Ban's draft letter to participants in Geneva 2

This letter was drafted by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon in November 2013, diplomats said. 

Draft text for Letter of the United Nations Secretary-General to International Participants

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon at his residence. 
September 2013

In light of the appalling human suffering and widespread destruction in Syria, including the grave and ever-deteriorating human rights situation, violations of international humanitarian law and the risk of deepening conflict and regional instability, it is imperative to reach a peaceful settlement with the greatest urgency.

The path towards such a settlement was outlined in the Geneva Communique of 30 June 2012 (Annex I), unanimously endorsed by Security Council resolution 2118 of 27 September 2013. The Security Council called for the convening, as soon as possible, of a conference to implement the Geneva Communiqué. Since the initiative of Foreign Minister Lavrov of the Russian Federation and Secretary of State Kerry of the United States of America on 7 May 2013, intensive preparatory consultations between the United Nations and the Permanent Five Members of the Security Council, including the two Initiating States, and others have taken place, along with consultations with the Syrian parties.

Consequently, I am now convening the Geneva Conference on Syria, and am pleased to invite you to attend the high-level international meeting that will launch the Conference. The Conference will begin on 23 November 2013 at the Palais des Nations at 9.00 am.

The Conference aims to assist the Syrian parties in ending the violence and achieving a comprehensive agreement for a political settlement, implementing fully the Geneva Communique. The Communique contains Principles and Guidelines for a Syrian-led transition. These set out a number of key steps, beginning with agreement on a transitional governing body with full executive powers, formed by mutual consent. As the Geneva Communiqué says, the public services must be preserved or restored. This includes the military forces and security services. All governmental institutions and state offices must perform according to professional and human rights standards, operating under a top leadership that inspires public confidence under the control transitional governing body.

The Conference will convene under my chairmanship, first in an international high-level format Over one day. Negotiations between the two Syrian parties, facilitated by the Joint Special Representative for Syria will follow immediately. Adjournments and subsequent meetings may take place in accordance with a work-plan to be agreed. The high-level international meeting 111213.r resume its deliberations as required.

I am confident that the international participants will offer meaningful support for constructive negotiations between the Syrian parties. I am sure that all present will do their utmost to encourage the Syrian parties to reach a comprehensive settlement, fully implementing the Geneva Communique, within an accelerated time-frame. In addition to participation in the high-level meeting, it may be necessary to call upon you to assist further as the negotiations between the Syrian parties progress.

In inviting the Syrian parties, I have reminded them that the Security Council has called on the them to engage seriously and constructively at the Conference, and underscored that they should be fully representative of the Syrian people and committed to the implementation of the Geneva Communique and to the achievement of stability and reconciliation. I have also reminded the Syrian parties that, consistent with the Geneva Communique, Security Council resolution 1325 and other relevant resolutions (Annex II), full and effective participation of women needs to be assured, including through their senior presence in both delegations.

I look forward to confirmation of attendance of your delegation, and the list of delegates and advisers, by 15 November 2013.

Confirmation of attendance will be taken as commitment to the aims of the Conference stated above, in accordance with the Geneva Communiqué, in particular the Principles and Guidelines for a Syrian-led transition contained in it.

You will find annexed a technical information note (Annex III) and basic rules for the Conference (Annex IV).

The conflict in Syria has raged for too long, and has imposed too many sacrifices on the people of Syria. The violence must be ended expeditiously. The Geneva Conference offers a unique avenue towards this end. I am deeply grateful for you cooperation in this venture, to help enSure that peace can restored and the transition foreseen in the Geneva Communique can be implemented in a way that fully meets the aspirations of the Syrian people.

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UNSG Ban's plan to move chemical weapons out of Syria

Sigrid Kaag, Special Coordinator of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission

 to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons programme, 

speaks to the press following her briefing to the Security Council 

in closed-door consultations. 05 November 2013

Click here to read the original document. 

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

27 November 2013

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to transmit the second monthly report of the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) pursuant to paragraph 2 (f) of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-3 3/DEC.1 and paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) (see annex). The present letter also provides the information requested in that resolution on the activities of the United Nations that took place from 23 October to 26 November 2013 related to the implementation of the resolution.

Introduction

A number of milestones were reached during the reporting period, which the Director—General has detailed at length in his report. The Syrian Arab Republic submitted its initial declaration to OPCW on 23 October 2013, in which it disclosed details about its chemical weapons pro gramme. Furthermore, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted, as a part of its declaration, its plan for the programme’s destruction. In this plan, the Syrian authorities proposed that its chemical material should be removed from its territory for destruction.

On 21 November 2013, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted an amendment to its initial declaration increasing the total amount of declared munitions to approximately 1,260 items. '

On 31 October 2013, the Joint Mission confirmed that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic had completed the functional destruction of critical equipment for all of its declared chemical weapons production facilities and mixing/filling plants, rendering them inoperable. By doing so, Syria met the deadline set by the OPCW Executive Council to complete destruction as soon as possible, and in any case not later than 1 November 2013.

