Ban on chemical weapons in Syria: Joint Mission will continue its work beyond June 30th

Here is the UN Secretary General's eighth report on the chemical weapons in Syria. It was sent to the Security Council today, 23 May 2014. 

Click here to read the full copy. 

THE SECRETARY GENERAL

23 May 2014

Dear Mr. President (of the Security Council),

I have the honour to transmit herewith the eighth monthly report of the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) (see annex). The present letter provides information requested in that resolution on the activities of the United Nations from 25 April to 22 May 2014 related to the implementation of the resolution.

Introduction

During the reporting period, there had been no further removal of chemical weapons material 01' verification activities allowing for the closure of additional chemical weapons storage and production facilities. However, the Syrian Arab Republic accessed the last site containing chemical weapons material, carried out the destruction of its residual stockpile of isopropanol, and prepared remaining chemical material for removal as soon as security conditions permit.

At the time of issuance of this letter, a number of activities remain outstanding in order for the Syrian Arab Republic to fully eliminate its declared chemical weapons programme in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) and the relevant decisions of the OPCW Executive Council. These are: the removal of the remaining chemical weapons material; the destruction of structures at twelve production facilities pending an agreement on the modalities of destruction by the OPCW Executive Council; the destruction of one item of loading equipment at one production facility; and the destruction of one building located at another production facility.

The Joint Mission of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic (Joint Mission) continues to urge the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic to carry out all remaining activities expeditiously.

Key developments

On 27 April 2014, the internal Syrian Arab Republic timeline for the removal of all chemical weapons material passed with close to 8% of material remaining at one storage facility inside Syrian territory. The Syrian Arab Republic had long before informed the Joint Mission that it did not have full security control in the area of that site, and that they had serious concerns about the safety and security of chemical weapons material convoys leaving the facility.

On 28 April 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic reported that armed opposition groups had taken control of two nearby facilities which had previously been emptied of chemical weapons material and expanded their presence in the area, rendering the remaining active storage facility inaccessible by road. The authorities further informed that a military operation was required to access the facility in order to adequately secure the area to allow safe extraction of the chemical weapons material.

On 15 May 2014, in order to destroy the remaining quantities of isopropanol held at the site and to finalize necessary preparations for eventual transportation of chemical weapons material to Latakia, the Syrian Arab Republic chartered an aircraft funded by the Joint Mission to airlift various equipment and packaging materials to the site.

Subsequently, the Syrian Arab Republic authorities destroyed its residual stockpile of isopropanol, and completed preparatory and packaging activities in readiness to remove the last batch of chemical weapons material. As of 20 May 2014, 7.2% percent of the chemical weapons material of Syria remained in country and awaiting swift removal for onward destruction. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic insisted that final removal operations can be conducted solely through ground transportation when security conditions allow. Officials of Syrian Arab Republic pledged-to- remove the remaining chemical material as soon as possible in the shortest possible timeframe.

Further to the visit of the OPCW Technical Secretariat team from 22 to 28 April 2014, which sought to address technical discrepancies in the original declaration, a second team arrived during the reporting period to focus on subsequent amendments and verification issues. The Syrian Arab Republic extended its constructive cooperation to the Technical Secretariat team in the course of their duties.

Joint Mission activities

The Joint Mission continued its engagement with Syrian Arab Republic officials, impressing the importance of accessing the site holding chemical weapons material and urging them to remove and destroy as relevant all remaining chemical weapons material. The Joint Mission continued outreach activities with contributing international partners and Member States in the region.

The security situation in the Syrian Arab Republic continued to be challenging. In Damascus, shelling and mortar attacks escalated during the reporting period, increasing the risks to Joint Mission and all United Nations personnel. On 6 May 2014, the area near the Joint Mission headquarters was hit by mortar shelling. As a result, one Joint Mission national personnel and another United Nations national staff member were injured when one of the mortars landed close to their home, some 300 meters from the Joint Mission headquarters.

