Wednesday, October 30, 2013
Monday, October 28, 2013
OPCW First Monthly Report on Syria
at
4:23 PM
The UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon transmitted this report to the Security Council today, October 28th 2013.
It enclosed the first report of the Director - General of the OPCW on the 'Progress in the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Program'.
Click here to get a copy of the report.
THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL
It enclosed the first report of the Director - General of the OPCW on the 'Progress in the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Program'.
Click here to get a copy of the report.
![]() |
Sigrid Kaag, Special Coordinator of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission
to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons programme,
speaks to journalists in Damascus. 22 October 2013
|
28
October 2013
Dear
Mr. President,
I
have the honour to transmit the first monthly report of the
Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) pursuant to paragraph 2 (f) of OPCW Executive Council
decision EC-M-3 3fDEC.1 and paragraph 12 of Security Council
resolution 2118 (2013). This letter also provides the information
requested in that resolution on the activities of the United Nations
related to the implementation of the resolution from 27 September to
22 October 2013.
Introduction
At
the outset, I would like to congratulate the OPCW for being awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize. I pay tribute to the leadership of the
Director—General, to the professionalism and dedication of OPCW
staff, and to their Work, which has earned them this year’s Nobel
Peace Prize.
I
Wish to recall your letter of 11 October 2013 (3/2013/603) conveying
the Security Council’s decision to authorize the establishment of
the OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission as proposed in my letter of 7
October 2013 (8/2013/591). I am pleased to confirm that, on 16
October 2013, the Director-General of OPCW and I established the
Joint Mission and concluded a Supplementary Arrangement concerning
cooperation . between the United Nations and the OPCW for the
implementation of Executive Council decision EC-M-3 3/DEC. 1 and
Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) relating to the elimination
of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.
Also
on 16 October 2013, in close consultation with the Director-General,
I appointed Ms. Sigrid Kaag as Special Coordinator to head the Joint
Mission. I have every confidence that the strong cooperation that has
already defined the work of the OPCW and the United Nations will
bolster the role of the Special Coordinator and guide the efforts of
our two organizations, Within our respective roles and
responsibilities, to fully implement the Executive Council decision
and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013).
His
Excellency
Mr.
Agshin Mehdiyev
President
of the Security Council
New
York
Upon
appointment, the Special Coordinator immediately assumed her
responsibilities and continued the effective and efficient
functioning of the Joint Mission to date. After a series of meetings
at United Nations Headquarters she travelled to the OPCW Headquarters
in The Hague for consultations on 19 and 20 October with the
Director-General and his staff, along with other stakeholders.
On
21 October 2013 the Special Coordinator travelled to the Syrian Arab
Republic to begin her work from the Joint Mission operations base in
Damascus. She met with Foreign Minister Waiid Al-Moualem, the Deputy
Foreign Minister and Head of the National Committee for the
Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Faisal Mekdad, and
other Syrian counterparts to identify ways to finalize phase
II—related activities and discuss arrangements for phase Hi
destruction, as described in my letter of '7 October 2013. During
those discussions the Government reiterated its support to the Joint
Mission, its commitment to fully implement the requirements of
Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) and the decisions of the
Executive Council
of
the OPCW. While in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Special Coordinator
Visited a chemical weapons production facility on 22 October 2013 and
observed the early results of destruction activities.
The
Special Coordinator travelled to Cyprus on 23 October 2013 to develop
the Joint Mission Staging Area and Support Base and convened a.
planning conference attended by OPCW and United Nations officials.
The planning conference focused on phase III activities, and made
important progress on key operational matters. The participants
finalized a mission concept, a planning framewoik, a draft
operational plan, and a range of supporting documentation.
Thus
far the Joint Mission, in particular the OPCW, with the support of
the United Nations, has focused on clarifying elements contained
Within the Government disclosure submitted to the OPCW on 21
September 2013, ahead of an initial declaration to be submitted by 27
October 2013. The Joint Mission has conducted verification activities
at 37 out of 41 disclosed facilities. As the Director-General of the
OPCW indicates in his attached report, Joint Mission personnel have
not been able to visit a few locations due to highly insecure
conditions at the respective locations. The security situation at
each of the locations is under constant review by the Joint Mission,
in close consultation with the Syrian authorities, with the intention
or" visiting them as soon as conditions permit. The Joint
Mission has confirmed the functional destruction of the production
and mixing and filling capabilities at all the sites it has
inspected. In all of these activities the Government of the Syrian
Arab Republic has extended consistent, constructive cooperation.
United
Nations activities
Since
the adoption of resolution 2118 (2013), the United Nations has worked
first to deploy and support the OPCW-United Nations advance team, and
subsequently to launch the Joint Mission. To this end, and guided by
the principles of the Organization’s global field support strategy,
the United Nations has rapidly deployed a range of personnel, assets
and capabilities to the Syrian Arab Republic and Cyprus.