On 15 November 2013, the OPCW Executive Council approved the destruction plan of the Syrian Arab Republic for the elimination of its chemical weapons programme. In its decision (EC-M-34/DEC.l), the Executive Council set out detailed requirements and a clear set of timelines for the removal and destruction of primary chemical material outside the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as the destruction of other chemical material, unfilled chemical munitions and chemical weapons production facilities inside the Syrian Arab Republic.

During this reporting period, the Special Coordinator visited Moscow, Washington D.C., The Hague, London and Ankara. She also participated in planning discussions at OPCW headquarters and addressed the Executive Council in The Hague, briefed the United Nations Security Council in

New York and addressed the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels. In each location, she held bilateral meetings with Member State counterparts to brief on the progress of the Joint Mission and to coordinate and seek support for its future activities. In addition, in all her meetings she solicited financial and in-kind voluntary contributions to two trust funds setup by OPCW and the United Nations to ensure that the Joint Mission operations are sufficiently funded and equipped for the significant tasks ahead.

The Special Coordinator also met with representatives of the United Nations in Geneva, including those of the Joint Special Representative for Syria, to coordinate relevant activities of the Joint Mission. She met with officials of the World Health Organization and is in contact with the United Nations Environment Programme to seek specialized assistance and advice in the domains of public health and environmental protection.

The Special Coordinator also met with counterparts in the Syrian Arab Republic in Damascus to coordinate Joint Mission activities and to seek the Government’s continuing commitment to its obligations under Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) and OPCW Executive Council decisions. The discussions reiterated the critical need to ensure the security of Joint Mission personnel and premises. She also met with representatives of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces in Istanbul to explain the Joint Mission’s mandated tasks and activities ahead of the Syrian Arab Republic commencing the transportation of chemical material inside the country and to discuss the need for the safety of the convoys.

In conducting these activities, the Special Coordinator has remained in constant contact With the Director-General of OPCW and myself to ensure that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons headquarters in The Hague and the United Nations Secretariat are fully and expeditiously informed of progress made and challenges faced in implementing mandated tasks.

United Nations component activities

The United Nations component of the Joint Mission has augmented its essential staffing, assets and capabilities required on the ground in Damascus, has developed the Joint Mission office in Cyprus and has established a small New York office, While remaining focused on having only alight footprint in each location. To this end, the Joint Mission continues to draw on

United Nations resources in the region as well as OPCW and United Nations Headquarters. Some of the United Nations support responsibilities continue to be met through temporary deployments of United Nations personnel Who provide short-term capabilities that are critical to the Joint Mission. Currently there are 15 OPCW experts and 48 United Nations personnel working in the Joint Mission, including national staff. These numbers for both OPCW experts and United Nations personnel are tailored to the specific operational requirements of the Joint Mission.

The United Nations component in Damascus continued to provide support through coordination and liaison with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, opposition groups and international stakeholders. It also provided the Joint Mission with security advice and risk assessments, information assessments, communications and outreach, logistical expertise, and logistical and administrative support.

The United Nations component continuously assesses the security situation as it affects the operations of the Joint Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic. It is undertaking measures to install security enhancements at its current headquarters in Damascus. While some enhancements have been implemented, others are either being installed or awaiting importation clearances. All armoured vehicles have been equipped with communications and tracking systems. Safety and security measures have been put in place for all personnel and a programme of security training courses has commenced. Despite these measures, the facility remains vulnerable to certain risks, and the Joint Mission is actively exploring viable alternative locations to base its activities, should the security situation require it.

As I stated in my last letter to the Security Council (8/2013/629), the safety and security of all Joint Mission personnel is of central concern to me, the Director-General of OPCW and the Special Coordinator. The security environment in the Syrian Arab Republic, including in Damascus, remains complex, challenging and unpredictable. The safety and security of Joint Mission personnel remains the ultimate responsibility of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. In addition, all parties must also ensure the access and safety of Joint Mission personnel at sites Where they may exert influence, in order that the Joint Mission may fulfill its mandate.

Key personnel have now deployed to the Joint Mission office in Cyprus. A donor coordination/advisory cell has been set up to work closely With international contributors. A Swedish aircraft and crew have deployed to Cyprus to carry out cargo and personnel airlift operations for the Joint Mission. Romanian Close Personal Protection officers, based partially in Cyprus to provide protection capabilities for the Special Coordinator in the mission area, have also deployed. It is envisioned that a Danish Close Protection team will assume this role from 1 March 2014 until the end of the mandate of the Mission.

A New York office of the Joint Mission has been established at United Nations Headquarters in order to communicate and coordinate closely with Member States and to ensure timely follow-up on behalf of the Joint Mission. A United Nations Liaison Officer has been continuously present at OPCW headquarters in The Hague to further ensure close collaboration and coordination.

The United Nations and OPCW are still negotiating the tripartite status-of-mission agreement with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. In addition, the United Nations and OPCW are seeking to conclude a memorandum of understanding With the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the provision of medical services to Joint Mission personnel.

