"US Draft Resolution" on Iran Arms Embargo

UN Photo

DRAFT Security Council Resolution on Iranian Regional Attacks and Arms Proliferation

The Security Council,

PP1. Reaffirming the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and recalling the importance of the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, and international co-operation,

PP2. Deploring the attacks against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 14 September 2019, which caused severe damage at Abqaiq and Khurais, targeted the security and stability of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and jeopardized the world economy by attacking the supply of energy,

PP3. Recalling the assessment of the Secretary-General that the cruise missiles and delta-wing uncrewed aerial vehicles, and/or parts thereof, used in the attack on Saudi Arabia were of Iranian origin, [Secretary-General's 9th Report on UNSCR 2231 Implementation]

PP4. Further recalling that the Panel of Experts on Yemen concluded that the Houthi forces did not launch the attacks on Abqaiq and Khurais on 14 September 2019 (S/2020/70),

PP5. Deploring the attack on 12 May 2019 against four oil tankers, flagged in Norway, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, off of the coast of the United Arab Emirates, and the attack on 13 June 2019 against two oil tankers, flagged in the Marshall Islands and Singapore, in the Gulf of Oman,

PP6. Expressing grave concern about the risk that these attacks posed to global energy supplies, to freedom of navigation in the region, to the safety of persons working in the energy and maritime transportation sectors, and to the environment,

PP7. Taking note of the decision of the Council of the International Maritime Organisation to condemn tanker attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and Sea of Oman, including a statement on heightened maritime security measures for ships operating in that area, adopted on 18 July 2019 during its 122nd session,

PP8. Expressing grave concern at the 27 December attack on an Iraqi military base in Kirkuk, Iraq, which killed a U.S. citizen and wounded several American and Iraqi personnel, which were carried out by Kata’ib Hezbollah, an organization supported by the Government of Iran,

PP9. Deploring ongoing Iranian support for militias and other armed groups, which threatens to destabilize the region and contributed to the 31 December attack on the United States Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq,

PP10. Recalling in this regard the fundamental principle of the inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises, and the special duty of host Governments under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to take all appropriate steps to protect diplomatic and consular premises against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of these missions or impairment of their dignity,

PP11. Recalling the letter of 9 January 2020 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Iraq to the President of the Security Council, which called attention to multiple Iranian missile strikes on 8 January 2020 targeting Iraqi military bases for Iraqi and coalition forces (S/2020/26),

PP12. Taking note of the Secretary-General’s assessment that certain arms and related materiel seized off the coast of Yemen in November 2019 and February 2020 were delivered to Iran after the adoption of resolution 2231 and are of Iranian origin, [Secretary-General's 9th Report on UNSCR 2231 Implementation]

PP13. Taking note of the Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen (S/2020/70), which concludes that the Houthi forces continue to receive military support in the form of assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, anti-tank guided missiles, and more sophisticated cruise missile systems, and that some of those weapons have technical characteristics similar to arms manufactured in Iran,

PP14. Determining that such attacks and continued proliferation of arms and related materiel by Iran constitute a threat to international peace and security,

PP15. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,

1. Condemns the September 2019 attack against Saudi Arabia carried out by Iran;

2. Further condemns the December 2019 attacks against an Iraqi military base in Kirkuk and the United States Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq;

3. Deplores Iran’s transfers of arms to militias and other armed groups in the region, and demands that Iran cease all such transfers immediately;

4. Further deplores violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia and other states in the region as well as the impact on their infrastructure;

5. Condemns the recent attacks on commercial ships in and near the Strait of Hormuz;

6. Demands that such attacks cease forthwith and that the navigational rights and freedoms of all states be upheld in accordance with international law;

7. Affirms the need for Member States to de-escalate tensions in the region and refrain from provocative acts;

8. Requests that the Secretary-General report to the Security Council any attack by an armed group that threatens the stability of the region, or any attack that interferes with the exercise of navigational rights and freedoms in this area, and further requests that the Secretary-General submit any such reports within one week of such incidents;

9. Decides that, effective upon the expiration of the measures imposed in resolution 2231, Annex B, paragraph 5, all Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to Iran, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of arms and related materiel unless the Committee has approved at least 30-days in advance on a case-by-case basis such activity for humanitarian purposes or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of this resolution;