To
accomplish this, the United Nations has drawn frOm other missions in
the region and from Headquarters with the flexible allocation of
personnel, assets and capabilities. As 1 indicated in my letter of '7
October 2013, I intend to make full use of the authorities provided
to me to ensure the timely achievement of the mandate of the Mission
in a safe manner. The costs of these United Nations activities and
deployments will he met by the Joint Mission budget, and will not
come at the expense of other missions’ financial resources.
Currently,
there are 26 OPCW experts and 50 United Nations personnel working in
the Joint Mission, including national staff. These numbers fluctuate
constantly, depending on operational requirements. In addition, some
of the United Nations support responsibilities are being met through
temporary surge deployments of UN personnel who provide short-term
capabilities critical for the start-up of the Joint Mission, but
whose services are required only for a short time and who are
temporarily Joint Mission staff.
During
this reporting period, the United Nations has worked to develop the
Joint Mission’s operational capability across a range of areas. The
United Nations has established office and personnel accommodation for
the Mission, deployed 22 armoured vehicles with the support of
donors, a diesel fuel tanker, and an armoured ambulance. The United
Nations is also providing logistic, administrative and public
information support as well as medical assistance, including a United
Nations doctor and nurse who work in concert with OP CW paramedics.
The United Nations has
also
provided emergency trauma bags for office premises and vehicles,
together with scheduled related training, and a range of chemical
protection equipment. The Mission has established a strategic
communications network by linking through other United Nations
missions in the region, establishing a VHF base station, and
providing computers and satellite and mobile telephones. The United
Nations has provided for the Geographic Information System
requirements of the Joint Mission, including affiliated equipment.
Finally, the United Nations has been central to the outreach effort
to Syrian, international and local partners.
The
safety and security of all Joint Mission personnel are a central
concern for
me
and for the Special Coordinator. The security environment in the
Syrian Arab Republic remains difficult and unpredictable. The
security of OPCW and United Nations personnel remains the ultimate
responsibility of the Government of
the
Syrian Arab Republic. The Joint Mission has taken a proactive role in
assessing the security context, working with the host Government to
ensure the necessary security arrangements, and advising on and
supporting the conduct of operations.
The
United Nations liaises with the Government and local groups related
to site access. Opposition groups have a central role in ensuring the
safety of the Mission and access to sites where they may exert
influence. One of the primary risk mitigation measures employed by
the Joint Mission is to deploy to the Syrian Arab Republic only staff
that need to be in the country to perform their function, and to keep
staff in the country only as long as their presence there is
operationally required. In this regard, the Joint Mission Staging
Area and Support Base in Cyprus will play an increasingly important
role as staff are deployed there in support of the Mission, but also
as staff move between Damascus and Cyprus. I
In
other efforts to establish the Mission, and further to paragraph 9 of
Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), in which the Council called
on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to conclude modality
agreements with the United Nations and OPCW, on 16 October 2013 the
United Nations and OPCW jointly proposed a draft tripartite
status-of-mission agreement to the Government of the Syrian Arab
Republic with a view to concluding the agreement by 1 November 2013.
The
United Nations and the OPCW have also concluded a tripartite exchange
of letters with the Government of Cyprus, for the Joint Mission
Staging Area and Support Base. Arrangements have also been put in
place in Lebanon to facilitate the transit of Joint Mission personnel
and equipment. The United Nations and the OPCW appreciate the support
of both Governments.
On
the same day that the Joint Mission was officially hunched on 16
October 2013, both the United Nations and the OPCW launched trust
funds to support our respective contributions to this mission. There
has been donor interest in both funds and discussions are ongoing
with a number of countries related to contributions to the United
Nations trust fund.
Phase
III activities
It
is clear that the Joint Mission, and in particular the OPCW, have a.
vital role in verifying Syrian activities with respect to the
destruction of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab
Republic. Less clear, but vital to the work of the Joint Mission, is
the degree to which the Mission will be expected to provide direct
support t0 Syrian authorities in their own planning or operations.
The role of the Joint Mission, if any, in conducting actual
operations, for instance in the packing, safe transport, and possible
removal from the Syrian Arab Republic of chemical agents, requires
further consultation and review. The Joint Mission is prepared to
contribute to the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons
programme in the most efficacious manner possible, consistent with
the decision of the OPCW Executive Council and resolution of the
Security Council. I have asked the Special Coordinator, operating
under the guidance of the OPCW Director-General and myself, to
rapidly conclude the necessary consultations with the Syrian
authorities and relevant stakeholders in order to arrive at a shared
understanding of the operational role to be played by the Syrian Arab
Republic, by the Joint Mission, and possibly by Member States. This
is an urgent task if the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and
the Joint Mission, working together, are to meet the envisaged
deadlines.