Phase II activities

The Joint Mission continues With ongoing phase II inspection and verification activities. While 3 of the 23 sites declared by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic have not received physical inspections by Joint Mission personnel owing to safety and security concerns, 2 of these 3 sites have now been verified with the support of sealed GPS cameras used by Syrian personnel, in accordance with guidance provided by Joint Mission inspectors. The exact geographical location and the time the images were captured were then fully authenticated. One of the two sites declared as abandoned by the Syrian Arab Republic was verified as such. Only one site remains to be verified. It has been declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as inactive. This site Will be verified as soon as conditions permit, and following a security assessment by Joint Mission personnel.

In addition, during the reporting period, Joint Mission inspectors also conducted visits to verify the complete destruction of Category 3 munitions at all relevant sites in the Damascus area, The Joint Mission has also completed plans for visits to the Horns area to verify the destruction of Category 3 munitions at the sites there. The Joint Mission remains poised to conduct visits when the security situation becomes permissive.

Also in this reporting period the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic began to destroy specialized and standard equipment belonging to production facilities, in addition to special features of buildings and standard buildings at the same locations. The Joint Mission will begin verifying activities at these sites in the coming days.

Phase III activities

In preparation for phase III activities, Joint Mission personnel visited a chemical material storage site near Damascus to determine the nature and quantity of specialist packaging materials required to safely transport all declared chemical material storage containers. The information was provided to an Operational Planning Group meeting at OPCW headquarters in The Hague, which met from 6 to 9 November 2013. Important pledges of in-kind donations, particularly from the United States of America, have since been confirmed to ensure safe and secure packaging, handling and transporting of the chemical material during phase III.

The Operational Planning Group meeting also supported the Syrian Arab Republic in outlining steps the Syrian authorities would be required to take for the removal of selected chemical material from the country for destruction outside its territory. The report of the Group includes timelines and projected logistics and security requirements considered necessary by the Syrian Arab Republic in this regard.

Following a request by the Director—General of OPCW, on 15 November 2013, the Special Coordinator sent a letter to all Member States attaching the projected logistics and security requirements identified by the Syrian Arab Republic as needed to meet the most urgent impending deadlines set out in the OPCW Executive Council decision of the same day.

The Director-General of OPCW made the letter of the Special Coordinator available to States parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention for their consideration.

Specialist packaging materials have begun to arrive in Lebanon, and the Joint Mission is contracting transport for onward movement to Damascus. Significant numbers of trucks Will be required to transfer the packaging materials overland to the Syrian capital. The Syrian authorities have identified a staging area in Damascus to store the packaging materials prior to their distribution to the various declared sites. In this connection, the United Nations and OPCW maintain that the Syrian Arab Republic, in accordance with its obligations as a State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, is responsible for preserving public health and the environment.

In preparation for the packaging of the chemical agents, the Joint Mission has organized a packaging and International Maritime Dangerous Goods course in Beirut to train select Syrian personnel.

Joint Mission personnel have conducted an assessment mission to the port of Latakia, the location designated by the Syrian Arab Republic prior to the transfer of chemical material out of the country. The Joint Mission determined that the port city had all the necessary capabilities required to handle the planned loading and shipment of chemical warfare agents, as well as sufficiently secure facilities for the deployment of Joint Mission personnel. The Joint Mission is currently working to establish a temporary forward operating base in Latakia to support the inspection and verification of chemical material prior to loading. Chemical material may have to be repacked for maritime transport to ensure the highest safety standards.

The Joint Mission is also coordinating the offers of assistance and the planning With respect to the support of the maritime transfer of selected chemical material from the Syrian Arab Republic. In this regard, several Member States have indicated their Willingness to provide specialized cargo container vessels capable of safely storing and transporting the material at sea. Member States have also offered maritime escorts to ensure security of the vessels. The Joint Mission is in discussions with these Member States to facilitate an agreed arrangement. A maritime planning group, consisting of interested Member States, Will meet in Cyprus to take discussions forward. Details concerning the final destruction plan need to be available as soon as possible. In this regard, the United Nations and OPCW maintain that the States undertaking the removal and maritime transport should seek to agree among themselves on questions of possession, jurisdiction and control and the related questions of liability for, and mitigation of, security and other risks, including in respect of damage to public health and the environment.

In addition to the two trust funds set up by OPCW and the United Nations to fund these activities, the Director-General of OPCW was requested by the Executive Council to set up a third special trust fund to seek financial contributions for the complete destruction of the binary chemical components and associated reaction masses of the Syrian Arab Republic outside the country. On 20 November 2013, OPCW also issued an “Expression of Interest” seeking to identify commercial companies interested in participating in a future tender for the treatment and disposal of hazardous and non-hazardous organic and non-organic chemicals and related packaging materials. Member States are encouraged to contribute to all three trust funds set up by OPCW and the United Nations to ensure successful implementation of the mandate.

Conclusion

The Joint Mission has made considerable progress in verifying the implementation of phase II by the Syrian Arab Republic, in planning for phase III and in starting initial phase III activities. The OPCW Executive Council decision of 15 November 2013 set ambitious timelines. Achieving these timelines Will require an unprecedented effort and coordination from all stakeholders under extremely challenging conditions.