10. Decides that, effective upon the expiration of the measures imposed in resolution 2231, Annex B, paragraph 6(b), Iran shall not supply, sell, or transfer, directly or indirectly, from its territory, by its nationals, or using its flag vessels or aircraft, any arms or related materiel, and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;

11. Decides that, effective upon the expiration of the measures imposed in resolution 2231, Annex B, paragraphs 5 and 6(b), all Member States shall prevent any transfers to Iran by their nationals or from their territories, or from Iran by its nationals or from its territory, of technical training, financial resources or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance, or use of arms and related materiel unless the Committee has approved at least 30-days in advance on a case-by-case basis such activity for humanitarian purposes or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of this resolution;

12. Decides that all Member States shall inspect, consistent with applicable international law, all cargo within or transiting through their territory, including in their airports, seaports, and free trade zones, that has originated from Iran, or that is destined for Iran, or has been brokered by or facilitated by Iran or its nationals, or by individuals and entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, or by designated individuals or entities, or that is being transported on Iranian flagged aircraft or maritime vessels, if the Member State concerned has reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, or transfer of which is prohibited by this resolution;

13. Decides to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable or unusable, storage, or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by this resolution that are identified in inspections, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under international law, including applicable Security Council resolutions;

14. Calls upon all Member States, when they undertake an inspection or seize and dispose of cargo pursuant to this resolution, to submit promptly reports containing relevant details to the Committee on such inspection, seizure, or disposal within 30 days of the inspection, seizure, or disposal for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

15. Calls upon all Member States to inspect vessels with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains items the supply, sale, or transfer of which is prohibited by this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

16. Calls upon all Member States to cooperate with inspections pursuant to this resolution’s provisions, and, if the flag State does not consent to inspection on the high seas, decides that the flag State shall direct the vessel to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection by the local authorities;

17. Requires any Member State, when it does not receive the cooperation of a flag State of a vessel pursuant to paragraph [16] above, to submit promptly to the Committee a report containing relevant details regarding the incident, the vessel and the flag State, and requests the Committee to release on a regular basis information regarding these vessels and flag States involved;

18. Affirms that paragraphs [15 and 16] contemplate only inspections carried out by warships and other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect, and underscores that it does not apply with respect to inspection of vessels entitled to sovereign immunity under international law;

19. Decides that all Member States shall seize, inspect, freeze (impound), confiscate, and dispose of any vessel in their ports, in a manner consistent with national legal authorities, if the Member State concerned has reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel was involved in activities prohibited by this resolution, unless the Committee decides, on a case-by-case basis and upon request of the impounding State, flag State, State with jurisdiction over the owner of the vessel, or other relevant State, that the vessel may be released from impoundment because disposal would not further the objectives of this resolution and adequate arrangements have been made to prevent the vessel from contributing to future violations of the measures imposed by this resolution, further decides that any Member State may seize, inspect, freeze (impound), confiscate, and dispose of any vessel subject to its jurisdiction in its territorial sea, in a manner consistent with national legal authorities, if the Member State concerned has reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel was involved in activities prohibited by this resolution, clarifies that disposal shall be in such a manner that the vessel will not contribute to future violations of the measures imposed by this resolution (which could include scrapping, rendering inoperable or unusable, long-term storage, or transferring to another Member State other than the originating or destination States for disposal), and encourages Member States to consult with the flag States of relevant vessels and Member States with jurisdiction over the owners of relevant vessels prior to disposal;

20. Affirms that paragraphs [15, 16, and 17] apply only with respect to the situation addressed in this resolution and shall not affect the rights, obligations, or responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any rights or obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, with respect to any other situation;

21. Decides that all Member States shall, in accordance with their respective legal processes, freeze immediately the funds, other financial assets, and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of the adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the persons or entities designated by the Committee or by the Security Council, [including in Annex I of this resolution,] as being engaged in or providing support for the activities prohibited by paragraphs [9, 10, or 11] of this resolution, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and ensure that any funds, financial assets, or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of such persons or entities;

22. Decides that all Member States shall take the necessary steps to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated by the Committee or by the Security Council, [including those in Annex II of this resolution,] as being as being engaged in or providing support for the activities prohibited by paragraphs [9, 10, or 11] of this resolution, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a state to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