As
part of this effort, the Joint Mission will identify areas where
support may. be required from Member States or other organizations. I
am grateful for the offers of assistance that have been made thus far
to the OPCW and the United Nations for this mission. Already the
Joint Mission has received valuable support from Canada, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European
Union. This support has included armoured vehicles vital to the
operational activities of the Joint Mission, airlift capacity for
personnel including the Special Coordinator and for ' material
including armoured vehicles and mapping information. In addition,
Sweden has agreed to place an aircraft at the disposal of the Joint
Mission for an initial period of two months. The aircraft will be
based in Cyprus and used primarily to transport personnel between
Cyprus and Beirut for onward travel to Damascus.
Related
to possible areas of support for the Joint Mission’s work is the
support that the Syrian authorities may require or benefit from for
the conduct of their activities I related to the destruction of the
chemical weapons programme. The Syrian authorities have developed an
initial security plan for the transport of materials associated with
the chemical weapons programme Within the country. That plan will be
further discussed between the Joint Mission and the Government. In
addition, the Syrian Arab Republic is obliged to submit its
destruction plan to the OPCW by 27 October 2013. The ExecutiVe
Council of the OPCW will consider the plan and take a decision by 15
November 2013 outlining the detailed requirements for the complete
elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment. The
Special Coordinator will work closely with the OPCW headquarters, the
Syrian authorities and interested Member States to ensure
synchronization of the related planning efforts.
The
Syrian Arab Republic remains responsible for the destruction of its
chemical weapons programme and has delivered a copy of a letter
addressed to the OPCW Director—General by the Syrian Deputy Foreign
Minister that contained a list of “requirements for the
implementation of the security plan”. The extensive list included
items related to transportation, material packing and handling,
communications, safety and security, power generation, and personnel
support.
The
Joint Mission is currently analysing the list. The United Nations,
possibly using the trust fund that I have established for this
operation, will consider meeting certain of the validated support
requests either through the direct provision of assistance to the
Government, through the conditional loan of material assistance to
the Government, or through its own direct operational engagement,
acting through the Joint Mission. Some of the support requested by
the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic could potentially be used
for legitimate purposes associated with the destruction of the
chemical weapons programme, while at the same time have practical
military applications. The United Nations will not pro cure or
otherwise provide such dual-use material to the Government. Any
assistance provided by the United Nations will be subject to strict
conditions in order to ensure that it is used solely for the intended
purposes.
The
Special Coordinator will consult With the Syrian authorities, and the
OPCW and the United Nations Headquarters as appropriate, in order to
develop as quickly as possible a list of support requirements for the
Syrian Arab Republic and separately for the Joint Mission, which she
will share with interested Member States as soon as it is available.
As
part of its planning activities, the Joint Mission, with support from
the Health and Safety Branch of the OPCW and the United Nations
Environment Pro gramme, has developed an initial environmental
protection and health and safety analysis. Both parties are prepared
to provide additional assistance once more detail regarding the
overall operational plan of the Joint Mission is established. The
United Nations is
also
in contact with the World Health Organization regarding the possible
public health implications of activities associated with the
destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons programme.
Conclusion
The
Security Council demonstrated the importance of eliminating the
chemical weapons pro gramme of the Syrian Arab Republic when it
unanimously adopted resolution 2118 (2013). The Director-General of
the OPCW and I, together with our staffs, have acted on this mandate
with singular focus to ensure timely progress for the sake of the
Syrian people and for the sake of regional and international peace
and security. The OPCW and the United Nations have managed Within the
brief time of the reporting period to establish a fully functioning
Mission capable of confronting the challenging tasks and operating in
a dangerous and volatile environment.
The
decisions taken by the two Councils rightly accorded operational
priority to disabling the capability to produce chemical weapons in
the Syrian Arab Republic from their separate component parts.
Accordingly, since the initia} deployment of a joint advance team
less than one month ago, the OPCW with the support of the United
Nations, has verified the destruction of critical equipment in
chemical weapons production, mixing and filling facilities. The
functional destruction of the declared capacity of the Syrian Arab
Republic to produce chemical weapons is expected to be completed as
planned by 1 November 2013, a mere 34 days after the adoption of
resolution 2118 (2013), with the possible exception of two sites that
could not be accessed for security reasons. Efforts _will continue to
conduct verification of destruction work at that site.
Let
me reiterate that all destruction of chemical Weapons facilities,
stocks | and associated materials is the responsibility of the Syrian
Government. Neither the OPCW nor the United Nations is mandated to
conduct actual destruction activities. First and foremost, success of
this Joint Mission will depend on the sustained commitment by the
Syrian authorities to fulfil their obligations under the Chemical
Weapons Convention, the decision of the OPCW Executive Council and
the resolution of the Security Council. Without sustained, genuine
commitment by the Syrian authorities, the Joint Mission will not its
objectives.