Several Member States have played a critical role assisting in the implementation of respective OPCW Executive Council decisions and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). In particular, I would like to reiterate my appreciation to the Government of Cyprus for agreeing to host the Joint Mission office on its territory and for facilitating the deployment of Joint Mission personnel and assets. I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to the Government of Lebanon for facilitating the transit of all Joint Mission personnel and assets through Beirut’s entry hubs to the Syrian Arab Republic.

In addition, a number of Member States have provided material funding, technical expertise and critical assets to the Joint Mission, and several other Member States are awaiting confirmation of their offers. The Joint Mission has received valuable additional in-kind support from Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States and the European Union. As at 25 November 2013, the OPCW trust fund included €10.8 million With contributions from Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The United Nations trust fund currently includes $2 million from the United States and pledges in the amount of €250,000 from Denmark and €250,000 from Luxembourg. Without this assistance, the Joint Mission would not have been able to implement its mandated tasks.

Going forward, there remain a number of issues and circumstances that could impact the implementation of mandated tasks in accordance with OPCW Executive Council decisions and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013).

First, Member State voluntary in-kind contributions continue to be at the forefront of requirements. As described above, progress has been made in procuring and delivering packaging material for phase HI activities. Member States considering contributions of assets necessary to ensure security have been asked to engage bilaterally with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. At the same time, the Syrian authorities are being encouraged to consider alternative options to ensure the safety and security of inland transportation for the chemical material. In addition, it is possible that other needs may be identified regarding the destruction of chemical material and reaction mass outside the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as possible additional equipment needed to complete the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, material and production facilities inside the Syrian Arab Republic.

Second, full clarity regarding the plan for the removal and destruction of chemical material outside Syrian territory is critical, including the location for destruction. In order to move forward, detailed arrangements need to be put in place, including timelines concerning the availability of equipment and the docking facilities, and careful agreement regarding specific roles and functions of the Joint Mission and concerned Member States.

Third, the implementation of Joint Mission mandated objectives cannot occur without conditiOns inside the Syrian Arab Republic that are conducive to carrying out these tasks. The Syrian authorities have continued their constructive cooperation with the Joint Mission. Representatives of the Syrian opposition based in Istanbul have also indicated their support for the safe transportation of convoys containing chemical material. The Security Council, in resolution 2118 (2013), emphasized the importance of ensuring the security of activities undertaken by Joint Mission personnel and allowing them immediate and unfettered access. Furthermore, the Council, by that resolution, decided that all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully in this regard. Nevertheless, recent fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic shows that the security situation is volatile, unpredictable and highly dangerous.

The Director-General of OPCW and I remain deeply concerned about the safety and security of Joint Mission personnel.

Given the complexity of the mission and the unpredictable operating environment, many factors remain outside the control of the Joint Mission. Its personnel are making every effort to ensure that the necessary arrangements are in place to implement mandated objectives. The international community should remain unwavering in its support to the women and men of the Joint Mission. The United Nations will continue to act in partnership with OPCW, and through the Joint Mission, to implement the provisions of the decisions of the Executive Council (EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DECl) and

Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) in their entirety.

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter urgently to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

 BAN Ki-moon

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Security Council Draft Statement on Yemen

DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT ON YEMEN

The members of the Security Council welcomed the progress made to date in Yemen’s ongoing political transition process and the Yemeni Government’s efforts to reconstruct the economy and safeguard security, including the National Dialogue Conference which has generated a peaceful, inclusive and meaningful dialogue about the country’s future amongst diverse actors, including youth, women, civil society representatives, the Houthi Movement and the Hiraak Southern Movement.

The members of the Security Council expressed concern, however, about the significant delays in concluding the National Dialogue Conference and emphasised the importance of concluding the National Dialogue Conference as soon as possible in order to begin constitutional drafting and electoral preparations.  They called on all parties to engage constructively in a spirit of compromise to address the remaining critical issues necessary to conclude the dialogue, in particular those concerning the southern question and the structure of the State.

The members of the Security Council reiterated their concern over continuing reports of interference by those intent on disrupting, delaying or derailing the transition process and undermining the Yemeni Government. The members of the Security Council condemned any such attempts, whether by members of the former regime or political opportunists, notably by abstaining from participation in the National Dialogue Conference, threatening to do so or standing in the way of a consensus agreement to conclude the National Dialogue. The members of the Security Council called on all parties to adhere to the guiding principles of the GCC Initiative and Implementation Mechanism for the transition process.

The members of the Security Council reaffirmed their support to the Yemeni Government to safeguard security, promote social and economic development and push forward political, economic and security reforms. They underlined their commitment to follow closely the peaceful political transition in Yemen, and emphasized that the conclusion of the political transition should be based on the completion of the steps contained in the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism. They reaffirmed their readiness to consider further measures in response to any actions by individuals or parties that are aimed at disrupting the transition process.