With the destruction and removal of much of the chemical weapons programme completed, and given the volatility of the security situation which continued to pose a significant risk to personnel, the Joint Mission initiated steps to reduce its presence inside the Syrian Arab Republic and adjust its functional footprint to a configuration commensurate to its remaining tasks. A number of Joint Mission personnel have already returned to parent duty stations and others transitioned to the Joint Mission’s support office in Cyprus. The Joint Mission maintained its core operations in Damascus to continue verification and other activities, although it temporarily relocated personnel from Latakia to Damascus pending the resumption of removal and verification operations. The Joint Mission maintained relevant personnel required at the port for remaining verification and inspection activities on stand-by.

Conclusion

Over the last eight months, a large part of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic has been either removed from its territory or destroyed iii—country, equating to approximately 92% of its chemical weapons material. Preparatory activities for the removal of the remaining quantities have been completed. Other notable achievements during the past eight months include the functional destruction of all declared chemical weapons production and mixing/ filling specialized equipment, rendering it inoperable; the destruction of all unfilled munitions; the destruction of all containers previously holding mustard gas; the destruction of all isopropanol on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic; the closure of eleven out of twelve chemical weapons storage facilities; and the closure of five out of eighteen chemical weapons production facilities, with the modalities for destruction of twelve facilities currently under review in the OPCW Executive Council. All of these activities had been verified and inspected physically by Joint Mission personnel where security conditions allowed and through remote camera sruveillance Where security conditions did not permit physical presence of Joint Mission personnel.

It is imperative that the Syrian Arab Republic concludes remaining removal operations as quickly as possible, as the authorities have pledged to do. However, it is now evident that some activities related to the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic Will continue beyond 30 June 2014.

With this in mind, and following consultation with the Director General of OPCW, I foresee that the Joint Mission Will continue its work for a finite period of time beyond 30 June 2014 during which most of the remaining activities for the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic should be completed. This will also give sufficient time to put in place appropriate successor arrangements for OPCW to continue any residual in-country verification activities beyond this period.

I continue to be very concerned by allegations regarding the use of chlorine gas in the context of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and look forward to the results of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission. I call on the

I want to thank those Member States who continue to provide significant funds and in-kind contributions towards the removal and destruction of chemical weapons material from the Syrian Arab Republic. I am particularly grateful to those Member States providing maritime assistance and support, who have had to deploy in the eastern Mediterranean for considerably longer periods than had been originally envisaged.

Once again, I thank Special Coordinator Kaag and all the personnel of the Joint Mission for their courageous work carried out in challenging and dangerous conditions inside the Syrian Arab Republic.

I would be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex urgently to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

BAN Ki-moon

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French draft resolution on ICC/ Syria in blue

       The Security Council,

      

       PP1 Recalling its resolutions 2042 (2012), 2043 (2012), 2118 (2013) and 2139 (2014), and its Presidential Statements of 3 August 2011, 21 March 2012, 5 April 2012 and 2 October 2013,

       PP2 Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

            PP3  Recalling its full endorsement of the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 which states that accountability for acts committed during the present conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic must be addressed,

          PP4 Taking note of the reports of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, mandated by the Human Rights Council to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law since March 2011 in the Syrian Arab Republic, to establish the facts and circumstances that may amount to such violations and of the crimes perpetrated and, where possible, to identify those responsible with a view to ensuring that perpetrators of violations, including those that may constitute crimes against humanity, are held accountable,

       PP5 Recalling the statements made by the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights that crimes against humanity and war crimes are likely to have been committed in the Syrian Arab Republic,

          PP6 Noting the repeated encouragement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for the Security Council to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court,

           

       PP7 Determining that the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

       PP8 Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

OP1 Reaffirms its strong condemnation of  the widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Syrian authorities and pro-government militias, as well as the human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by non-State armed groups, all committed in the course of the ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011;

OP2 Decides to refer the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic described in paragraph 1 above since March 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court;

OP3 Decides also that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor, including by implementing fully the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court, pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, strongly urges all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully with the Court and the Prosecutor;