I
would also like to underscore that the Joint Mission is carrying out
its work in an extremely dangerous, volatile, and unpredictable
environment. It impacts the ability of the Joint Mission to conduct
its highly technical work and we should remain vigilant to do all in
our powers to support the men and women of the OPCW and the United
Nations who have worked so hard, and so well together to achieve
these initial steps. However, the job is far from complete and much'
impmtant work remains to be done. The United Nations will continue to
act in partnership with the OPCW, and through the Joint Mission, to
implement the provisions of resolution 2118 (2013) in their entirety.
I
should be grateful if you could bring this letter urgently to the
attention of the members of the Security Council.
Please
accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.
BAN
Ki-moon
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Monday, September 30, 2013
Security Council draft statement on humanitarian situation in Syria
at
10:33 AM
This draft presidential statement was proposed by Australia and Luxembourg. Security Council will discuss it today afternoon (Monday, 30 Sep).
28 September 2013
Statement
by the President of the Security Council
1. The Security Council recalls its Resolutions
2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012) and 2118 (2013), and its Presidential Statements of
3 August 2011, 21 March 2012 and 5 April 2012.
2. The Security Council reaffirms its strong
commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of
Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
3.
The
Security Council calls on all parties to respect the UN guiding principles of
humanitarian emergency assistance while stressing the importance of such
assistance being delivered on the basis of need, devoid of any political
prejudices and aims.
4.
The Security Council is
appalled at the unacceptable and escalating level of violence and the death of
more than 100,000 people in Syria as reported by the UN Secretary-General and
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. It is gravely alarmed by the significant and rapid
deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Syria. It notes with grave
concern that several million Syrians are in need of immediate humanitarian
assistance and that without urgent increased humanitarian action, their lives
will be at risk.
5.
The Security Council condemns
the widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by
the Syrian authorities, as well as any human rights abuses and violations of
international humanitarian law by armed groups.
6.
The Security Council also
condemns all violence committed in Syria, irrespective of where it comes from,
including all acts of sexual and gender-based violence and abuse, and recalls
that international humanitarian law prohibits rape and other forms of sexual
violence.
7.
The Security Council further
condemns all grave violations and abuses committed against children in
contravention of applicable international law, such as recruitment and use,
killing and maiming, rape and all other forms of sexual violence, attacks on
schools and hospitals as well as arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, ill
treatment and use as human shields.
8.
The Security Council moreover
condemns increased terrorist attacks resulting in numerous casualties and
destruction carried out by organisations and individuals associated with
Al-Qaeda, and calls on all parties to commit to putting an end to terrorist
acts perpetrated by such organisations and individuals. The Council reaffirms,
in this regard, that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes
one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, and that
any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their
motivation, wherever, whenever and by whomsoever committed.
9.
The Security Council recalls
the obligations under international humanitarian law to distinguish between
civilian populations and combatants, and the prohibition against indiscriminate
and disproportionate attacks against civilians and civilian objects, as well as
the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons and the employment of weapons, projectiles
and material and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering. The Council urges all parties to immediately
cease and desist from all violations of international humanitarian law and
violations and abuses of human rights, and calls on all parties to reaffirm
their obligations under international humanitarian law and to take all
appropriate steps to protect civilians, including by desisting from attacks
directed against civilian objects, such as medical centres, schools and water
stations, and also calls on all parties to avoid establishing military
positions in populated areas. The Council recalls in this regard that the
Syrian authorities bear the primary responsibility to protect their populations.
10.
The Security Council also
recalls that under international humanitarian law, the wounded and sick must
receive, to the fullest extent practicable, and with the least possible delay,
medical care and attention required by their condition and that medical and
humanitarian personnel, facilities and transport must be respected and
protected. To this end, the Council urges free passage to all areas for medical
personnel and supplies, including surgical items and medicine.
11.
The Security Council stresses
that the magnitude of the humanitarian tragedy caused by the conflict in Syria
requires immediate action to facilitate safe and unhindered delivery of
humanitarian assistance in the whole country. It condemns all cases of denial
of humanitarian access, and recalls that arbitrarily depriving civilians of
objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief
supply and access, can constitute a serious violation of international law.
12.
The Security Council urges all
parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, to take all appropriate steps to
facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and all
humanitarian actors engaged in humanitarian relief activities, to provide
immediate humanitarian assistance to the affected people in Syria, including by
promptly facilitating safe and unhindered humanitarian access to civilians in
need of assistance in all areas under their control and across conflict lines.
It also encourages further cooperation between the United Nations, its
specialized agencies and all parties concerned, including Syrian civil society
organisations, to facilitate access and the delivery of assistance in the
entirety of the Syrian territory.
13.