The members of the Security Council noted the expectation of the people of Yemen that a National Dialogue and transition process will lead to outcomes and actions that would improve security, governance and delivery of basic services to all Yemenis.

The members of the Security Council welcome the good offices of the Secretary -General and, in particular, reaffirm their support for the efforts of Special Adviser Jamal Benomar. They also commend the ongoing efforts of the Group of 10 Ambassadors in Sana’a and other international partners to support Yemen’s transition.

The members of the Security Council reaffirmed their commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen.

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"Strictly Confidential" Amos's letter to Security Council on Syria: Exert pressure on parties

Bashar Ja’afari (back, in grey suit), Ambassador of Syria to the UN,

listens as Valerie Amos, USG for Humanitarian Affairs, speaks to

journalists on the humanitarian situation in his country.

 25 October 2013

In this "Strictly Confidential" letter, Valerie Amos, the head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), called on the Security Council to take action on priority areas "where sustained attention from Council Members could help us to make an immediate difference on the ground in Syria."

This document was obtained by UN REPORT. Click here to read the original copy.

"STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

 Note to Security Council Members

    Following my recent briefing to the Security Council on Syria, I thought it would be helpful to set out the points I highlighted when summing up the discussions. One of the key messages is the need to learn the lessons from the Security Council’s handling of the chemical weapons issue and the success of that and understanding how these positive lessons could be applied to make progress on humanitarian issues. Effective operationalisation of the Security Council Presidential Statement requires sustained political support from Security Council members.

     Please see below priority areas where sustained attention from Council Members could help us to make an immediate difference on the ground in Syria:

SAFE AND UNHINDERED DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

* Use leverage with parties to the conflict to allow the evacuation of civilians from areas besieged by either the Government or opposition forces. The recent case of Moadamiyeh is an example of what is possible.

* Use leverage with parties to the conflict to facilitate humanitarian access to hard to reach areas under their control. Attached please find a map of the hard to reach areas where 2.5 million people are trapped and a list of the areas which are besieged.

* Exert pressure on the parties to the conflict to implement a weekly humanitarian pause or area specific pauses to access those in need, especially in hard to reach and besieged areas.

EXPANSION OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATIONS

* Use contacts with the Government of Syria to enable the expansion of humanitarian relief  operations and lift bureaucratic impediments, especially:

a. Facilitation of visas for humanitarian workers, including for UN DSS staff;

b. Facilitation of customs clearance procedures for humanitarian supplies and equipment;

c. Facilitation missions;

d. Agreement on additional humanitarian hubs in Dara’a, Aleppo and Qamishly;

* Use contacts with the Government of Syria to facilitate agreement that humanitarian assistance can go directly to affected communities through the most direct route when supplies are imported from neighbouring countries, for example from Lebanon, Jordan or Iraq, rather than supplies first having to go through Damascus to then be redistributed throughout Syria;

PROTECTION

* Exert pressure on the parties to the conflict to publicly declare that it is unacceptable to target medical facilities, staff and ambulances, and to occupy such facilities, and ask them to immediately demilitarize and evacuate such premises;

SAFE PASSAGE OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES

* Use leverage with all parties to the conflict to allow medical equipment, including surgical equipment, in all conflict areas;

FUNDING

* Engage with countries ahead of the pledging Conference in Kuwait in January 2014 to ensure adequate level of funding to meet increasing needs for 2014.

* Fund the winterization plan. The immediacy of the situation makes it a priority.

      

We are monitoring the progress being made in implementing the recommendations in the Presidential Statement. I will present to the Council a paper which will help Council members to monitor the timely operationalisation of the PRST. 

Valerie Amos, 1 November 2013"

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UNGA (Saudi) Draft Resolution on Human Rights in Syria

DRAFT Resolution to be submitted to the UNGA Third Committee

Sixty-eighth session

Agenda item 69 (c)

Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic

The General Assembly,

PP1 Guided by the Charter of the United Nations, [A/RES/67/183 PP1]

PP2 Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights[1] and relevant international human rights treaties, including the International Covenants on Human Rights,[2] [A/RES/67/183 PP2]

PP3 Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic and to the principles of the Charter, [A/RES/67/183 PP7]

PP4 Recalling its resolutions 66/176 of 19 December 2011, 66/253 A of 16 February 2012 and 66/253 B of 3 August 2012, 67/183 of 20 December 2012 and 67/262 of 15 May 2013, Human Rights Council resolutions S 16/1 of 29 April 2011,[3] S 17/1 of 23 August 2011, S 18/1 of 2 December 2011,[4] 19/1 of 1 March 2012,[5] 19/22 of 23 March 2012, S 19/1 of 1 June 2012,[6] 20/22 of 6 July 2012[7], 21/26 of 28 September 2012[8], 22/24 of 22 March 2013, 23/XX of 14 May 2013 and 24/XX of 27 September 2013, and Security Council resolutions 2042 (2012) of 14 April 2012, 2043 (2012) of 21 April 2012, and 2118 (2013) of 27 September 2013, and presidential statement 2013/15 of 2 October 2013 [A/RES/67/183 PP3 as updated]