OP4 Demands that non-State armed groups in the Syrian Arab Republic also cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor in connection with investigations and prosecutions undertaken pursuant to this resolution;

OP5 Expresses its commitment to an effective follow up of the present resolution;

OP6 Recalls the guidance issued by the Secretary General on contacts with persons who are the subject of arrest warrants or summonses issued by the International Criminal Court;

OP7 Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a State outside the Syrian Arab Republic which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the Syrian Arab Republic established or authorized by the Council, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the State;

OP8 Recognizes that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral, including expenses related to investigations or prosecutions in connection with that referral, shall be borne by the United Nations and that such costs shall be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that wish to contribute voluntarily and encourages States to make such contributions, noting the need for funding of expenses related to investigations or prosecutions of the International Criminal Court, including in connection with situations referred to the Court by the Security Council, as stated in General Assembly resolution 67/295;

OP9 Invites the Prosecutor to address the Council within two months of the date of adoption of this resolution and every six months thereafter on actions taken pursuant to this resolution and requests the Secretary-General to circulate the report of the Prosecutor as a document of the Council, in advance of such briefings,

OP10 Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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Russian draft resolution on Syria

Russian Federation — resolution (May 13, .2014)

The Security Council,

PPl Recalling its Resolution 2139‘ (2014) and its Presidential Statement of 2 October 2013,

PP2 Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

PP3 Expressing grave alarm at the significant and rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Syria, in particular the dire situation of hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as civilians trapped in besieged areas or living in hard-to-reach areas,

PP4 Deploring the difficulties in providing necessary humanitarian assistance to all civilians in need inside Syria,

PPS Calling on all parties to respect the UN Guiding Principles of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance, and stressing the importance of such assistance being delivered on the basis of need, devoid of any political prejudices and aims,

PP6 Recognizing practical steps undertaken by the Syrian parties in implementing the requirements of Security Council Resolution 2139 (2014),

OPl Commends the local cease-fire agreement reached between the representatives of the Syrian authorities and the opposition forces in the Old City of Horns which saved the lives of thousands of civilians in this area;

0P2 Strongly supports the efforts in this regard of the United Nations and all local and international humanitarian and medical personnel in Syria, notably of the ICRC, WHO, WP and SARC;

0P3 Emphasizes that the success in Homs has been achieved through the concrete steps made by the Syrian parties on the ground having thus facilitated delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians in the conflict= affected areas and safe return of thousands of internally displaced persons to their homes;

0P4 Urges all parties to the conflict to promptly secure safe and unhindered humanitarian access to people in need in other parts of Syria through the most effective ways, including local cease-fire agreements and across conflict lines and, where appropriate, across borders from neighbouring countries in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance;

OPS Calls upon all parties to fully implement the provisions of Security Council Resolution 2139 (2014);

0P6 Urges all parties to take all appropriate steps to protect civilians, including ethnic, religious and confessional minorities;

0P7 Emphasizes that the humanitarian situation Will continue to deteriorate in the absence of a political solution, and demands that all parties work through all-inclusive Syrian dialogue towards the comprehensive settlement of the crisis with a view. to full implementation of the Geneva Communique of 30 June 2012 endorsed by Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013);

0P8 Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

French draft resolution refers Syria to the ICC

The Security Council,

PP1 Recalling its resolutions 2042 (2012), 2043 (2012), 2118 (2013) and 2139 (2014), and its Presidential Statements of 3 August 2011, 21 March 2012, 5 April 2012 and 2 October 2013,

PP2 Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

PP3  Recalling its full endorsement of the Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012 which states that accountability for acts committed during the present conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic must be addressed,

PP4 Taking note of the reports of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, mandated by the Human Rights Council to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law since March 2011 in the Syrian Arab Republic, to establish the facts and circumstances that may amount to such violations and of the crimes perpetrated and, where possible, to identify those responsible with a view to ensuring that perpetrators of violations, including those that may constitute crimes against humanity, are held accountable,