The Security Council further
urges the Syrian authorities to take immediate steps to facilitate the
expansion of humanitarian relief operations, and lift bureaucratic impediments
and other obstacles, including through:
(a)
expediting the approval of
further domestic and international Non-Governmental Organizations to engage in
humanitarian relief activities;
(b)
easing and expediting the
procedures for the operationalization of further humanitarian hubs, the entry
and movement of humanitarian personnel and convoys by granting the necessary
visas and permits in a predictable manner, the importation of goods and
equipment, such as communication tools, protective armoured vehicles and
medical and surgical equipment, needed for humanitarian operations;
(c)
promptly facilitating safe and
unhindered humanitarian access to people in need through the most effective
ways, including across conflict lines and, where appropriate, across borders
from neighbouring countries in accordance with the UN guiding principles of
humanitarian emergency assistance; and
(d)
accelerating approval for the
implementation of humanitarian projects, including those in the revised Syria
Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan.
14. The Security Council also urges all parties to:
(a)
take all appropriate steps to
ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel, those of its
specialized agencies, and all other personnel engaged in humanitarian relief
activities, without prejudice to their freedom of movement and access, and stresses
that the primary responsibility in this regard lies with the Syrian
authorities;
(b)
immediately demilitarize
medical facilities, schools and water stations, and agree on the modalities to
implement humanitarian pauses, as well as key routes to enable promptly - upon
notification from relief agencies - the safe and unhindered passage of
humanitarian convoys along these routes to access people in need; and
(c)
designate empowered
interlocutors with the necessary authority to discuss with humanitarian actors
operational and policy issues.
15.
The Security Council expresses
its deep concern at the consequences of the refugee crisis caused by the
conflict in Syria, which has a destabilising impact on the entire region. It
expresses its appreciation for the significant efforts that have been made by
the neighbouring countries and the countries of the region, notably Jordan,
Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt, to accommodate the refugees from Syria.
16.
The Security Council reaffirms
the importance of the principle of non-refoulement, the right for refugees to
return voluntarily to Syria and encourages countries neighbouring Syria to
protect all people fleeing the violence in Syria, including Palestinians. It
urges all Member States, based on burden sharing principles, to support these
countries in assisting refugees and affected communities. The Council
underlines the need for all parties to respect and maintain the security and
civilian character of camps for refugees and internally displaced persons.
17.
The Security Council also
urges all Member States to respond swiftly to the United Nations’ humanitarian
appeals to meet the spiralling needs of people inside Syria and in neighbouring
countries, and to ensure that all pledges are honoured in full. It further urges all Member States, in
coordination with international financial institutions and United Nations
agencies, to increase their support to address the increasing political,
socio-economic and financial impact of the refugee crisis on hosting countries.
18.
The Security Council stresses
the need to end impunity for violations of international humanitarian law and
violations and abuses of human rights, and reaffirms that those who have
committed or are otherwise responsible for such violations and abuses in Syria
must be brought to justice.
19.
The Security Council
emphasizes that the humanitarian situation will continue to deteriorate in the
absence of a political solution to the crisis, reiterates its endorsement of
the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 (Annex II of resolution 2118 (2013)) and demands
that all parties work towards the immediate and comprehensive implementation of
the Geneva Communiqué aimed at bringing an immediate end to all violence and
violations and abuses of international law, and facilitating a Syrian-led
political process leading to a transition that meets the legitimate aspirations
of the Syrian people and enables them independently and democratically to
determine their own future. It reiterates the need to convene as soon as
possible an international conference to implement the Geneva Communiqué in
order to facilitate a Syrian-led political process leading to a transition that
would hasten an end to the conflict in Syria.
20.
The Security Council requests
the Secretary-General to regularly inform the Council about the humanitarian
situation in Syria and its impact on neighbouring countries, including on
progress towards implementation of this presidential statement.