23. Decides that paragraph [21] shall not apply to funds, other financial assets, or economic resources that have been determined by relevant Member States:

a. To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges, or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets and economic resources at least 30 days in advance with detailed information submitted to sufficiently explain the transactions and provide reasonable assurances that the funds would not be diverted for other purposes and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;

b. To be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee at least 30 days in advance and has been approved by the Committee; or

c. To be subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement was entered prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person referred to in paragraph [21] or an individual or entity identified by the Security Council or the Committee, and has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee at least 30 days in advance;

24. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph [22] above shall not apply where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis at least 15 days in advance that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of this resolution;

25. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council (herein “the Committee”), to undertake the following tasks:

d. To monitor the implementation of the measures imposed in this resolution;

e. To designate those individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed in paragraphs [21 and 22], and to review information regarding those individuals and entities;

f. To consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in the paragraphs above;

g. To establish such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed in this resolution;

h. To encourage a dialogue between the Committee and interested Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations, in particular those in the region, including by inviting representatives of such States or organizations to meet with the Committee to discuss implementation of the measures;

i. To seek from all States and international, regional, and sub-regional organizations whatever information it may consider useful regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed above;

j. To examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations or non-compliance with the measures contained in this resolution;

26. Requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary financial arrangements to enable the Committee to undertake the tasks mentioned in paragraph [25] above;

27. Requests the Secretary-General to create, for an initial period of twelve months from the adoption of this resolution, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts (“Panel of Experts”), under the direction of the Committee, and to make the necessary financial and security arrangements to support the work of the Panel, expresses its intent to consider the renewal of this mandate no later than 12 months after the adoption of this resolution, and decides that the Panel shall carry out the following tasks:

k. Assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in this resolution, including through providing the Committee with information relevant to the potential designation at a later stage of individuals and entities pursuant to paragraphs [21 and 22] above;

l. Gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies, regional organizations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures imposed in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

m. Provide to the Council two reports no later than six months and twelve months, respectively, from the adoption of this resolution, and periodic updates in between;

n. Assist the Committee in refining and updating information on the list of individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs [21 and 22] above, including through the provision of biometric information and additional information for the publicly-available narrative summary of reasons for listing;

28. Notes that the selection process of the experts composing the Panel should prioritize appointing individuals with the strongest qualifications to fulfil the duties described above while paying due regard to the importance of regional and gender representation in the recruitment process;

29. Directs the Panel of Experts to cooperate with other relevant expert groups established by the Security Council to support the work of its Sanctions Committees, including the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014), and with the Secretary-General in his reporting on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), particularly with respect to its arms embargo;

30. Urges all parties and Member States, as well as international, regional, and subregional organizations to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts, and further urges all Member States involved to ensure the safety of the members of the Panel of Experts and unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites in order for the Panel of Experts to execute its mandate;

31. Calls upon all States, particularly those in the region, to actively implement the measures contained in this resolution and to regularly report to the Committee on the actions they have taken to implement the measures imposed in this resolution;

32. Requests the Committee to report orally, through its Chair, on a quarterly basis every year to the Council, on the state of the overall work of the Committee, and encourages the Chair to hold regular briefings for all interested Member States including through open briefings and special meetings for the full General Assembly membership;

33. Expresses its intention, in the event of non-compliance with the present resolution, to consider additional measures that are commensurate with the gravity of the situation in order to maintain international peace and security;

34. Expresses its intention to keep the situation in the region under continuous review;

35. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 

Annex I

Individuals Subject to the Travel Ban and Assets Freeze

1. ESMAIL GHANI

a. Description: ALTERNATIVE: Esmail Ghani replaced Qasem Soleimani as Commander of the IRGC-QF. The IRGC-QF, Iran’s primary tool for conducting unconventional operations abroad, maintains a wide and varied network of non-state partners, proxies, and affiliates primarily in the Middle East. Iran provides a range of financial, political, training, and materiel support to these groups, which has included small arms, ammunition, explosives, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), vehicles, antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), artillery, rockets, UAVs, and some more-advanced systems, such as ASCMs and ballistic missiles.

