effective ways, including across conflict lines and, where appropriate, across borders from neighbouring countries in accordance with the UN guiding principles of humanitarian emergency assistance; and

(d)   accelerating approval for the implementation of humanitarian projects, including those in the revised Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan.

14. The Security Council also urges all parties to:

(a)   take all appropriate steps to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel, those of its specialized agencies, and all other personnel engaged in humanitarian relief activities, without prejudice to their freedom of movement and access, and stresses that the primary responsibility in this regard lies with the Syrian authorities;

(b)   immediately demilitarize medical facilities, schools and water stations, and agree on the modalities to implement humanitarian pauses, as well as key routes to enable promptly - upon notification from relief agencies - the safe and unhindered passage of humanitarian convoys along these routes to access people in need; and

(c)   designate empowered interlocutors with the necessary authority to discuss with humanitarian actors operational and policy issues.

15.  The Security Council expresses its deep concern at the consequences of the refugee crisis caused by the conflict in Syria, which has a destabilising impact on the entire region. It expresses its appreciation for the significant efforts that have been made by the neighbouring countries and the countries of the region, notably Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt, to accommodate the refugees from Syria.

16.  The Security Council reaffirms the importance of the principle of non-refoulement, the right for refugees to return voluntarily to Syria and encourages countries neighbouring Syria to protect all people fleeing the violence in Syria, including Palestinians. It urges all Member States, based on burden sharing principles, to support these countries in assisting refugees and affected communities. The Council underlines the need for all parties to respect and maintain the security and civilian character of camps for refugees and internally displaced persons.

17.  The Security Council also urges all Member States to respond swiftly to the United Nations’ humanitarian appeals to meet the spiralling needs of people inside Syria and in neighbouring countries, and to ensure that all pledges are honoured in full. It further urges all Member States, in coordination with international financial institutions and United Nations agencies, to increase their support to address the increasing political, socio-economic and financial impact of the refugee crisis on hosting countries.

18.  The Security Council stresses the need to end impunity for violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights, and reaffirms that those who have committed or are otherwise responsible for such violations and abuses in Syria must be brought to justice.

19.  The Security Council emphasizes that the humanitarian situation will continue to deteriorate in the absence of a political solution to the crisis, reiterates its endorsement of the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 (Annex II of resolution 2118 (2013)) and demands that all parties work towards the immediate and comprehensive implementation of the Geneva Communiqué aimed at bringing an immediate end to all violence and violations and abuses of international law, and facilitating a Syrian-led political process leading to a transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people and enables them independently and democratically to determine their own future. It reiterates the need to convene as soon as possible an international conference to implement the Geneva Communiqué in order to facilitate a Syrian-led political process leading to a transition that would hasten an end to the conflict in Syria.

20.  The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to regularly inform the Council about the humanitarian situation in Syria and its impact on neighbouring countries, including on progress towards implementation of this presidential statement. 

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Security Council resolution 2118 on chemical weapons in Syria

القرار باللغة العربية - إضغط هنا. 

The Security Council,

PP1. Recalling the Statements of its President of 3 August 2011, 21 March 2012, 5 April 2012, and its resolutions 1540 (2004), 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012),

PP2. Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic,

PP3. Reaffirming that the proliferation of chemical weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

PP4. Recalling that the Syrian Arab Republic on 22 November 1968 acceded to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,

PP5. Noting that on 14 September 2013, Syria deposited with the Secretary-General its instrument of accession to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Convention) and declared that it shall comply with its stipulations and observe them faithfully and sincerely, applying the Convention provisionally pending its entry into force for the Syrian Arab Republic,

PP6. Welcoming the establishment by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (“the Mission”) pursuant to General Assembly resolution 42/37 C (1987) of 30 November 1987, and reaffirmed by resolution 620 (1988) of 26 August 1988, and expressing appreciation for the work of the Mission,

PP7. Acknowledging the report of 16 September 2013 (S/2013/553) by the Mission, underscoring the need for the Mission to fulfil its mandate, and emphasizing that future credible allegations of chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic should be investigated,

PP8. Deeply outraged by the use of chemical weapons on 21 August 2013 in Rif Damascus, as concluded in the Mission’s report, condemning the killing of civilians that resulted from it, affirming that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law, and stressing that those responsible for any use of chemical weapons  must be held accountable,

PP9. Recalling the obligation under resolution 1540 (2004) that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, and their means of delivery,

PP10. Welcoming the Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons dated 14 September 2013, in Geneva, between the Russian Federation and the United States of America (S/2013/565), with a view to ensuring the destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons program in the soonest and safest manner, and expressing its commitment to the immediate international control over chemical weapons and their components in the Syrian Arab Republic,

PP11. Welcoming the decision of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) of [XX September 2013] establishing special procedures for the expeditious destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons program and stringent verification thereof, and expressing its determination to ensure the destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons program according to the timetable contained in the OPCW Executive Council decision of [XX September 2013],

PP12. Stressing that the only solution to the current crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic is through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process based on the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012, and emphasising the need to convene the international conference on Syria as soon as possible,