Follow me on Twitter @NabilAbiSaab
Thursday, September 26, 2013
Security Council resolution 2118 on chemical weapons in Syria
at
8:09 PM
The Security Council,
PP1. Recalling the
Statements of its President of 3 August 2011, 21 March 2012, 5 April
2012, and its resolutions 1540 (2004), 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012),
PP2. Reaffirming its
strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic,
PP3. Reaffirming
that the proliferation of chemical weapons, as well as their means of
delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
PP4. Recalling that
the Syrian Arab Republic on 22 November 1968 acceded to the Protocol
for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at
Geneva on 17 June 1925,
PP5. Noting that on
14 September 2013, Syria deposited with the Secretary-General its
instrument of accession to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
on their Destruction (Convention) and declared that it shall comply
with its stipulations and observe them faithfully and sincerely,
applying the Convention provisionally pending its entry into force
for the Syrian Arab Republic,
PP6. Welcoming the
establishment by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Mission
to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the
Syrian Arab Republic (“the Mission”) pursuant to General Assembly
resolution 42/37 C (1987) of 30 November 1987, and reaffirmed by
resolution 620 (1988) of 26 August 1988, and expressing
appreciation for the work of the Mission,
PP7. Acknowledging the
report of 16 September 2013 (S/2013/553) by the Mission, underscoring
the need for the Mission to fulfil its mandate, and emphasizing
that future credible allegations of chemical weapons use in the
Syrian Arab Republic should be investigated,
PP8. Deeply outraged
by the use of chemical weapons on 21 August 2013 in Rif Damascus, as
concluded in the Mission’s report, condemning the killing of
civilians that resulted from it, affirming that the use of
chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international
law, and stressing that those responsible for any use of
chemical weapons must be held accountable,
PP9. Recalling the
obligation under resolution 1540 (2004) that all States shall refrain
from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt
to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use
weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, and their
means of delivery,
PP10. Welcoming the
Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons dated 14
September 2013, in Geneva, between the Russian Federation and the
United States of America (S/2013/565), with a view to ensuring the
destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons program
in the soonest and safest manner, and expressing its
commitment to the immediate international control over chemical
weapons and their components in the Syrian Arab Republic,
PP11. Welcoming the
decision of the Executive Council of the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) of [XX September 2013]
establishing special procedures for the expeditious destruction of
the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons program and stringent
verification thereof, and expressing its determination to
ensure the destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical
weapons program according to the timetable contained in the OPCW
Executive Council decision of [XX September 2013],
PP12. Stressing that
the only solution to the current crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic
is through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process based on the
Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012, and emphasising the need
to convene the international conference on Syria as soon as possible,
PP13. Determining
that the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic
constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
PP14. Underscoring that
Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the
United Nations to accept and carry out the Council's decisions,
1.
Determines that the use of chemical weapons anywhere
constitutes a threat to international peace and security;
2.
Condemns in the strongest terms any use of chemical weapons in
the Syrian Arab Republic, in particular the attack on 21 August 2013,
in violation of international law;
3.
Endorses the decision of the OPCW Executive Council [XX
September 2013], which contains special procedures for the
expeditious destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical
weapons program and stringent verification thereof and calls for its
full implementation in the most expedient and safest manner;
4. Decides that the
Syrian Arab Republic shall not use, develop, produce, otherwise
acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly
or indirectly, chemical weapons to other States or non-State actors;
5. Underscores that
no party in Syria should use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile,
retain, or transfer chemical weapons;
6. Decides that
the Syrian Arab Republic shall comply with all aspects of the
decision of the OPCW Executive Council of [XX September 2013] (Annex
I);
7. Decides that the
Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with the OPCW and the
United Nations, including by complying with their relevant
recommendations, by accepting personnel designated by the OPCW or the
United Nations, by providing for and ensuring the security of
activities undertaken by these personnel, by providing these
personnel with immediate and unfettered access to and the right to
inspect, in discharging their functions, any and all sites, and by
allowing immediate and unfettered access to individuals that
the OPCW has grounds to believe to be of importance for the purpose
of its mandate, and decides that all parties in Syria shall
cooperate fully in this regard;
8. Decides to
authorize an advance team of United Nations personnel to provide
early assistance to OPCW activities in Syria, requests the
Director-General of the OPCW and the Secretary-General to closely
cooperate in the implementation of the Executive Council decision of
[XX September 2013] and this resolution, including through their
operational activities on the ground, and further requests the
Secretary-General, in consultation with the Director-General of the
OPCW and, where appropriate, the Director-General of the World Health
Organization, to submit to the Council within 10 days of the adoption
of this resolution recommendations regarding the role of the United
Nations in eliminating the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons
program;
9. Notes that the
Syrian Arab Republic is a party to the Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations, decides that
OPCW-designated personnel undertaking activities provided for in this
resolution or the decision of the OPCW Executive Council of [XX
September 2013] shall enjoy the privileges and immunities contained
in the Verification Annex, Part II(B) of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, and calls on the Syrian Arab Republic to conclude
modalities agreements with the United Nations and the OPCW;
10. Encourages
Member States to provide support, including personnel, technical
expertise, information, equipment, and financial and other resources
and assistance, in coordination with the Director-General of the OPCW
and the Secretary-General, to enable the OPCW and the United Nations
to implement the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical
weapons program, and decides to authorize Member States to
acquire, control, transport, transfer and destroy chemical weapons
identified by the Director-General of the OPCW, consistent with the
objective of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to ensure the
elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons program
in the soonest and safest manner;
11. Urges all Syrian
parties and interested Member States with relevant capabilities to
work closely together and with the OPCW and the United Nations to
arrange for the security of the monitoring and destruction mission,
recognizing the primary responsibility of the Syrian government in
this regard;
12. Decides to
review on a regular basis the implementation in the Syrian Arab
Republic of the decision of the OPCW Executive Council [XX September
2013] and this resolution, and requests the Director-General
of the OPCW to report to the Security Council, through the
Secretary-General, who shall include relevant information on United
Nations activities related to the implementation of this resolution,
within 30 days and every month thereafter, and requests
further the Director-General of the OPCW and the Secretary-General to
report in a coordinated manner, as needed, to the Security
Council, non-compliance with this resolution or the OPCW Executive
Council decision of [XX September 2013];
13. Reaffirms its
readiness to consider promptly any reports of the OPCW under Article
VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which provides for the
referral of cases of non-compliance to the United Nations Security
Council;
14. Decides that
Member States shall inform immediately the Security Council of any
violation of resolution 1540 (2004), including acquisition by
non-State actors of chemical weapons, their means of delivery and
related materials in order to take necessary measures therefore;
Accountability
15.