b. NEZHAD, Ismail Akbar; AKBARNEJAD, Esmaeil Ghaani; QANI, Esmail; GHA'ANI, Esma'il; GHAANI, Esmail; QA'ANI, Esma'il

c. Identifiers: DOB: 08 August 1957; POB: Mashhad, Iran; Passport (Iran): D9008347 (Issued 18 July 2010, Expired 18 July 2015); Passport (Iran): D9003033

2. HASSAN PELARAK

a. Description: Hassan Pelarak, an IRGC-QF officer, was selected by former IRGC-QF Commander Qasem Soleimani to serve as his special assistant on an IRGC-QF-led committee focused on sanctions evasions activity. Pelarak also worked with IRGC-QF officials to transfer missiles, explosives, and small arms to Yemen, intensifying the Yemeni conflict and exacerbating one of the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophes.

b. AKA: POLARAK, Hassan; JA'FARI, Hasan

c. Identifiers: DOB: 3 September 1961; Nationality: Iran; National ID No. (Iran): 3051910163; Passport (Iran): D10001869; Passport (Iran): V43936121; Gender: Male; Addresses: Iran, Iraq

3. ABDOLHOSSEIN KHEDRI

a. Description: For years, the IRGC-QF has used Abdolhossein Khedri and firms under his control to support maritime weapons smuggling operations. For over ten years, Iranian businessman Abdolhossein Khedri had been involved in shipping operations for the IRGC-QF.

b. AKA: KHEDRI, Abdolhossein Heid; KHODRI, Abed Al Hsein Heid; KHEDRI, Abdul Hossein

c. Identifiers: DOB: May 1971; POB: Bushehr Province, Iran; Gender: Male; Address: Iran

4. MAHMUD BAGHERI KAZEMABAD

a. Description: Bagheri is the Commander of the IRGC Aerospace Forces Al- Ghadir Missile Command (ASF AGMC). He oversees the transfer of missile components and the deployment of ballistic missile specialists across the region in support of the IRGC’s activities. He provided ballistic missile-related technical

expertise to Yemen’s Houthis and transferred weapons not seen in Yemen prior to the current conflict on behalf of the IRGC-QF.

b. AKA: BAGHERI-KAZEMABAD, Mahmud; BAGHERI, Mahmud Kazemabad; KAZEMABAD, Mahmoud Bagheri; KZEMABAD, Mahmoud Bagheri; BAGHERI, Mahmud; BAGHERI, Mahmoud

c. Identifiers: DOB: 26 June 1965; POB: Meybod, Iran; Nationality: Iran; National ID No. (Iran): 448947941; Passport (Iran): J32377129 (Expires 31 August 2020); Gender: Male; Address: Iran

5. MOHAMMAD AGHA JA’FARI

a. Description: Ja’fari is a senior IRGC official who oversees the transfer of missile components and the deployment of ballistic missile specialists across the region in support of the IRGC’s activities. He has provided ballistic missile-related technical expertise to Yemen’s Houthis and transferred weapons not seen in Yemen prior to the current conflict on behalf of the IRGC-QF.

b. AKA: JA'FARI, Mohammad

c. Identifiers: DOB: 1966, 1967; POB: Kashan, Iran; Address: Iran

Annex II

Entities Subject to the Assets Freeze

1. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS (IRGC) - QODS FORCE (IRGC-QF)

a. Description: The IRGC-QF, Iran’s primary tool for conducting unconventional operations abroad, maintains a wide and varied network of non-state partners, proxies, and affiliates primarily in the Middle East. Iran provides a range of financial, political, training, and materiel support to these groups, which has included small arms, ammunition, explosives, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), vehicles, antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), artillery, rockets, UAVs, and some more-advanced systems, such as ASCMs and ballistic missiles.

b. AKA: PASDARAN-E ENGHELAB-E ISLAMI (PASDARAN); SEPAH-E QODS (JERUSALEM FORCE); IRGC-QF; IRGC-QUDS FORCE; ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS-QODS FORCE; QODS FORCE; QUDS FORCE; JERUSALEM FORCE; AL QODS; SEPAH-E QODS; QODS (JERUSALEM) FORCE OF THE IRGC

c. Identifiers: Address: Tehran, Iran; Syria

2. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS

a. Description: The Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) oversees Iran’s defense industry. MODAFL arms and equips the armed forces, which include the IRGC-QF, through military research and development, production, acquisition, and personnel support. The major industrial organizations subordinate to MODAFL are responsible for the research, development, and production of nearly all types of military hardware, including ballistic and cruise missiles, SAMs, radars, armored vehicles, UAVs, naval vessels, small arms, ammunition, and communications equipment.