PP5 Recalling the statements made by the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights that crimes against humanity and war crimes are likely to have been committed in the Syrian Arab Republic,

PP6 Noting the repeated encouragement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for the Security Council to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court,

PP7 Determining that the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

PP8 Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

OP1 Reaffirms its strong condemnation of the widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by the Syrian authorities and pro-government militias, as well as the human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law by non-State armed groups, all committed in the course of the ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011;

OP2 Decides to refer the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic described in paragraph 1 above since March 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court;

OP3 Decides also that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor, including by implementing fully the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court, pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, strongly urges all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully with the Court and the Prosecutor;

OP4 Demands that non-State armed groups in the Syrian Arab Republic also cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor in connection with investigations and prosecutions undertaken pursuant to this resolution;

OP5 Expresses its commitment to an effective follow up of the present resolution, in particular regarding issues of cooperation, arrest and transfer to the International Criminal Court of persons against whom arrest warrants are issued;

OP6 Recalls the guidance issued by the Secretary General on contacts with persons who are the subject of arrest warrants or summonses issued by the International Criminal Court;

OP7 Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a State outside the Syrian Arab Republic which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the Syrian Arab Republic established or authorized by the Council, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the State;

OP8 Recognizes that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral, including expenses related to investigations or prosecutions in connection with that referral, shall be borne by the United Nations and that such costs shall be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that wish to contribute voluntarily and encourages States to make such contributions;

OP9 Invites the Prosecutor to address the Council within two months of the date of adoption of this resolution and every six months thereafter on actions taken pursuant to this resolution and requests the Secretary-General to circulate the report of the Prosecutor as a document of the Council, in advance of such briefings;

OP10 Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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Ban's report on chemical weapons in Syria

TH E SECRETARY-GEN ERAL

25 April 2014

Dear Madam President,

I have the honour to transmit herewith the seventh monthly report of the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) (see annex). The present letter provides information requested in that resolution on the activities of the United Nations from 22 March to 24 April 2014 related to the implementation of the resolution.

Introduction

During the latter half of the reporting period, the Syrian Arab Republic made important progress towards the elimination of its entire declared stockpile of chemical weapons material. As at 24 April 2014, the total figure for removal and in-country destruction had reached 92.5%. This includes 96.7% of high priority chemical materials and 82.6% of other chemical materials removed. The amount of declared isopropanol verified as destroyed in-country remained at 93.1%.

The Syrian Arab Republic had earlier committed to removing all chemical weapons material from its territory by 13 April 2014, apart from material located at two sites that were considered inaccessible by the government owing to the prevailing security situation, which were to be cleared by 27 April 2014. The Syrian authorities postponed planned chemical weapons material removal operations for two weeks in late March 2014 in view of the deterioration in the security situation in the Latakia region. Removal operations resumed on 4 April 2014 and a systematic and regular series of movements was re-established in mid-April 2014.

At the same time, the Syrian Arab Republic had made significant progress eliminating other parts of its chemical weapons programme. This included the destruction of the remaining standard equipment and buildings related to the storage and production of chemical weapons material, aside from the twelve remaining production facilities currently awaiting an OPCW Executive Council Decision on the modalities for destruction.

It is critical for the Syrian Arab Republic to maintain its commitment and determination in ensuring the removal and in-country destruction of the final 7.5% of its declared chemical weapons material, and the timely completion of other remaining activities. This would permit the Syrian Arab Republic to achieve remaining timelines in line with its obligations under Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) and relevant Decisions of the OPCW Executive Council.

Activities towards the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic

Following military confrontations in the north of the Latakia region that began on 21 March 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic authorities informed the Joint Mission that the security situation necessitated the diversion of military forces and the redeployment of security assets previously dedicated to safeguarding the security of chemical weapons material during the course of transport and loading operations at the port of Latakia. In view of this development, the Syrian Arab Republic postponed scheduled movements.