Expresses its strong conviction that those individuals
responsible for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab
Republic should be held accountable;
Political
transition
16.
Endorses
fully
the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 (Annex II), which sets out a
number of key steps beginning with the establishment of a
transitional governing body exercising full executive powers, which
could include members of the present Government and the opposition
and other groups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent;
17.
Calls
for
the convening, as soon as possible, of an international conference on
Syria to implement the Geneva Communiqué, and calls
upon all
Syrian parties to engage seriously and constructively at the Geneva
Conference on Syria, and underscores
that
they should be fully representative of the Syrian people and
committed to the implementation of the Geneva Communiqué and to the
achievement of stability and reconciliation;
Non-Proliferation
18.
Reaffirms that all Member States shall refrain from providing
any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop,
acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and calls
upon all Member States, in particular Member States neighbouring
the Syrian Arab Republic, to report any violations of this paragraph
to the Security Council immediately;
19.
Demands that non-State actors not develop, acquire,
manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical
or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and calls upon
all Member States, in particular Member States neighbouring the
Syrian Arab Republic, to report any actions inconsistent with this
paragraph to the Security Council immediately;
20.
Decides that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement
of chemical weapons, related equipment, goods and technology or
assistance from the Syrian Arab Republic by their nationals, or using
their flagged vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the
territory of the Syrian Arab Republic;
Compliance
21.
Decides,
in the event of non-compliance with this resolution, including
unauthorized transfer of chemical weapons, or any use of chemical
weapons by anyone in the Syrian Arab Republic, to impose measures
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;
22. Decides to
remain actively seized of the matter.
ANNEX
1
OPCW
Executive Council Decision
ANNEX II
Action Group for Syria
Final Communiqué
30 June 2012
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Saturday, September 14, 2013
Kerry - Lavrov agreement: Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons
at
1:23 PM
For Immediate Release September 14, 2013
2013/2121
MEDIA NOTE
Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons
Taking into account the decision of the Syrian Arab Republic to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the commitment of the Syrian authorities to provisionally apply the Convention prior to its entry into force, the United States and the Russian Federation express their joint determination to ensure the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons program (CW) in the soonest and safest manner.
For this purpose, the United States and the Russian Federation have committed to prepare and submit in the next few days to the Executive Council of the OPCW a draft decision setting down special procedures for expeditious destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons program and stringent verification thereof. The principles on which this decision should be based, in the view of both sides, are set forth in Annex A. The United States and the Russian Federation believe that these extraordinary procedures are necessitated by the prior use of these weapons in Syria and the volatility of the Syrian civil war.
The United States and the Russian Federation commit to work together towards prompt adoption of a UN Security Council resolution that reinforces the decision of the OPCW Executive Council. This resolution will also contain steps to ensure its verification and effective implementation and will request that the UN Secretary-General, in consultation with the OPCW, submit recommendations to the UN Security Council on an expedited basis regarding the UN’s role in eliminating the Syrian chemical weapons program.
The United States and the Russian Federation concur that this UN Security Council resolution should provide for review on a regular basis the implementation in Syria of the decision of the Executive Council of the OPCW, and in the event of non-compliance, including unauthorized transfer, or any use of chemical weapons by anyone in Syria, the UN Security Council should impose measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
The proposed joint US-Russian OPCW draft decision supports the application of Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which provides for the referral of any cases of non-compliance to the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council.
In furtherance of the objective to eliminate the Syrian chemical weapons program, the United States and the Russian Federation have reached a shared assessment of the amount and type of chemical weapons involved, and are committed to the immediate international control over chemical weapons and their components in Syria. The United States and the Russian Federation expect Syria to submit, within a week, a comprehensive listing, including names, types, and quantities of its chemical weapons agents, types of munitions, and location and form of storage, production, and research and development facilities.