b. AKA: MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND SUPPORT FOR ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS; MODAFL; MODSAF; MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FOR ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS; MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS; VEZARAT-E DEFA VA POSHTYBANI-E NIRU-HAYE MOSALLAH; MINISTRY OF DEFENCE & ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS; GOVERNMENT OF IRAN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; VEZARATE DEFA

c. Identifiers: Address: Ferdowsi Avenue, Sarhang Sakhaei Street, Tehran, Iran; PO Box 11365-8439, Pasdaran Ave, Tehran, Iran; West side of Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran, Iran

3. AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ORGANIZATION (AIO)

a. Description: The Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) produces ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, anti-air missiles, and anti-tank guided missiles. AIO subordinates Shahid Hemmat Industries Group (SHIG) and Shahid Bakeri Industries Group (SBIG) are the primary entities responsible for ballistic missile development and production. Iran domestically develops and produces liquid- and solid-propellant ballistic missiles and continues to improve

the range, lethality, and accuracy of its missile systems. SHIG and SBIG are responsible for producing Iran's QIAM missile. Iran has provided QIAM missiles to Yemen’s Houthi rebels, as evidenced by remnants collected from two Iranian-origin QIAM missiles fired into Saudi Arabia by the Houthis in 2017, which were stamped with the SHIG acronym.

b. AKA: SAZMANE SANAYE HAVA FAZA; AIO

c. Identifiers: Address: Langare Street, Nobonyad Square, Tehran, Iran

4. DEFENSE INDUSTRIES ORGANIZATION

a. Description: MODAFL’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) is responsible for procuring tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, small arms, ammunition, and explosives.

b. AKA: DIO; DEFENCE INDUSTRIES ORGANISATION; SAZEMANE SANAYE DEFA; SASEMAN SANAJE DEFA; SASADJA

c. Identifiers: Address: P.O. Box 19585-777, Pasdaran Street, Entrance of Babaie Highway, Permanent Expo of Defence Industries Organization, Tehran, Iran

5. MARINE INDUSTRIES ORGANIZATION

a. Description: The Marine Industries Organization (MIO) and its subsidiaries are the primary domestic producers of naval platforms for both of Iran’s navies. These industries build a wide range of small high-speed boats equipped with guns, rockets, and missiles primarily for the IRGC Navy. MIO is responsible for producing Iran's SHARK-33 explosive-laden, unmanned attack boat. The Houthis used an unmanned explosive small boat to attack the Saudi Arabia frigate HMS al Madinah in 2017, and a SHARK-33 captured in 2016 that Iran provided to the Houthis contained a fuze plate identical to that produced by MIO's Shahid Jolaie Marine Industries.

b. AKA: MIO

c. Identifiers: Address: Pasdaran Av., PO Box 19585/777, Tehran, Iran

6. IRAN AVIATION INDUSTRIES ORGANIZATION

a. Description: The Iran Aviation Industries Organization (IAIO) is a key MODAFL subordinate responsible for managing Iran’s military aviation industry, including the development of long range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). IAIO entity Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (HESA) produces the QASEF UAV, a UAV configuration unique to Iran. Houthi forces used a QASEF UAV in a 10 January 2019 attack on Al Anad airbase in Yemen.

b. AKA: IAIO, SAZMANE SANAYE HAVAI

c. Identifiers: Address: Karaj Special Road, Mehrabad Airport, Tehran, Iran; Sepahbod Gharani 36, Tehran, Iran; 3th km Karaj Special Road, Aviation Industries Boulevard, Tehran, Iran

7. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LOGISTICS EXPORT

a. Description: MODLEX sells Iranian-produced arms to customers around the world.

b. AKA: MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LEGION EXPORT; MODLEX

c. Identifiers: Address: PO Box 16315-189, Tehran, Iran, located on the west side of Dabestan Street, Abbas Abad District, Tehran, Iran; PO Box 19315-189, Pasdaran Street, South Noubonyand Square, Tehran, Iran. 

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