During the initial part of the reporting period, the Syrian Arab Republic continued packing and loading chemical weapons material at storage facilities in preparation for movement to Latakia. At the same time, Syrian personnel conducted internal movements consolidating material from sites deemed vulnerable to attack, by moving them to safer locations. At the request of the Joint Mission, the Syrian Arab Republic also carried out concurrent activities required prior to the closing of each of the twelve chemical weapons storage facilities and eighteen production facilities. These activities included the decontamination of containers with chemical residue and the destruction of remaining standard buildings and equipment. Syrian personnel also destroyed all remaining containers that had previously held sulphur mustard. These operations were subsequently verified by the Joint Mission.

Consequently, by the end of the reporting period, the Joint Mission had verified the closure of eleven of the twelve declared storage facilities, and five of the six production facilities that are not currently under review at the OPCW Executive Council. Notably, the modalities of destructiOn for the remaining twelve production facilities are currently under review by the OPCW Executive Council.

Following the resumption of chemical weapons material removal operations on 4 April 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic had conducted a total of 18 movements until 24 April 2014. During this period, the Syrian Arab Republic reiterated its concerns over the security risks posed by ongoing military confrontations in the north of the Latakia region. Accordingly,_the authorities decided to limit the size of each convoy. Nevertheless, the Syrian Arab Republic achieved the removal of all declared chemical Weapons material with the exception of material held at one site, Where the Government had determined it would not be possible to undertake removal operations due to the prevailing security situation. Some 7.5% of declared chemical weapons material now remains at this one site in the Syrian Arab Republic. This includes high priority and other chemicals, as well as a small percentage of isopropanol which is to be destroyed in-country. The Syrian authorities have recommitted to the removal and destruction of this remaining stockpile as soon as the security situation permits.

Any further postponement in the completion of chemical weapons material removal operations will delay the commencement of outside country destruction activities. This in turn could delay full elimination of the chemical weapons programme as envisioned in the relevant Decisions of the OPCW Executive Council and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). Furthermore, postponement in the'completion of removal operations increases direct and indirect costs to Member States participating in the maritime effort. An early commencement of out-of-country destruction is imperative. The Joint Mission engaged with the Syrian Arab Republic on a continuous basis to provide recommendations to its Syrian counterparts and helped to facilitate progress in furtherance of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). The Special Coordinator remained in close contact with senior Syrian officials underscoring the critical importance of the timely removal of chemical weapons material.

The Joint Mission maintained its operations throughout the reporting period. It conducted sampling and analysis of chemical weapons material, and carried out verification and inspection activities, including final inspections of storage and production facilities. Verification and inspection were carried out physically at sites Where security conditions were conducive, and remotely, using surveillance camera equipment, Where security conditions did not permit. During removal operations, Joint Mission personnel carried out additional verification and inspection activities at the port of embarkation prior to loading the containers onto the cargo vessels.

The Joint Mission continued outreach activities With representatives of contributing Member States, including those assisting in maritime operations. During the reporting period, the Special Coordinator visited Egypt and met with diplomatic representatives in Damascus, Beirut and Nicosia. The Joint Mission continued its engagement with the World Health Organization (WHO) helping to strengthen the hazard response capability of the Syrian Arab Republic, including managing and responding to chemical accidents and mass casualty incidents involving toxic materials.

             Conclusion

As the Syrian conflict continues, significant progress had been made towards the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic, which must reach its successful conclusion as quickly as possible.

It is the responsibility of the Syrian Arab Republic to complete the removal of its entire stockpile of chemical weapons material and ensure the full elimination of its chemical weapons programme on its territory. The continuing the security situation only underscores the importance of expediting the removal of remaining chemical weapons material and the destruction of remaining parts of its chemical weapons programme.

I call once more on Member States to use their influence on all of the parties to the Syrian conflict to abstain from any activity which could directly or indirectly impact the completion of chemical weapons material removal operations and remaining in—country destruction activities, including the safety and security of Joint Mission personnel.