PP5 Expressing outrage at the continuing escalation of violence in the Syrian Arab Republic, which has caused over 100,000 casualties, mostly by conventional weapons; and in particular at the continued widespread and systematic gross violations, as well as abuses, of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, including those involving the continued use of heavy weapons and aerial bombardments, such as the indiscriminate use of ballistic missiles and cluster munitions, by the Syrian authorities against the Syrian population,

PP6 Alarmed at the failure of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to protect its population [based on A/RES/67/262 PP5] and to implement the relevant resolutions and decisions by United Nations bodies,

PP7 Strongly condemning any human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by armed extremists; [based on A/HRC/RES/24/XX OP3]

PP8 Also strongly condemning the large scale use of chemical weapons on 21 August 2013 in Al-Ghouta, as concluded in the report of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, condemning the killing of civilians that resulted from it, affirming that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law, and stressing that those responsible for any use of chemical weapons must be held accountable, [based on S/RES/2118 PP8]

PP9 Recalling that the League of Arab States, in its resolution 7667 adopted by the 140th ordinary session of the Ministerial Council on 1 September 2013, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, in the Final Communiqué of its Annual Coordination Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of 27 September 2013, have held the Syrian government fully responsible for the chemical attacks against the Syrian people, which took place in Al-Ghouta,

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OPCW First Monthly Report on Syria

The UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon transmitted this report to the Security Council today, October 28th 2013. 
It enclosed the first report of the Director - General of the OPCW on the 'Progress in the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Program'. 

Click here to get a copy of the report. 

Sigrid Kaag, Special Coordinator of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission

 to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons programme, 

speaks to journalists in Damascus. 22 October 2013

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

28 October 2013

Dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to transmit the first monthly report of the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) pursuant to paragraph 2 (f) of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-3 3fDEC.1 and paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). This letter also provides the information requested in that resolution on the activities of the United Nations related to the implementation of the resolution from 27 September to 22 October 2013.

Introduction

At the outset, I would like to congratulate the OPCW for being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. I pay tribute to the leadership of the Director—General, to the professionalism and dedication of OPCW staff, and to their Work, which has earned them this year’s Nobel Peace Prize.

I Wish to recall your letter of 11 October 2013 (3/2013/603) conveying the Security Council’s decision to authorize the establishment of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission as proposed in my letter of 7 October 2013 (8/2013/591). I am pleased to confirm that, on 16 October 2013, the Director-General of OPCW and I established the Joint Mission and concluded a Supplementary Arrangement concerning cooperation . between the United Nations and the OPCW for the implementation of Executive Council decision EC-M-3 3/DEC. 1 and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) relating to the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Also on 16 October 2013, in close consultation with the Director-General, I appointed Ms. Sigrid Kaag as Special Coordinator to head the Joint Mission. I have every confidence that the strong cooperation that has already defined the work of the OPCW and the United Nations will bolster the role of the Special Coordinator and guide the efforts of our two organizations, Within our respective roles and responsibilities, to fully implement the Executive Council decision and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013).

His Excellency

Mr. Agshin Mehdiyev

President of the Security Council

New York

       Upon appointment, the Special Coordinator immediately assumed her responsibilities and continued the effective and efficient functioning of the Joint Mission to date. After a series of meetings at United Nations Headquarters she travelled to the OPCW Headquarters in The Hague for consultations on 19 and 20 October with the Director-General and his staff, along with other stakeholders.

On 21 October 2013 the Special Coordinator travelled to the Syrian Arab Republic to begin her work from the Joint Mission operations base in Damascus. She met with Foreign Minister Waiid Al-Moualem, the Deputy Foreign Minister and Head of the National Committee for the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Faisal Mekdad, and other Syrian counterparts to identify ways to finalize phase II—related activities and discuss arrangements for phase Hi destruction, as described in my letter of '7 October 2013. During those discussions the Government reiterated its support to the Joint Mission, its commitment to fully implement the requirements of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) and the decisions of the Executive Council

of the OPCW. While in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Special Coordinator Visited a chemical weapons production facility on 22 October 2013 and observed the early results of destruction activities.

The Special Coordinator travelled to Cyprus on 23 October 2013 to develop the Joint Mission Staging Area and Support Base and convened a. planning conference attended by OPCW and United Nations officials. The planning conference focused on phase III activities, and made important progress on key operational matters. The participants finalized a mission concept, a planning framewoik, a draft operational plan, and a range of supporting documentation.

Thus far the Joint Mission, in particular the OPCW, with the support of the United Nations, has focused on clarifying elements contained Within the Government disclosure submitted to the OPCW on 21 September 2013, ahead of an initial declaration to be submitted by 27 October 2013. The Joint Mission has conducted verification activities at 37 out of 41 disclosed facilities. As the Director-General of the OPCW indicates in his attached report, Joint Mission personnel have not been able to visit a few locations due to highly insecure conditions at the respective locations. The security situation at each of the locations is under constant review by the Joint Mission, in close consultation with the Syrian authorities, with the intention or" visiting them as soon as conditions permit. The Joint Mission has confirmed the functional destruction of the production and mixing and filling capabilities at all the sites it has inspected. In all of these activities the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has extended consistent, constructive cooperation.