We further determined that the most effective control of these weapons may be achieved by removal of the largest amounts of weapons feasible, under OPCW supervision, and their destruction outside of Syria, if possible. We set ambitious goals for the removal and destruction of all categories of CW related materials and equipment with the objective of completing such removal and destruction in the first half of 2014. In addition to chemical weapons, stocks of chemical weapons agents, their precursors, specialized CW equipment, and CW munitions themselves, the elimination process must include the facilities for the development and production of these weapons. The views of both sides in this regard are set forth in Annex B.
The United States and the Russian Federation have further decided that to achieve accountability for their chemical weapons, the Syrians must provide the OPCW, the UN, and other supporting personnel with the immediate and unfettered right to inspect any and all sites in Syria. The extraordinary procedures to be proposed by the United States and the Russian Federation for adoption by the OPCW Executive Council and reinforced by a UN Security Council resolution, as described above, should include a mechanism to ensure this right.
Under this framework, personnel under both the OPCW and UN mandate should be dispatched as rapidly as possible to support control, removal, and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons capabilities.
The United States and the Russian Federation believe that the work of the OPCW and the UN will benefit from participation of the experts of the P5 countries.
The United States and the Russian Federation strongly reiterate their position on Syria as reflected in the Final Communique of the G-8 Summit in Northern Ireland in June 2013, especially as regards chemical weapons.
The two sides intend to work closely together, and with the OPCW, the UN, all Syrian parties, and with other interested member states with relevant capabilities to arrange for the security of the monitoring and destruction mission, recognizing the primary responsibility of the Syrian Government in this regard.
The United States and the Russian Federation note that there are details in furtherance of the execution of this framework that need to be addressed on an expedited basis in the coming days and commit to complete these details, as soon as practicable, understanding that time is of the essence given the crisis in Syria.
Annex A
Principles for Decision Document by OPCW Executive Council
1. The decision should be based on para 8. Art. IV and para. 10 of Art V of the CWC.
2. The decision should address the extraordinary character of the situation with the Syrian chemical weapons.
3. The decision should take into account the deposit by Syria of the instrument of accession to the CWC.
4. The decision should provide for the easy accessibility for States Parties of the information submitted by Syria.
5. The decision should specify which initial information Syria shall submit to the OPCW Technical Secretariat in accordance with a tightly fixed schedule and also specifies an early date for submission of the formal CWC declaration.
6. The decision should oblige Syria to cooperate fully on all aspects of its implementation.
7. The decision should address a schedule for the rapid destruction of Syrian chemical weapons capabilities. This schedule should take into account the following target dates:
A. Completion of initial OPCW on-site inspections of declared sites by November.
B. Destruction of production and mixing/filling equipment by November.
C. Complete elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014.
The shortest possible final deadline, as well as intermediate deadlines, for the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons capabilities should be included into the schedule.
8. The decision should provide stringent special verification measures, beginning within a few days, including a mechanism to ensure the immediate and unfettered right to inspect any and all sites.
9. The decision should address the issue of duties of the OPCW Technical Secretariat in this situation and its need for supplementary resources to implement the decision, particularly technical and personnel resources, and call upon states with relevant capacities to contribute to this end.
10. The decision should refer to the provisions of the CWC obliging the Executive Council, in cases of non-compliance with the Convention, to bring the issues directly to the attention of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council.
Annex B
Joint Framework on Destruction of Syrian CW
The Russian Federation and the United States of America agree on the need to achieve rapid elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons, thus reducing the threat posed to the people of Syria. They are each prepared to devote high-level attention and resources to support the monitoring and destruction mission of the OPCW, both directly and in cooperation with the United Nations and other States concerned. They agree to set an ambitious goal of eliminating the threat in a rapid and effective manner.
Both parties agree that a clear picture of the state of Syrian chemical weapons could help advance a cooperative development of destruction options, including possible removal of chemical weapons outside of the Syrian territory. We agree on the importance of rapid destruction of the following categories:
1. Production equipment
2. Mixing and filling equipment
3. Filled and unfilled weapons and delivery systems
4. Chemical agents (unweaponized) and precursor chemicals. For these materials, they will pursue a hybrid approach, i.e., a combination of removal from Syria and destruction within Syria, depending upon site-specific conditions. They will also consider the possibility of consolidation and destruction in the coastal area of Syria.
5. Material and equipment related to the research and development of chemical weapons
The two parties agree to utilize the “universal matrix”, developed in the course of consultations by our two National Security Councils, as the basis for an actionable plan.
They agree that the elimination of chemical weapons in Syria should be considered an urgent matter to be implemented within the shortest possible time period.
The parties agree to set the following target dates:
A. Completion of initial OPCW on-site inspections by November.
B. Destruction of production and mixing/filling equipment by November.
C. Complete elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014.
The Russian Federation and the United States will work together closely, including with the OPCW, the UN and Syrian parties to arrange for the security of the monitoring and destruction mission, noting the primary responsibility of the Syrian government in this regard.
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