PP13. Determining that the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

PP14. Underscoring that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Council's decisions,

   1. Determines that the use of chemical weapons anywhere constitutes a threat to international peace and security;

   2. Condemns in the strongest terms any use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, in particular the attack on 21 August 2013, in violation of international law;

   3. Endorses the decision of the OPCW Executive Council [XX September 2013], which contains special procedures for the expeditious destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons program and stringent verification thereof and calls for its full implementation in the most expedient and safest manner;

   4. Decides that the Syrian Arab Republic shall not use, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to other States or non-State actors;

   5. Underscores that no party in Syria should use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile,  retain, or transfer chemical weapons;

   6.  Decides that the Syrian Arab Republic shall comply with all aspects of the decision of the OPCW Executive Council of [XX September 2013] (Annex I);

   7. Decides that the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with the OPCW and the United Nations, including by complying with their relevant recommendations, by accepting personnel designated by the OPCW or the United Nations, by providing for and ensuring the security of activities undertaken by these personnel, by providing these personnel with immediate and unfettered access to and the right to inspect, in discharging their functions, any and all sites, and by allowing immediate and unfettered  access to individuals that the OPCW has grounds to believe to be of importance for the purpose of its mandate, and decides that all parties in Syria shall cooperate fully in this regard;

   8. Decides to authorize an advance team of United Nations personnel to provide early assistance to OPCW activities in Syria, requests the Director-General of the OPCW and the Secretary-General to closely cooperate in the implementation of the Executive Council decision of [XX September 2013] and this resolution, including through their operational activities on the ground, and further requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Director-General of the OPCW and, where appropriate, the Director-General of the World Health Organization, to submit to the Council within 10 days of the adoption of this resolution recommendations regarding the role of the United Nations in eliminating the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons program;

   9. Notes that the Syrian Arab Republic is a party to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, decides that OPCW-designated personnel undertaking activities provided for in this resolution or the decision of the OPCW Executive Council of [XX September 2013] shall enjoy the privileges and immunities contained in the Verification Annex, Part II(B) of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and calls on the Syrian Arab Republic to conclude modalities agreements with the United Nations and the OPCW;

   10. Encourages Member States to provide support, including personnel, technical expertise, information, equipment, and financial and other resources and assistance, in coordination with the Director-General of the OPCW and the Secretary-General, to enable the OPCW and the United Nations to implement the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons program, and decides to authorize Member States to acquire, control, transport, transfer and destroy chemical weapons identified by the Director-General of the OPCW, consistent with the objective of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to ensure the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons program in the soonest and safest manner;

   11. Urges all Syrian parties and interested Member States with relevant capabilities to work closely together and with the OPCW and the United Nations to arrange for the security of the monitoring and destruction mission, recognizing the primary responsibility of the Syrian government in this regard;

   12. Decides to review on a regular basis the implementation in the Syrian Arab Republic of the decision of the OPCW Executive Council [XX September 2013] and this resolution, and requests the Director-General of the OPCW to report to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, who shall include relevant information on United Nations activities related to the implementation of this resolution, within 30 days and every month thereafter, and requests further the Director-General of the OPCW and the Secretary-General to report in a coordinated manner, as needed,  to the Security Council, non-compliance with this resolution or the OPCW Executive Council decision of [XX September 2013];

   13. Reaffirms its readiness to consider promptly any reports of the OPCW under Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which provides for the referral of cases of non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council;

   14. Decides that Member States shall inform immediately the Security Council of any violation of resolution 1540 (2004), including acquisition by non-State actors of chemical weapons, their means of delivery and related materials in order to take necessary measures therefore;

Accountability

   15. Expresses its strong conviction that those individuals responsible for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic should be held accountable;

Political transition

   16. Endorses fully the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 (Annex II), which sets out a number of key steps beginning with the establishment of a transitional governing body exercising full executive powers, which could include members of the present Government and the opposition and other groups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent;

   17. Calls for the convening, as soon as possible, of an international conference on Syria to implement the Geneva Communiqué, and calls upon all Syrian parties to engage seriously and constructively at the Geneva Conference on Syria, and underscores that they should be fully representative of the Syrian people and committed to the implementation of the Geneva Communiqué and to the achievement of stability and reconciliation;

Non-Proliferation

   18. Reaffirms that all Member States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and calls upon all Member States, in particular Member States neighbouring the Syrian Arab Republic, to report any violations of this paragraph to the Security Council immediately;

   19. Demands that non-State actors not develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and calls upon all Member States, in particular Member States neighbouring the Syrian Arab Republic, to report any actions inconsistent with this paragraph to the Security Council immediately;

   20. Decides that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of chemical weapons, related equipment, goods and technology or assistance from the Syrian Arab Republic by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic;

Compliance

   21. Decides, in the event of non-compliance with this resolution, including unauthorized transfer of chemical weapons, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in the Syrian Arab Republic, to impose measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;

   22. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

ANNEX 1

OPCW Executive Council Decision

ANNEX II

Action Group for Syria Final Communiqué

30 June 2012

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