United Nations activities

Since the adoption of resolution 2118 (2013), the United Nations has worked first to deploy and support the OPCW-United Nations advance team, and subsequently to launch the Joint Mission. To this end, and guided by the principles of the Organization’s global field support strategy, the United Nations has rapidly deployed a range of personnel, assets and capabilities to the Syrian Arab Republic and Cyprus.

        To accomplish this, the United Nations has drawn frOm other missions in the region and from Headquarters with the flexible allocation of personnel, assets and capabilities. As 1 indicated in my letter of '7 October 2013, I intend to make full use of the authorities provided to me to ensure the timely achievement of the mandate of the Mission in a safe manner. The costs of these United Nations activities and deployments will he met by the Joint Mission budget, and will not come at the expense of other missions’ financial resources.

Currently, there are 26 OPCW experts and 50 United Nations personnel working in the Joint Mission, including national staff. These numbers fluctuate constantly, depending on operational requirements. In addition, some of the United Nations support responsibilities are being met through temporary surge deployments of UN personnel who provide short-term capabilities critical for the start-up of the Joint Mission, but whose services are required only for a short time and who are temporarily Joint Mission staff.

During this reporting period, the United Nations has worked to develop the Joint Mission’s operational capability across a range of areas. The United Nations has established office and personnel accommodation for the Mission, deployed 22 armoured vehicles with the support of donors, a diesel fuel tanker, and an armoured ambulance. The United Nations is also providing logistic, administrative and public information support as well as medical assistance, including a United Nations doctor and nurse who work in concert with OP CW paramedics. The United Nations has

also provided emergency trauma bags for office premises and vehicles, together with scheduled related training, and a range of chemical protection equipment. The Mission has established a strategic communications network by linking through other United Nations missions in the region, establishing a VHF base station, and providing computers and satellite and mobile telephones. The United Nations has provided for the Geographic Information System requirements of the Joint Mission, including affiliated equipment. Finally, the United Nations has been central to the outreach effort to Syrian, international and local partners.

The safety and security of all Joint Mission personnel are a central concern for

me and for the Special Coordinator. The security environment in the Syrian Arab Republic remains difficult and unpredictable. The security of OPCW and United Nations personnel remains the ultimate responsibility of the Government of

the Syrian Arab Republic. The Joint Mission has taken a proactive role in assessing the security context, working with the host Government to ensure the necessary security arrangements, and advising on and supporting the conduct of operations.

The United Nations liaises with the Government and local groups related to site access. Opposition groups have a central role in ensuring the safety of the Mission and access to sites where they may exert influence. One of the primary risk mitigation measures employed by the Joint Mission is to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic only staff that need to be in the country to perform their function, and to keep staff in the country only as long as their presence there is operationally required. In this regard, the Joint Mission Staging Area and Support Base in Cyprus will play an increasingly important role as staff are deployed there in support of the Mission, but also as staff move between Damascus and Cyprus. I

In other efforts to establish the Mission, and further to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), in which the Council called on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to conclude modality agreements with the United Nations and OPCW, on 16 October 2013 the United Nations and OPCW jointly proposed a draft tripartite status-of-mission agreement to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic with a view to concluding the agreement by 1 November 2013.

The United Nations and the OPCW have also concluded a tripartite exchange of letters with the Government of Cyprus, for the Joint Mission Staging Area and Support Base. Arrangements have also been put in place in Lebanon to facilitate the transit of Joint Mission personnel and equipment. The United Nations and the OPCW appreciate the support of both Governments.

On the same day that the Joint Mission was officially hunched on 16 October 2013, both the United Nations and the OPCW launched trust funds to support our respective contributions to this mission. There has been donor interest in both funds and discussions are ongoing with a number of countries related to contributions to the United Nations trust fund.

Phase III activities

It is clear that the Joint Mission, and in particular the OPCW, have a. vital role in verifying Syrian activities with respect to the destruction of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Less clear, but vital to the work of the Joint Mission, is the degree to which the Mission will be expected to provide direct support t0 Syrian authorities in their own planning or operations. The role of the Joint Mission, if any, in conducting actual operations, for instance in the packing, safe transport, and possible removal from the Syrian Arab Republic of chemical agents, requires further consultation and review. The Joint Mission is prepared to contribute to the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons programme in the most efficacious manner possible, consistent with the decision of the OPCW Executive Council and resolution of the Security Council. I have asked the Special Coordinator, operating under the guidance of the OPCW Director-General and myself, to rapidly conclude the necessary consultations with the Syrian authorities and relevant stakeholders in order to arrive at a shared understanding of the operational role to be played by the Syrian Arab Republic, by the Joint Mission, and possibly by Member States. This is an urgent task if the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Joint Mission, working together, are to meet the envisaged deadlines.