I am concerned about recent reports of allegations regarding the use of toxic chemicals during the course of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. All necessary steps should be taken to establish the facts surrounding these allegations.

A number of Member States have provided significant funds and in-kind contributions towards the removal and destruction of chemical weapons material from the Syrian Arab Republic. This support will be required a while longer to complete remaining removal operations. There may be an additional requirement to support possible destruction activities related to production facilities currently under review in the OPCW Executive Council.

Once again, I Wish to express my appreciation'to the Special Coordinator and the staff of the Joint Mission for working 'under hazardous and challenging circumstances inside the Syrian Arab Republic. The safety and security of the Joint Mission is ultimately the responsibility of the Syrian Arab Republic. It remains amongst my highest concerns. The Joint Mission shall continue to assess the security situation and review its presence on the ground. It shall do so in order to minimise risks and undertake its remaining mandated activities as quickly and safely as possible. '

In the face of the tragedy that has befallen the Syrian people, the timely completion of the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons programme will make a modest, but hopefully meaningful, contribution to peace and security in the country and the Wider region.

I would be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex urgently to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Madam President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Ban Ki-moon

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Ban's report on the implementation of Resolution 2139 / Syria

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (seated, centre) poses for a group photo with Security Council members. 
22 April 2014

IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2139 

Report of the Secretary-General

23 April 2014

(PDF copy with Annexes here)

I. Introduction

1. This second report is submitted pursuant to Paragraph 17 of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014), in which the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to report, every 30 days, on the implementation of the resolution by all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic.

2. The report covers the period 22 March to 21 April 2014. The information contained in the report is based on the limited data available to the United Nations (UN) actors on the ground as well as reports from open sources and Syrian Government sources.

II. Major Developments

A. Political/Military

3. During the reporting period fighting between Government and opposition forces, as

well as between various opposition groups, continued in many parts of Syria. Fighting was particularly intense in Aleppo, Latakia, Dar’a, Homs and Rural Damascus governorates. Clashes also continued in several other parts of the country, including in Hama, Idleb, Ar-Raqqa and Deir -ez-Zor governorates. The conduct of hostilities by all parties to the conflict, including direct and indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian areas, continued to cause deaths and injuries.

4. In Aleppo, fighting escalated with significant shelling and the continued use of other heavy weaponry by Government forces. The use of missiles and rocket launchers by opposition groups resulted in a high number of casualties and injuries. An average of 20 shells and missiles were reported to have fallen daily on neighbourhoods in both eastern and western Aleppo between the end of March and early April. According to Human Rights Watch, which conducted a review of satellite imagery on 22 February, 1 March and 2 April 2014, there is strong evidence to suggest the use by government forces of indiscriminate aerial bombardment and ground attacks of opposition-held neighbourhoods in Aleppo. This reportedly includes over 85 major places impacted since 22 February with damage signatures strongly consistent with the use of improvised barrel and conventional bombs, resulting in the destruction of a vast number of residential buildings. This damage was particularly evident in opposition held neighbourhoods of Masaken Hanano, al Sakhour, Terbet Lala, Helwaniye, Jabal Badro, Al Heidariyya and Owaija.

5. Since 5 April, armed groups have also launched an offensive in the Al-Layramoun and Al-Zahraa neighbourhoods, in north-west Aleppo city, with armed clashes resulting in scores of civilians injured and displaced. In addition, armed clashes between Government and opposition groups in and around Ramousa town on the southern outskirts of Aleppo city have rendered access to the western part of Aleppo irregular since 12 April. Aleppo city is effectively encircled by armed opposition groups. Fighting, especially near the only supply route from Homs, Damascus and the coast into the city, has raised concerns about fuel shortages and rising food prices and other commodities in both western and eastern Aleppo.

6. In Latakia, armed opposition groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham and Ansar al-Sham, launched a major offensive on Kassab town and surrounding areas on 21 March, taking control of the adjacent border crossing with Turkey from the Syrian Government. The fighting reportedly led to the forced displacement of over 7,500 people, many of whom have sought shelter in Latakia city. There have been reports of attacks on civilians, as well as looting of civilian homes and religious sites, including churches, although these remain unconfirmed.

7. In Dar’a Governorate, conflict persisted in locations with a heavy concentration of civilians including displaced people. Reports of a high number of aerial bombardments were reported in Dar’a city, Jasim and Ankhal (north Dar’a); Tassil, Tafs and Mzeireb (southwest); and Tiba and Sayda (east of al-Naseeb border crossing with Jordan). This included, for example, the damaging of grain silos storing 25 tons of wheat in Dar’a on 26 March.

8. Government-controlled cities and towns, including Damascus, were subject to indiscriminate mortar attacks and shelling by armed opposition groups. Between 26 March and 1 April heavily populated areas of Damascus, such as Al Midan, Al Mogambo, Al Sulaymaniya, Al Khaldiya and Nile Street, were attacked with mortars, resulting in secondary and tertiary displacement. In the first week of April alone, over 100 mortars were fired on neighbourhoods of Damascus. Opposition groups shelled residential areas in the city including the districts of Al-Malk, Bab Touma, al-Sadat, al-Kabbas and al-Zablatani.

9. Car bombings and suicide attacks, including against civilians, resulted in further civilian deaths and injuries. In particular, multiple instances of vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) were reported in the governorates of Idleb, Dar’a, Al-Hasakeh, Latakia and Homs. For example, according to open sources, on 9 April at least 25 people, including women and children, were killed and another 100 were wounded when two car bombs exploded in the Karam al-Luz district, a predominantly Alawite neighbourhood of Homs city. Two volunteers from the Syrian Arab Red Crescent were among the injured as they arrived in an ambulance to treat people hurt by the initial blast.

10. Fighting near the Khan Danoun Palestinian Refugee camp, in south Damascus, resulted in a number of deaths and injuries of Palestine refugees. Several buildings and a mosque were also damaged. Four Palestinians were taken hostage by armed opposition groups and are still missing. After several hours of fighting the armed groups withdrew from the camp.

UN Secretary General's updated report on Western Sahara

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara

Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2099 (2013), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April 2014 and requested the Secretary-General to provide a report to it on the situation in Western Sahara well before the end of the mandate period. It covers developments since my report dated 8 April 2013 (S/2013/220) and describes the situation on the ground, the status and progress of the negotiations and the existing challenges to the Mission’s operations, as requested by the Council in its resolution 2099 (2013).

Recent developments

2. The situation in Western Sahara, as it presents itself to MINURSO, is generally calm. The ceasefire continues to hold and the people can live without fear of a resumption of armed conflict in the medium term.

3. That part of Western Sahara under control of Morocco, west of the berm marking the ceasefire line, continued to witness considerable Moroccan investment in infrastructure and in the social and cultural sphere. Public life proceeded peacefully, and holidays brought large numbers of people into the streets, generally without incident. This was at least in part due to the extensive presence of security forces.

4. An increased number of delegations from foreign legislatures and diplomatic missions, as well as governmental and non-governmental institutions and journalists, visited the western part of the Territory. Moroccan authorities showed increased openness to and engagement with such visits, although on occasion visitors deemed hostile to Moroccan interests were denied access to or expelled from the Territory.

5. Some underlying discontent, however, remained perceptible among the Saharan population, expressing itself in sporadic demonstrations in Laayoune and other towns in the western part of the Territory throughout the reporting period. These were usually small in scale, but at times the participation of up to 300 demonstrators was reported. These demonstrations aimed at drawing attention to human rights concerns, socioeconomic issues and political demands, including the right to self-determination. They were swiftly dispersed by Moroccan security forces. On most such occasions, there were credible reports of heavy-handedness on the part of security forces, as well as violence, such as stone-throwing, on the part of demonstrators. At times, the regional offices of the Moroccan National Human Rights Council (Conseil national des droits de l’homme) in Laayoune and Dakhla deployed observers and tried to defuse tensions and prevent clashes.