As part of this effort, the Joint Mission will identify areas where support may. be required from Member States or other organizations. I am grateful for the offers of assistance that have been made thus far to the OPCW and the United Nations for this mission. Already the Joint Mission has received valuable support from Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. This support has included armoured vehicles vital to the operational activities of the Joint Mission, airlift capacity for personnel including the Special Coordinator and for ' material including armoured vehicles and mapping information. In addition, Sweden has agreed to place an aircraft at the disposal of the Joint Mission for an initial period of two months. The aircraft will be based in Cyprus and used primarily to transport personnel between Cyprus and Beirut for onward travel to Damascus.

Related to possible areas of support for the Joint Mission’s work is the support that the Syrian authorities may require or benefit from for the conduct of their activities I related to the destruction of the chemical weapons programme. The Syrian authorities have developed an initial security plan for the transport of materials associated with the chemical weapons programme Within the country. That plan will be further discussed between the Joint Mission and the Government. In addition, the Syrian Arab Republic is obliged to submit its destruction plan to the OPCW by 27 October 2013. The ExecutiVe Council of the OPCW will consider the plan and take a decision by 15 November 2013 outlining the detailed requirements for the complete elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment. The Special Coordinator will work closely with the OPCW headquarters, the Syrian authorities and interested Member States to ensure synchronization of the related planning efforts.

The Syrian Arab Republic remains responsible for the destruction of its chemical weapons programme and has delivered a copy of a letter addressed to the OPCW Director—General by the Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister that contained a list of “requirements for the implementation of the security plan”. The extensive list included items related to transportation, material packing and handling, communications, safety and security, power generation, and personnel support.

The Joint Mission is currently analysing the list. The United Nations, possibly using the trust fund that I have established for this operation, will consider meeting certain of the validated support requests either through the direct provision of assistance to the Government, through the conditional loan of material assistance to the Government, or through its own direct operational engagement, acting through the Joint Mission. Some of the support requested by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic could potentially be used for legitimate purposes associated with the destruction of the chemical weapons programme, while at the same time have practical military applications. The United Nations will not pro cure or otherwise provide such dual-use material to the Government. Any assistance provided by the United Nations will be subject to strict conditions in order to ensure that it is used solely for the intended purposes.

The Special Coordinator will consult With the Syrian authorities, and the OPCW and the United Nations Headquarters as appropriate, in order to develop as quickly as possible a list of support requirements for the Syrian Arab Republic and separately for the Joint Mission, which she will share with interested Member States as soon as it is available.

As part of its planning activities, the Joint Mission, with support from the Health and Safety Branch of the OPCW and the United Nations Environment Pro gramme, has developed an initial environmental protection and health and safety analysis. Both parties are prepared to provide additional assistance once more detail regarding the overall operational plan of the Joint Mission is established. The United Nations is

also in contact with the World Health Organization regarding the possible public health implications of activities associated with the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons programme.

Conclusion

The Security Council demonstrated the importance of eliminating the chemical weapons pro gramme of the Syrian Arab Republic when it unanimously adopted resolution 2118 (2013). The Director-General of the OPCW and I, together with our staffs, have acted on this mandate with singular focus to ensure timely progress for the sake of the Syrian people and for the sake of regional and international peace and security. The OPCW and the United Nations have managed Within the brief time of the reporting period to establish a fully functioning Mission capable of confronting the challenging tasks and operating in a dangerous and volatile environment.

The decisions taken by the two Councils rightly accorded operational priority to disabling the capability to produce chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic from their separate component parts. Accordingly, since the initia} deployment of a joint advance team less than one month ago, the OPCW with the support of the United Nations, has verified the destruction of critical equipment in chemical weapons production, mixing and filling facilities. The functional destruction of the declared capacity of the Syrian Arab Republic to produce chemical weapons is expected to be completed as planned by 1 November 2013, a mere 34 days after the adoption of resolution 2118 (2013), with the possible exception of two sites that could not be accessed for security reasons. Efforts _will continue to conduct verification of destruction work at that site.

Let me reiterate that all destruction of chemical Weapons facilities, stocks | and associated materials is the responsibility of the Syrian Government. Neither the OPCW nor the United Nations is mandated to conduct actual destruction activities. First and foremost, success of this Joint Mission will depend on the sustained commitment by the Syrian authorities to fulfil their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the decision of the OPCW Executive Council and the resolution of the Security Council. Without sustained, genuine commitment by the Syrian authorities, the Joint Mission will not its objectives.

I would also like to underscore that the Joint Mission is carrying out its work in an extremely dangerous, volatile, and unpredictable environment. It impacts the ability of the Joint Mission to conduct its highly technical work and we should remain vigilant to do all in our powers to support the men and women of the OPCW and the United Nations who have worked so hard, and so well together to achieve these initial steps. However, the job is far from complete and much' impmtant work remains to be done. The United Nations will continue to act in partnership with the OPCW, and through the Joint Mission, to implement the provisions of resolution 2118 (2013) in their entirety.

I should be grateful if you could bring this letter urgently to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

BAN Ki-moon

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